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Recommendations of the Committee of Independent Experts
Chapter 2
A genuine contracting philosophy, a remodelled legislative, regulatory, and budgetary frame
of  reference, and greater responsibility entrusted to authorising officers should help to
restore order to the Commission’s management, in which the most disturbing anomalies have
been brought to light by the TAO phenomenon.
Recommendation 1
The Commission should treat contracts as a whole as a priority in their own right in order to
make for the utmost transparency. Instructions should be laid down and proper training
provided. Community public procurement law is marred by a jumble of disparate source texts.
Its codification is a matter to be studied, without seeking to overregulate, but rather to achieve
rationalisation to facilitate the work of practitioners (see 2.1.17).
Recommendation 2
Given that it is not suited to the requirements of modern management and effective
supervision, the Financial Regulation is in need to fundamental revision. In any event, it
should form part of a clear-cut hierarchy of Community acts and be confined to the essential
principles which all institutions must observe. As regards the details, it should make reference
to specific rules applying to each institution (see Chapter 2 as a whole).
Recommendation 3
Conclusion of a contract – following an invitation to tender or by a negotiated procedure –
funding of a project under the heading of external aid, or award of a subsidy are different
forms of disbursement of Community moneys. The Financial Regulation should accordingly
lay down the basic rules to be observed by all institutions, namely transparent decision-
making, non-discrimination,  and ex post assessment of use, and dispel the fundamental
confusion as regards contracts. The concept of a contract and the different types of contracts
should be spelled out (see 2.1.21 ff.).
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Recommendation 4
The present budget nomenclature, based on the distinction necessitated by the Financial
Regulation between Part A (administrative expenditure) and Part B (operating expenditure) is
impracticable. It is frequently circumvented when appropriations are earmarked under the
budget. A nomenclature based on policies whereby the aggregate cost of the latter would be
specified and the various expenditure assigned for a given purpose would be identified
according to its nature must be established in order to facilitate assessment and enable the
budgetary authority to exercise complete supervision (see 2.1.15 to 2.1.19).
Recommendation 5
Expenditure under the heading of  cooperation with non-member countries is at present a self-
contained, chaotic area, given the numerous and diverse legal rules by which it is governed.
The principles deriving from Community Directives must apply not only to the public
contracts awarded by the Commission itself, but also to those it awards as the agent of
external recipients of Community funds (see 2.1.33 to 2.1.35).
Recommendation 6
Rules must be laid down to govern subsidies. Since they entail a quid pro quo, and are
awarded for that reason, they should be treated in the same way as contracts as regards the
award procedure (putting up for tender), supervision (consideration by the CCAM), and
administration (monitoring by means of databases) (see 2.1.40).
Recommendation 7
The serious gap in terms of the membership of the assessment committee has to be remedied
(see 2.1.28).
Recommendation 8
Intellectual service contracts must be systematically planned. Human and financial resources
should not be scattered over a myriad of contracts too small to be overseen, the different
procedures must be properly understood, accurate definition of the subject of the contract
should be treated as a matter of crucial importance, and the Commission must have the means
to monitor the proper execution of contracts (see 2.2.17 to 2.2.48).
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Recommendation 9
The Commission should ask its contractors and special interest groups, where applicable, to
specify the membership of their board of directors and the identity of their shareholders. Both
to educate them and to treat them absolutely equally, it must allow unsuccessful bidders to
consult the documents relating to a tender procedure (see 2.2.36 to 2.2.38 and 2.2.60 to
2.2.63).
Recommendation 10
Authorising officers must be responsible, consider themselves responsible, and held
responsible. Their role should be enhanced, for instance by offering them the necessary
guarantees of independence, or indeed certain career advantages, and all the requisite training
and information. Their disciplinary and financial liability must not remain a purely theoretical
possibility. The fact that a decision to commit expenditure is separate from the signing of the
commitment proposal runs counter to a sense of responsibility. The authorising officer and the
signatory to a contract (the only instrument legally binding on the Commission in relation to
third parties, whereas commitment is merely an internal decision) must be, if not one and the
same person, at any rate close associates (see 2.2.49 to 2.2.59).
Recommendation 11
The Commission, or a Member whom it has empowered to act, must be debarred from acting
as authorising officers (see 2.2.58).
Recommendation 12
Authorising officers should be advised more extensively where contracts are concerned. The
Central Contracts Unit, recently set up by the Commission, should accordingly be equipped
with increased human resources in order to provide the necessary prior assistance to
authorising officers to help them compile the requisite documents and thereafter monitor the
execution of the main contracts and draw the appropriate conclusions to enable constant
adjustments to be made to the rules. The unit thus needs to be acquainted, through the
Advisory Committee on Procurements and Contracts (CCAM), with the most important or
typical contracts. Its representatives should therefore serve on the committee and constitute
the principal technical element (see 2.2.75 to 2.2.77).
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Recommendation 13
The CCAM, which at present does no more than carry out near-routine implementation
checks and is slowing down what is already an excessively cumbersome procedure, has to be
reformed. Very strict limits should be imposed on the number of matters considered. Draft
contracts should be selected under the personal responsibility of the chairman of the CCAM,
assisted by the secretariats of the committee and the Central Contracts Unit, working in
synergy. Contracts not selected must be abandoned immediately, and, instead, those few
matters deemed to serve as example should be studied in depth. In hierarchical terms, CCAM
meetings should take place at a sufficiently high level, but not so high that full members
would more often than not be prevented from attending. The CCAM must be constituted as a
joint body in order to provide a forum for dialogue between administrative and operating
DGs. Opinion thresholds should be raised substantially, broadly according to the types of
contracts (see 2.2.78 to 2.2.98).
Recommendation 14
The Commission must finally equip itself with a central database for contracts and
contractors. If this cannot be done under the SINCOM system, the central departments should
consider the alternatives (expansion of the CCAM database) in collaboration with the
authorising officers (see 2.2.64. to 2.2.73).
Recommendation 15
Since the Commission’s management tasks are increasing in both number and range and the
complement of officials cannot be expanded continuously to tackle them, a policy of
outsourcing should be pursued. The use of private sector resources should be regulated so as
to meet the requirements of public service. In addition, the committee believes that
implementing agencies under the exclusive control of the Commission is an option deserving
thorough consideration (see the entire section 2.3).
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Chapter 3
The extreme complexity of the legislation renders the EAGGF Guarantee section vulnerable
to fraud and makes its control very difficult. The control of EAGGF Guarantee expenditure
remains an important current issue despite the gradual reduction in the EAGGF Guarantee
section’s percentage share of the total Community budget. Sensitive sectors such as export
refunds and direct income support are also key sectors which merit the Commission’s
particular attention. The recent clarification of the respective responsibilities of the
Commission and the Member States for payments and control may have a positive impact if
given the correct follow-up. The clearance of the accounts with the Member States is the final,
overall management act by the Commission in its exercise of control over expenditure by the
Member States under the Commission’s responsibility. The findings of the Court of Auditors
annual Statements of Assurance suggest that there should be an increase in the amounts
recovered through the Clearance of Accounts.
Recommendation 16
All decisions taken by the Commission in the EAGGF Guarantee area, either as an
administration or as a college, must be taken in conditions of complete independence. The
Commission must ensure that the Clearance of Accounts unit can work independently and
without being subject to any inappropriate external or internal pressure or influence (3.12.3.-
4).
Recommendation 17
The Commission should ensure a more stringent application of the provisions of Regulations
1287/95 and 1663/95 which deal with the accreditation of paying agencies and the
certification of their accounts (3.9.8.-3.9.10).
Recommendation 18
The Commission should make full use of its right of on-the-spot controls in the Member
States for accounting and compliance clearance and exclude from the certified accounts those
amounts relating to accounting errors and underlying transactions which are irregular
(3.10.6.).
Recommendation 19
Where systematic weaknesses are found higher rates of flat rate correction for the amounts to
be recovered should be applied (3.8.6., 3.12.2.)
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Recommendation 20
There remains scope to recover greater amounts through a reinforced clearance effort. To this
end the Clearance of Accounts unit needs a further increase in staff to allow a wider coverage
each year and checks through to the level of the final beneficiary. It should set a target for
amounts recovered linked to the error rates found by the Court of Auditors in its annual
Statements of Assurance ((3.12.2.).
Recommendation 21
Interest should be charged by the Commission from the date of payment by the paying agency
on those amounts recovered which have been subject to the conciliation procedure (3.11.1-
3.11.5-6).
Recommendation 22
The threshold for amounts in dispute which can be presented to the Conciliation body should
be increased if need be by expressing it as a fraction of the value of the average transaction in
each Member State (3.11.3.).
Recommendation 23
The Commission should seek to reduce the length of time taken in the clearance procedure by
reducing the number of steps and in particular the number of distinct occasions which
Member States have to comment on proposed recoveries and the Commission’s observations
leading to them (3.10.9.).
Recommendation 24
The Commission should ensure that the cycle of Clearance of Accounts’ inspection of market
and direct payment regimes is short enough to guarantee that all major areas are covered in a
24 month period in view of article 1 of Regulation 1663/95 (3.10.7.).
Recommendation 25
In the new system the compliance clearance decisions can refer to transactions in different
years. The Commission should therefore ensure that in the interests of transparency its records
and reporting show how much is recovered through compliance clearance for payments made
for each accounting year (3.10.5.-8).
Recommendation 26
The Commission should pay particular attention to the area of export refunds differentiated by
destination and ensure that guarantees are recovered in full when frauds are uncovered
(3.13.2-5).
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Recommendation 27
The Commission should give priority to ensuring the proper implementation and correct
application of the Integrated administrative and control system (IACS) (3.13.6-7).
The size of the Structural Funds means that day-to-day control of expenditure must be
exercised by the Member States. The fact that the division of responsibilities between the
Commission and the Member States has recently been clarified in legislation does not mean
that the right balance in the division of responsibilities has been struck. A certain number of
factors tend to divest the Member States of responsibility. The Commission must ensure that
the Member States have put in place effective control systems.
Recommendation 28
There has to be a strengthening of control within the Commission through reinforced internal
control units in the Directorates General. This is necessary to avoid the Commission being
almost entirely dependent on the Member States for information on implementation and
irregularities and the subsequent possibilities of pursuing these. This recommendation accords
with proposals made in Chapter 4 of this report concerning decentralised financial control and
modern internal and professional auditing (3.17.2-9).
Recommendation 29
Checks by the Commission in the Member States must be reinforced both in number and in
quality, that is to say they should go beyond checks which lead simply to the provision of
advice by the Commission and an exchange of views. Checks should be designed to result in
the detection of irregularities and consequently in financial corrections. They should be most
frequent in countries and regions with relatively weak administrative structures. This implies
more Commission resources devoted to control in the Member States This implies stronger
and more effective control by the Commission of such structures in all the Member States
(3.17.2-9).
Recommendation 30
The number of administrative units involved in the management of the Structural Funds
should  be decreased and not increased. To this end the EAGGF Guarantee Directorates in
DG 6 should have no role in rural development measures which should be left to the
Guidance Directorates. The Committee’s view is that only one Directorate General should
have responsibility for the new objectives 1 and 2 (3.21.1.-2).
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Recommendation 31
The use of diverse national rules to determine project eligibility if compatible with the
provisions of the Treaties, should be carefully monitored by the Commission to ensure
equality of treatment in respect of Structural Fund assistance for all citizens of the Union.
Where the national rules cannot ensure this then the Commission should come forward with
one or more additional eligibility datasheets to function as guidance notes (3.18.5.).
Recommendation 32
The Commission should refuse to accept over-declarations for reimbursement from Member
States and return them for proper presentation (over-declaration occurs where Member States
in claiming submit more expenditure than their entitlement leaving to the Commission the
task of  selecting eligible expenditure from within this larger sum). It is the Member State’s
responsibility to present its claims for payment in a transparent and detailed way so that all
parties can be satisfied that the expenditure concerned was eligible and its effects can be
evaluated (3.18.1.-4).
Recommendation 33
Member States should inform the Commission of all project substitutions and their value. The
Commission should systematically retain this information to form an overview of the integrity
and coherence of the programmes. Member States should prepare for comparison the initial
proposal without substitutions with the final outcome with substitutions. This would allow the
Commission to intervene to assess certain instances of re-use and to ensure it may recover
sums unduly paid from the Community budget(3.18.1-4).
Recommendation 34
If the reforms refered above at paragraphs 3.24.1. and 3.24.6. were not to be implemented, the
Commission should take the initiative by preparing a distinct legislative proposal.
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Chapter 4
The existence of a procedure whereby all transactions must receive the explicit prior approval
of a separate financial control service has been a major factor in relieving Commission
managers of a sense of personal responsibility for the operations they authorise while at the
same time doing little or nothing to prevent serious irregularities of the sort analysed in the
Committee’s First Report.  Moreover, the combination of this function with a (weak) internal
audit function in a single directorate-general gives rise to potential conflicts of interest on the
part of the Financial Controller.  Thus a serious rethink of both internal control and internal
audit is necessary.
Recommendation 35
A professional and independent Internal Audit Service, the competences and activities of
which should be based upon the relevant international standards (Institute of Internal
Auditors), should be established, reporting directly to the President of the Commission. The
centralised pre-audit function in DG XX should be dispensed with and internal control - as an
integrated part of line responsibility - decentralised to the directorates-general.  One of the
principal tasks of the proposed Internal Audit Service should be to audit the efficiency and
effectiveness of these decentralised control systems.  (c.f. Recommendation 49 below) (4.7.1-
2, 4.9.8, 4.13.3, 7)
Recommendation 36
Chains of delegation should be made clear and explicit: every subordinate manager is
responsible and accountable for internal control in his/her field of responsibility. It is for the
director-general (and heads of independent services) to assume (overall) responsibility for all
operational matters in her/his directorate-general or service, including for internal control. The
chain of delegation begins at the level of the Commission through the commissioner.  She or
he thus holds ultimate managerial responsibility for all financial matters, including for
financial control, and political responsibility as a member of the College. (4.9.5-9)
Recommendation 37
Each directorate-general should have at its disposal two basic prerequisites for effective
financial management : (i) a specialised internal control function, exercised under the
responsibility of a senior official reporting directly to the director-general; (ii) an accounting
function, exercised under the responsibility of a delegated accounting officer.  The latter
would work under the functional supervision of the Commission’s accounting officer, but be
responsible for keeping the accounts and processing the financial operations exclusively of
the directorate-general in which it is located.
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Recommendation 38
Each directorate-general should produce its own annual financial report and accounts, audited
by the Commission’s internal auditor, including both financial information and a wider review
of the directorate-general’s activities. These reports should be examined first by the
Commission, which should then submit them to the competent institutions as part of the
discharge procedure.  (4.9.13-17)
Recommendation 39
The Internal Audit Service should act under the responsibility and authority of the President
of the Commission, independently of any other Commission service. It should above all be a
diagnostic tool in the hands of the President, enabling him/her to identify structural and
organisational weaknesses in the Commission.  The competences, objectives, powers and
status of this Service should be set out in a basic founding document (a “charter”) The work
programme of the Internal Audit Service should ensure periodic coverage of all Commission
activities.  It should however leave headroom for additional ad hoc audit tasks to be carried
out at the request of the President and/or on the basis of needs arising.  (4.13.3, 7, 9)
Recommendation 40
The Head of the Internal Audit Service should be a highly qualified and experienced member
of the auditing profession, recruited specifically for this task.  S/he should hold and
administrative grade equivalent to that of a director general.  The Head of the Internal Audit
Service, though reporting to the President, should enjoy full independence as to the conduct of
audits, the maintenance of professional standards, the contents of reports, etc. (4.13.8)
Recommendation 41
The internal contradictory procedure between the Internal Audit Service and its auditees
should last at most one month, whereafter publication of the audit report should take place at
the discretion of the Head of the Internal Audit Service.  (4.13.11-12)
Recommendation 42
The President of the Commission should present to the Commission each year an annual
report of the Internal Audit Service, outlining its activities, principal findings and the action
taken, or to be taken, by the President as a result.  This report should be made public.
(4.13.13-14)
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Recommendation 43
All audit reports of the Internal Audit Service should be sent to the Court of Auditors.
Additionally, all data collected by the Service, all preparatory work and audit findings should
be available to the Court and be of sufficient professional quality to be used by it. (4.13.15)
Recommendation 44
The present General Inspectorate of Services (IGS) should be integrated into the new Internal
Audit Service.
Recommendation 45
A central specialised unit, responsible for the formulation and oversight of financial
procedures and internal control mechanisms should be constituted within DG XIX.  This body
should have no role in individual transactions (though it could, in difficult cases, offer
advice), but should establish Commission-wide procedures and ground rules for financial
management and monitor their application. (4.9.1-3)
Recommendation 46
All officials involved in financial procedures should undergo compulsory and regular training
in the rules and techniques applying to financial management as a precondition of being
allocated such work. (4.9.1-2, 4, 11)
Recommendation 47
The formal aspects of financial transactions should be verified by the delegated accounting
officer.  Any objections should be referred back to the authorising officer, who should decide,
on his/her own responsibility, whether to overrule the objections and proceed with the
operation. (4.9.12)
Recommendation 48
A new and specific administrative procedure should be established, governed by (an
amended) Title V of the Financial Regulation, designed formally to establish the individual
responsibilities and/or liabilities of authorising officers in respect of financial errors and
irregularities.  To this end, a new Financial Irregularities Committee would deliberate on the
basis of reports from the Commission’s internal auditor.  Disciplinary or other action could
follow if necessary. (4.9.18-28)
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Recommendation 49
In the light of the foregoing recommendations, the existing DG XX no longer has any reason
to exist.  DG XX staff qualified for audit work should be redeployed to the new Internal Audit
Service, while other staff should be redeployed, as needed, to other Commission services,
notably those requiring expertise in financial procedures.  (4.15.1-2)
Recommendation 50
The Court of Auditors could seek to obtain a more constructive reaction on the part of the
Commission to its audit observations through greater recourse to department-based auditing,
presenting its observations in a more analytical style, giving an overview of the situation it
encountered and placing greater emphasis on the management needs of the Commission.
(4.16.4)
Recommendation 51
It would be helpful if the Court were able in its Statement of Assurance (“DAS”) to indicate
with greater precision which sectors, systems and procedures, and, in the case of shared
management, which  Member States, are mainly affected by errors, and the nature of the
errors concerned. (4.16.5)
Recommendation 52
The duration of the contradictory procedure between the Court of Auditors and the
Commission (and other auditees) should be considerably shortened.  The process should not
assume the nature of a negotiation on the severity or otherwise of the Court’s observations but
seek only to establish the facts.  The underlying purpose of the Court’s audits should be to
identify the remedial management action required in the Commission to address the issues
identified by the Court (4.16.7).
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Chapter 5
The Committee found that the current legal framework for combating fraud against the
financial interests of the European Communities is as yet incoherent and incomplete, largely
because the Commission (i.e. UCLAF/OLAF) possesses only administrative law powers and
competences, which however have important implications in the area of criminal law.  Thus
the existing framework (i) fails to recognise and accommodate the true nature of
UCLAF/OLAF, (ii) leaves the legal instruments for the investigation, prosecution and
punishment of fraud ineffective and (iii) fails to provide sufficient guarantees of individual
liberties.
Recommendation 53
The independence of OLAF vis-à-vis the Commission in particular must be and remain a
fundamental point of principle if the organisation is to play its role, which is substantially of
criminal investigation, fairly and effectively. (5.11.4-8)
Recommendation 54
OLAF must earn the respect, and thus wholehearted cooperation, both of EU institutions and
personnel and of Member States’ investigative and judicial authorities through ensuring that
its inquiries are – and are seen to be – independent, rigorous, objective, procedurally correct,
reasonably rapid and ultimately productive of results. (5.9.4-7)
Recommendation 55
OLAF’s activities must be subject to the supervision of a judicial authority  in order to
guarantee due legal process in the course of investigations and the protection of the civil
rights of persons affected, directly or indirectly, by inquiries.  In this context, the existing
Supervisory Committee of OLAF, though fulfilling a useful transitional role, cannot be
considered adequate and should be replaced by a special chamber of the Court of First
Instance created for this purpose (and, on appeal, also by a chamber of the Court of Justice).
(5.12.5-5.12.9)
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Recommendation 56
With a view to its role as a central data and criminal intelligence collation point, OLAF must
take action to overcome the failings of UCLAF (identified by the Court of Auditors in
particular) in the exploitation of information technology.  While respecting the data protection
requirements of Community and Member State legislation, it should also do the utmost to
maximise the potential synergies with national authorities and with Europol in this area (5.9.5,
5.11.10)
Recommendation 57
OLAF must possess adequate human resources to deal with its case-load at least as effectively
as an equivalent Member State service.  It should also ensure that certain lacunae in the
staffing of UCLAF are remedied, notably through the recruitment of adequate specialist
expertise, beyond its core investigative personnel, in the fields of (a) auditing, especially
“forensic accountancy”, (b) information technology, (c) prosecution and (d) judicial
procedures in Member States.  All OLAF staff should moreover be selected strictly on the
basis of their suitability for OLAF’s purposes, which should preclude any “automatic”
transfer of UCLAF staff to the new organisation. (5.11.9-13)
Recommendation 58
In preparation for the introduction of the new legal framework described hereafter, the
Member States should (i) ratify the Convention on the protection of the financial interests of
the European Communities (ii) further develop common definitions of relevant criminal
offences and procedures, and (iii) formally agree common standards of criminal investigation
within the context of the European Convention on Human Rights (5.13.2)
Recommendation 59
With the foregoing principles in mind, the Committee recommends a three-stage introduction
of a new legal framework for the prosecution and punishment of criminal offences affecting
the financial interests of the European Communities in accordance with the proposal set out in
this report (section 5.13), summarised as follows:
• Stage 1: Appointment of an independent European Public Prosecutor (EPP).  The EPP
would hold unrestricted jurisdiction (i.e. without the obstacle of official immunity or
confidentiality) for offences committed by  members and officials of EU institutions and
bodies.  S/he would work closely with the Director of OLAF and prepare prosecutions as
appropriate. Prosecutions would be referred to the appropriate national court.  The legality
of OLAF investigations and of EPP decisions would be supervised by a special chamber
of the Court of First Instance (5.13.4)
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• Stage 2: Creation in each Member State of a national Prosecution Office for European
Offences (POEO) which would be competent for its entire territory.  A POEO would be
established within each national prosecution service specifically to deal with cases wholly
or partially affecting the financial interests of the European Communities.  POEOs would
act through national police forces and before national criminal courts in conformity with
national criminal procedure. The legality of the POEO’s activities would be supervised in
each Member State by a single court, the same court at which it is located.  (5.13.5, 7) The
EPP would receive from OLAF all information liable to give rise to criminal proceedings
and be responsible for referring it, with appropriate advice, to the appropriate POEO.  The
EPP would moreover act as liaison between the POEOs of different Member States,
notably advising them on possible conflicts of jurisdiction on cases involving more than
one Member State and making recommendations for their resolution.  The EPP would
report annually to the EU institutions on its activities and on the action taken by the
POEOs as a result of its recommendations. (5.13.6)
• Stage 3:  Creation, on the basis of the EPP and POEOs, of a single, indivisible European
Prosecution Office (EPO) with delegated public prosecutors in the Member States holding
jurisdiction for all offences affecting the financial interests of the European Communities.
The EPO would operate through OLAF and national investigation units.  In terms of EU
fraud, this stage of the reform would create the single “area of freedom, security and
justice” foreseen by the Treaty (TEU Art. 29) (5.13.7)
Recommendation 60
Preparation of the three-stage introduction of a new legal framework should begin
immediately and implementation achieved within the following timescale:
First stage: within one year
Second stage: as soon as possible thereafter,
Third stage: to be agreed at the next Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), or at an ad hoc
IGC shortly thereafter.  (5.13.9-10)
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Chapter 6
An in-depth reform of Staff policy is required. Practices and procedures must be changed in
order to ensure that the Commission can operate effectively and retain its traditional role as
the driving force behind European integration. What is really required is not an overhaul of
the Staff Regulations themselves, but simply correct application of the rules and principles set
out therein.
The Commission should vigorously enforce the principle of the recognition of merit. This will
improve standards throughout the organisation, which will in turn serve as an example to all
and lead to a positive atmosphere at all levels of the hierarchy.
With this in mind the Commission should formulate a dynamic careers policy so as to foster
greater commitment and ambition in its staf and head off all risk of stagnation.
Recommendation 61
Proper social and trade union relations within the Commission are essential The
Adminsitration must recognise the role played by the trade unions, but the latter must in turn
avoid any temptation to set up a kind of alternative hierarchy and must focus on the
responsibilities they exercise which are crucial to the success of the plan to change and
modernise the European civil services (62.34-38).
Recommendation 62
The significnce of national balances within the Commission should be reduced by: designing
professional training courses in such a way as to strengthen the ‘European’ nature of the civil
service in the institutions; encouraging the genunie ‘multinationalisation’ of Commissioners’
cabinets; reconsidering the number of tasks and their distribution among the Directorates-
General, according to real needs, rather than national balances; making ‘national quotas’ more
flexible; and rotating staff more frequently (6.2.18-33).
Recommendation 63
Training an professional conversion should be seen as an ongoing process, starting with the
probationary period and forming a regular, compulsory element throughout an official’s
career. The Commission should step up the financial resources allocated to training measures
(6.3.6.-14).
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Recommendation 64
Mobility should be encouraged and no exceptions should be made. It should be made
compulsory to change posts at the end of a given period of time. This means that flexibility is
a quality which is valued and rewarded in terms of promotion. Furthermore, mobility should
be an  essential precondition for duties involving leadership or management of staff ( 6.3.15-
18).
Recommendation 65
Empowerment of staff requires that everyone’s duties should be clearly defined and that the
efforts made and the results obtained by each official in carrying out the duties allocated to
him are recognised, encouraged and rewarded (6.3.19-22)
Recommendation 66
Decentralisation plays an important role in enhancing the sense of responsibility felt by staff.
However, the tasks that are decentralised must be clearly defined and effective.  Thus the
practice of creating or maintaining posts with no real responsibilities (or corresponding
workload) should be regarded as contrary not only to the rationality and effectiveness of the
system but also to the principle of empowerment.  Decentralisation should not become
synonymous with confusion. The process of decentralisation must be accompanied by a
reinforcement of programming and internal coordination and genuine leadership must be
exercised (6.3.23-25).
Recommendation 67
The practice under which ‘other servants’ of the Commission – in particular, temporary staff –
have ‘permanent temporary status’ should be brought to an end. Temporary staff should be
appointed to permanent posts, which would oblige them under the Staff Regulations to leave
within three years. At the same time, the list of temporary posts should be gradually
reduced.(6.4.22-27).
Recommendation 68
The use of external help should be reduced so as to decrease the institution’s dependence on
external staff, who should be used only in exceptional circumstances, on the basis of better-
regulated conditions and procedures.(6.428-41).
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Recommendation 69
The system of open competitions for the recruitment of Commission staff should be
thoroughly reviewed, since the number of candidates has increased considerably over time
and the procedures followed have proved inadequate. One might consider decentralising pre-
selection tests in each Member State, and extending the practice of holding specialist
competitions with more precise job descriptions, and holding competitions for each language.
In order to eliminate the lack of transparency in practice which occurs between drawing up
the reserve list and recruitment, a list of candidates who have passed a competition should be
published in order of merit reflecting the results of the competition. Any divergence from the
order on the list when the actual recruitment takes place should be justified and made public.
Internal competitions for the establishment of temporary staff should be abolished. On the
other hand, internal competitions to enable officials to move from one category to another
should be retained. (6.5.4-25)
Recommendation 70
A reform of the staff reports and promotions system is necessary in order to  restore the
credibility of the selection process and the career structure. To that end there is a need to
strengthen the assessment culture, review the form of the reports and simplify their headings,
draw more specific and balanced assessment criteria, award more clearly differentiated marks
and provide more detailed comments with better justifications, and encourage more active and
responsible participation by the officials concerned.
One might even consider a system of internal competitions for a limited number of available
posts, particularly for professional and managerial staff, whose appointments are decided
upon by a flexible procedure which is thus open to dangers of favouritism. This competition,
based on qualifications and examinations, and carried out by external selection boards or
chaired by an external examiner, would the most ambitious and motivated officials an
alternative means of trying their chances other than promotion under the Staff regulations.
(6.5.28-42.)
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Recommendation 71
Over the years rather serious shortcomings have been revealed in the appointment of senior
officials (A1 and A2). It is essential to establish rules, or at least a code of conduct, for their
recruitment. As for national balances, one might consider gradually increasing the flexibility
of quotas, placing a time-limit on the term of office, or banning the appointment of a
successor of the same nationality. As for the recruitment arrangements, more rigorous
selection criteria and more transparent procedures should be introduced within these quotas.
Although improvements will have to be made later, as regards the procedure to be followed,
and the criteria and arrangements for selection, the Committee considers that the reforms
envisaged by the new Commission are a step in the right direction (6.5.43-58).
Recommendation 72
Professional incompetence should be the subject of a more clear and precise system of rules.
A procedure distinct from the one for disciplinary hearings should be introduced (6.5.61-66).
Recommendation 73
Practice in the field of disciplinary responsibility should be amended. It has shown severe
limitations in terms of effectiveness and speed, with negative consequences for the European
civil service and its image.
In particular:
• the rules on the formal conditions and procedural arrangements, as well as the protection
of individual rights, should be specified;
• the membership of the disciplinary board should be much more stable and less internal to
the Commission, particularly its chairman. An inter-institutional disciplinary board might
also be a possibility. The idea of entrusting the part of the procedure which currently takes
place before the disciplinary board to an external body should also be considered,
particularly as regards the higher grades ;
• a member of the Appointing Authority should be involved in the work of  the disciplinary
board, at least for all the stages of the procedure at which the official and/or his
representative are present;
• disciplinary scales setting out a relatively standard correspondence between errors and
penalties should be set to prevent widely diverging penalties from being imposed for
identical failings (6.6.11-34).
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Chapter 7
The Committee considered that the codes of conduct elaborated by the Commission remain
insufficient and are not yet backed up by the necessary legal framework.  The attribution of
responsibilities and chain of delegation between the Commission, single commissioners and
the departments are ill-defined and ill-understood by those concerned.  Finally, the concepts
of political responsibility and accountability remain unclear and the mechanisms for their
practical application inadequate.
Recommendation 74
The code of conduct for commissioners should redefine the concept of collective
responsibility to encompass not only a prohibition on calling into question decisions adopted
by the college, but also the right and the obligation of each commissioner to keep him/herself
fully appraised of the activities of every other commissioner and to take action in this respect
as necessary, for example by having frank and open discussions with other commissioners
both inside and outside the college. (7.5.1-4, 7.10.1-2)
Recommendation 75
Commissioners’ cabinets should be limited to a maximum of six category-A officials.  The
commissioner must ensure that the cabinet is multi-national in character and rules must be
introduced to exclude any unduly favourable treatment of cabinet members at the end of their
service. (7.5.7-8)
Recommendation 76
Clear rules should be established as to the applicable criteria to the appointment of individuals
to commissioners’ cabinets, with a particular view to eliminating the possibility of
favouritism based on personal relationships.  Full transparency as to any personal relationship
between a commissioner and a member of  his/her cabinet must be ensured. (7.5.9-10)
Recommendation 77
Commissioners who use undue influence to favour fellow nationals or wider national interests
in any sector for which they are competent are in serious breach of their obligation of
independence, and should be subject to an appropriate sanction. (7.5.9-10)
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Recommendation 78
Commissioners must carry out their duties with complete political neutrality.  They should not
be permitted to hold office in any political organisation during their term of office.  (7.5.11-
12)
Recommendation 79
The Commission must establish clear internal guidelines – to be made public – designed to
ensure maximum openness and transparency as to acts and decisions of the Commission once
taken and the processes by which they were arrived at. (7.6.3-7)
Recommendation 80
The rights and obligations of officials to report instances of suspected criminal acts and other
reprehensible behaviour to the appropriate authorities outside the Commission should be
established in the Staff Regulations and the necessary mechanisms put in place. The Staff
Regulations should also protect whistleblowers who respect their obligations in this regard
from undue adverse consequences of their action. (7.6.8-11)
Recommendation 81
An independent standing “Committee on Standards in Public Life” should be created by
interinstutional agreement to formulate, supervise and, where necessary, provide advice on
ethics and standards of conduct in the European institutions.  This Committee on Standards
should approve the specific codes of conduct established by each institution. (7.7.1-5)
Recommendation 82
All Commission staff should undergo professional training aimed at raising awareness of
ethical issues and providing guidance, from both a personal and management perspective, on
how to deal with practical situations as they arise. (7.7.6-9)Recommendation 82(7
The code of conduct on commissioners and their departments should establish that each
commissioner is responsible both for policy formulation and the implementation of policy by
his/her department(s).  The commissioner shall therefore be answerable to the Commission as
a whole for the actions of the department(s), and accountable to the European Parliament.
Officials in departments shall answer to their director-generals, which shall in turn be
accountable to the competent commissioner. (7.9.1-9)
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Recommendation 83
The Secretary General should be considered as the prime interface between the political and
administrative levels of the Commission.  He/she should above all ensure that decisions of the
Commission are effectively followed up by the administration. (7.11.1)
Recommendation 84
Members of cabinets should not be permitted to speak on behalf of their commissioners.  The
primary function of cabinets is to provide information and to facilitate communication
vertically (between the commissioner and the services) and horizontally (between
commissioners).  In neither case should the cabinet prevent direct communication with the
commissioner, but rather stimulate such communication. (7.12.1-6)
Recommendation 85
The Commission is accountable to the European Parliament.  To this end, it is under a
constitutional duty to be fully open with Parliament, providing it with the complete, accurate
and truthful information and documentation necessary for Parliament to carry out its
institutional role, notably in the context of the discharge procedure and in connection with
committees of inquiry.  Access to information and documentation should only be refused in
exceptional, duly motivated circumstances and in accordance with procedures agreed between
the institutions. (7.14.1-13)
Recommendation 86
The enforcement of the individual political responsibility of commissioners should be a
matter for the President of the Commission.  The President should be empowered to dismiss
individual commissioners, modify the attribution of responsibilities between them or take any
other measure in respect of the composition or organisation of the Commission he/she deems
necessary to enforce political responsibility.  The President of the Commission shall be
accountable to the European Parliament for any action (or inaction) in this context.  These
powers of the President should be made explicit in the Treaties, but, until this is possible, all
commissioners should agree to abide by these principles. (7.14.16-22)
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Recommendation 87
Any commissioner who knowingly misleads Parliament, or omits to correct at the earliest
opportunity inadvertently erroneous information provided to Parliament should be expected to
offer his/her resignation from the Commission.  In the absence of an offer of resignation, the
president of the Commission should take appropriate action. (7.14.14)
Recommendation 88
The Council should give greater political priority to the preparation of its annual
recommendation to the European Parliament on discharge, as this would reinforce the
political status of the prime institutional mechanism whereby the Commission is held
accountable for financial management. (7.15.8-9)
Recommendation 89
Council and Parliament should be bound by the principle of budgetary discipline to take into
account the resource requirements attached to any policy initiative they request from the
Commission.  The Commission should be able to refuse to assume any new tasks for which
administrative resources are not available and cannot be provided through redeployment.
(7.15.10)
Recommendation 90
The management of Community programmes, and in particular all questions of financial
management are the sole responsibility of the Commission.  Committees composed of
Member State representatives should not therefore be empowered to take any decision
relating to the ongoing financial management of programmes. Any risk that national
considerations might affect financial management at the expense of sound financial
management criteria should be excluded. (7.15.11-14)
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1.  INTRODUCTION
1.1.The Mandate
1.1.1.  In its First Report, and in accordance with the mandate it was given for the first phase
of its work1, the Committee of Independent Experts (henceforth ‘the Committee’), addressed
the issue of individual responsibilities of members of the Commission relating to certain
allegations of fraud, mismangement and nepotism.
1.1.2  Following publication of the First Report of the Committee on 15 March 1999 and
successive events, at its meeting of 22 March 1999 the Conference of Presidents of the
European Parliament considered and approved a note on the terms of reference for the
Committee’s second report.  Specifically, it mandated the Committee as follows:
"In the light of the findings of the first report (...), it is proposed to mandate the Committee to
produce its second report, concentrating on formulating recommendations for improving:
• procedures for the awarding of financial contracts, and of contracts for interim or
temporary staff, to implement programmes;
• the coordination of Commission services responsible for detecting, and dealing
with fraud, irregularities and financial mismanagement (and, particularly,
internal auditing departments, and financial control);
• the application and, possible, the adaptation of the Staff Regulations, to
facilitate the holding of officials to account in cases of fraud and
mismanagement."
1.1.3. The following day the European Parliament adopted a resolution confirming the
mandate of the Committee in the following terms:
"Looks forward to the second report by the Committee of Independent Experts
containing a more wide-ranging review of the Commission’s culture, practices and
procedures and in particular its concrete recommendations for strengthening these
procedures and any other appropriate reforms to be considered by Commission and
Parliament; this report should deal amongst other issues with procedures in existence
for the awarding of financial contracts and of contracts for interim or temporary staff
to implement programmes, with procedures for following up allegations of fraud,
mismanagement and nepotism (detection and treatment), and with the treatment by the
Commission of cases of fraud, mismanagement and nepotism, involving staff; this
report must be finished by the beginning of September 1999;" 2
1.1.4.  In preparing its Second Report the Committee has adhered to the terms of this
mandate.  The report therefore deals the “culture, practices and procedures” of the
Commission, with an eye to formulating recommendations for reforms in the areas
encompassed by its mandate, namely financial procedures, control mechanisms, personnel
                                                
1
 See First Report, section 1.1
2
 Resolution B4-0327, 0328, 0329, 0330, 0331, 0332 and 0333/99 of 23.3.99, paragraph 4
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management, measures aimed at combating fraud, etc.  By the same token, the Second Report
does not seek - by contrast with its First Report - to attribute individual responsibilities. Cases
cited in the present report serve simply as illustrations of the wider points the Committee
wishes to make.
1.1.5.  The approach taken by the Committee was formally communicated to the President of
the European Parliament by its Chair by letter on 3 August 1999:
“Everything relating to the individual or collective responsibiliies of the Commissioners
was said in the first report submitted on 15 March 1999. The second report will not in
any way go back over this type of question…Nothing it contains will be of a kind to call
into question past responsibilities. It will be devoted to analysing the procedures and
systems set up by all those involved in the European Union – Institutions and Member
States – to combat fraud, and will endeavour simply to present analyses and
recommendations in order to increase their effectiveness.”
1.1.6.  In keeping with this approach, the Committee does not in the present report pursue, re-
examine or update any of the cases analysed in its First Report.
1.2.  Structure of Second Report
1.2.1.  The subjects covered by the Second Report are determined by the mandate outlined
above.  The Report comprises a brief introduction, six substantive chapters, each containing
specific recommendations, and some brief concluding remarks.  For ease of reference, the
Committee’s recommendations are also presented together at the beginning of the report.  It
should be stated at the outset, however, that the recommendations can only fully be
understood in the light of the substantive arguments contained within the body of the text.
For this reason the reader is invited to refer, for explanation and elucidation of the
recommendations, to the paragraphs cited after each of them.
1.2.2.  The chapters of the Second Report are as follows:
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 2: Direct Management
Chapter 3: Shared Management
Chapter 4: The Control Environment
Chapter 5: Fighting Fraud and Corruption
Chapter 6: Personnel Matters
Chapter 7: Integrity, Responsibility and Accountability in European Political
andAdministrative Life
Chapter 8: Final Remarks
1.3.  Working methods and language
1.3.1.  As in the first phase of its work, the Committee worked independently of both the
European Parliament and of the Commission.  It therefore adopted its own working methods
and procedures.  It has continued to operate on the basis of the agreements already in place
concerning the availability of Commission officials to appear before the Committee and the
provision of documentary information on request.  The Committee thanks all those who have
contributed through the statements they gave and the information they provided to the
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formulation of the ideas set out in this report.
1.3.2. The constituent parts of this report were drafted and adopted in one or the other of the
Committee’s two working languages: English and French. The Committee declines any
responsibility for language versions other than the originals, translation of the text being a
matter for the European Parliament.  The reader is therefore informed that the original
languages of the chapters are as follows:
English: Chapters 1, 3, 4, 5, 7
French: Chapters 2, 6, 8
- 30 -
2. DIRECT MANAGEMENT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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2. DIRECT MANAGEMENT
2.0.           Introduction
2.0.1. This chapter considers certain expenditure incurred under the direct management of
the Commission which has come in for a good deal of criticism in recent years. In
order to cope with ever more numerous and specific management responsibilities, for
which it did not always have the appropriate staff, the Commission has had to contract
out part of its work. The contracts concluded to this end with organisations commonly
referred to as TAOs have been at the heart of the difficulties which have arisen. On the
other hand, many subsidies have been criticised. Most of the contracts concerned have
related to the provision of complex services: project management, technical assistance,
consultancy work and research, the importance of which has increased in the past ten
years.
2.0.2. Expenditure whose management is shared between the Commission and Member
States (particularly EAGGF-Guarantee and Structural Funds) is dealt with in Chapter
3.
2.0.3. Initially, the Committee thought that it would perform a traditional audit of the
contracts and subsidies directly managed by the Commission. In order to do so, it
would have been necessary to start with a risk analysis to identify the highest-risk
types of contract and subsidy, then compile a representative sample of cases, study
them and draw general conclusions from them. This proved impossible, due to a lack
of data classified under the appropriate headings from which selections could have
been made.
2.0.4. This observation is indicative of the poor quality of the Commission’s management
tools for contracts and subsidies.
2.0.5. Generally, there are grounds for believing that the Commission’s current difficulties
are due not only to a lack of human resources but also to a lack of management tools
and the inadequacy of the contracting system, which have made it difficult to contract
work out to reliable partners. However, in the case of contracts the largest possible
number of specific cases has been examined by way of example. The Committee has
based its work on a knowledge of existing practices and rules gained from a number of
interviews and from the available documentation in order nevertheless to perform a
study of the system and formulate general conclusions concerning it.
2.0.6. To the Commission, ‘contract’ and ‘subsidy’ are poorly defined and largely
overlapping concepts. Most subsidies are the subject of quasicontractual documents
signed by the two parties concerned and designated as agreements, or sometimes even
as contracts. What is a subsidy? How does it differ from a contract? The answer is not
clear. At all events, virtually no rules exist concerning the awarding of subsidies: there
is no reference to this category of expenditure in the Financial Regulation.
2.0.7. The rules on awarding contracts are rather confused: the general legal provisions in the
Financial Regulation occupy only a minor position among them, particularly in
comparison with the Directives on public contracts. Moreover, apart from the two
major fields which the Financial Regulation recognises as enjoying
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exceptional status, namely research and external action programmes, each Community
programme has its own procedures.
2.0.8. The aid granted to certain third countries (or to other parties under agreements
concluded with States) itself gives rise to contracts awarded by these recipients rather
than by the Commission. However, in most cases the Commission retains a
responsibility as an agent entrusted with drafting calls for tenders and selecting
candidates. In addition, it is responsible to the Community’s budgetary authority for
checking that this aid is put to good use.
2.0.9. The Financial Regulation applies to all institutions of the European Union. For this
reason it is inevitably poorly adapted to the size and diversity of the tasks which the
Commission is now required to perform, and which are out of all proportion to those
of the other institutions. Moreover, the Regulation has not changed much since it was
first adopted. The procedure for amending it is long and complicated.
2.0.10. The Commission tends to resort to internal instructions which mingle advice, wishes
expressed in the conditional, and prohibitions of various degrees of severity. This
miscellany of documents – instructions, procedural manuals and vade mecums – is
applied according to need and circumstances to such fields as the ACPC, external
procedures, subsidies and TAOs, and sometimes lacks coherence.
2.0.11. As regards management procedures, the shortcomings are likewise extreme. Decision-
making procedures are often of an artificial character. The extreme centralisation of
many of them dilutes responsibilities. When the Commission itself takes decisions –
which is by no means unusual – the documents supplied to each member of the
Commission contain a whole series of favourable opinions delivered at various stages
by departments which have only ever been marginally involved in the matter
concerned. These opinions are regarded as sufficiently reassuring to secure a positive
final decision. There is hardly any monitoring of contracts or subsidies already
awarded.
2.0.12. The following observations deal firstly with the legal and budgetary framework in
which operations are performed relating to contracts for the provision of complex
services and subsidies and the management of these contracts and subsidies. Secondly,
the problem of contracting work out will be discussed in general terms.
2.1.           The framework
2.1.1. The appropriations3 for direct-management operations amount to around EUR 14
billion4 per annum, or one sixth of the Community budget.
2.1.2. The annual number of contracts approved by the ACPC5 is approximately 1200 and
their value is EUR 2 billion, to which must be added some 10 000 contracts
representing a total of EUR 2 billion awarded in the context of external aid (including
                                                
3
 After consideration by the ACPC. The figures quoted in paragraphs 2.1.1 to 2.1.3 are taken from estimates by
DG XIX.
4
 EUR 12 billion if one excludes administrative expenditure, particularly on staff.
5
 Advisory Committee on Procurements and Contracts. See 2.2.81 et seq.
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8000 which are additional agreements further to existing contracts and 2000 contracts
concluded after a call for tenders). These figures include technical assistance contracts.
2.1.3. Of these subsidies, those awarded by virtue of a legal basis (a programme based on a
directive, regulation or decision) have a total value of EUR 7 billion, while those
which do not have a legal basis other than the budget (also referred to as ‘unregulated
subsidies’)6 number about 7000 and have an approximate value of EUR 1 billion.
2.1.4. The distinction between contracts and subsidies is extremely debatable, both in theory
and in practice.
The structure of the budget: administrative and operating appropriations
2.1.5. It was not until the Preliminary Draft Budget for 1982 that the Commission proposed
distinguishing, apparently in the interests of ‘political transparency’, between two
parts: administrative appropriations – expenditure on staff and buildings and other
administrative expenditure (Part A) – and operating appropriations (Part B). However,
from the outset some Part B appropriations, classified according to purpose, were
assigned to staff, particularly for research (performance budgeting).
2.1.6. In order for the distinction to improve transparency, precise criteria would have been
required, to make it possible to determine the exact dividing line between
administration and operations, which proved impossible. The manual on budgetary
procedures merely states: ‘Administrative appropriations are appropriations intended
to ensure the operation of the whole administrative machinery represented by the
Institutions, to enable them to carry out their tasks’; ‘operating appropriations are
directly intended for the implementation of the various Community measures or
policies: they are funds for carrying out operations’.
2.1.7. It is often suggested that the Part A/Part B nomenclature gives Parliament the
advantage that it separates operating appropriations off into Part B, enabling
Parliament to exert visible political influence, while facilitating its control over the
administrative expenditure in Part A. As budgetary authority, Parliament has the last
word on all non-compulsory expenditure, whether in Part A or in Part B. Thus this
distinction does not affect the classification of expenditure. The distinction between
CE (compulsory expenditure) and NCE (non-compulsory expenditure) could be
expressed perfectly satisfactorily if the budget were structured in a way which did not
involve the Part A/Part B nomenclature.
2.1.8. With regard to subsidies, the Part A/Part B nomenclature, far from leading to clarity,
adds to the confusion. As will be seen below, a large proportion of subsidies are in fact
disguised contracts which the Commission refuses to treat as such, for a whole series
of reasons, the main one being that transparency is even less fully assured for
subsidies than for contracts.
                                                
6
 The figure of 1 billion is based on the Inspectorate-General’s inquiry concerning the 1996 financial year, but
does not take account of changes in this field which have made it possible to give several budget lines a legal
basis, which has obvious implications for the relationship between regulated and unregulated subsidies – see
Annexes I and II.
- 34 -
2.1.9. Many subsidies contribute directly to the attainment of one or other of the objectives
of the European Union. They are only assigned to ‘beneficiaries’, who are in effect
contractors, because in doing this the Commission asks them in return to help achieve
these objectives. If the Part A/Part B nomenclature were adhered to, all of them would
have to be financed from Part B (operating appropriations), which is far from being
the case. It should also be the case for all the subsidies allocated to external
organisations to which a specific task is assigned, such as the European Institute in
Florence. Conversely, all subsidies which do not help to attain a given objective of the
European Union, or which help only indirectly to do so, ought to be classified as Part
A expenditure (operating appropriations), which they are not. By way of example,
EUR 325 000 is allocated for the Yehudi Menuhin Foundation, classified under
heading B3-2005, and EUR 100 000 is allocated as a subsidy to the European Forum
for the Arts and Heritage, classified under heading A-3021.
2.1.10. This confusion has been further aggravated since the Court of Justice gave its
judgment of 12 May 19987 condemning the Commission for having executed
appropriations on lines which lacked a legal basis (directive, regulation or decision).
Since then the Commission and, to an even greater extent, Parliament have sought to
‘protect’ subsidies which lacked a legal basis by entering them in Part A of the budget.
As no legal basis is regarded as necessary to justify entering appropriations in Part A,
which is intended to ensure the operation of the Institutions, this part has become a
refuge for the financing of subsidies which have no legal basis, no matter what their
purpose.
Mini-budgets and TAOs
2.1.11. A decade ago, the concept of operating appropriations (Part B) favoured the creation
of ‘mini-budgets’, the Commission’s first attempt to meet the need for specific and
temporary staff arising from the launching of new Community measures which were
directly managed.
2.1.12. Mini-budgets comprised administrative appropriations which, despite their character,
were entered in Part B because they were closely associated with the implementation
of a measure which was itself financed by means of operating appropriations. In 1991,
all the mini-budgets together were valued at ECU 153 m. From 1993 and until 1998,
these appropriations were repatriated to Part A. They were converted into 1830 new
budgetary posts spread over five years. An equivalent number of staff were recruited
(temporary, auxiliary and local staff and service-providers), using internal competition
procedures which lacked transparency.
2.1.13. In parallel, at the beginning of the present decade the practice developed of awarding
contracts to what it was agreed should be dubbed ‘technical assistance offices’
(TAOs), to which the third part of this chapter relates. In November 1998 it appears
that these contracts were responsible for the employment of 800 staff carrying out
administrative duties at about a hundred TAOs8. Far from being charged to Part A of
the budget, as required by the Financial Regulation, they were financed from Part B,
the concept of ‘operating expenditure’ making it possible to camouflage them, while
                                                
7
 CJEC 12.05.98, Case 106/96, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Commission of the
European Communities, ECR I-2729
8
 The Commission has been unable to confirm these data with any exactitude.
- 35 -
the ceilings imposed by the multiannual Financial Perspective did not allow these
appropriations to be entered as administrative expenditure (Part A).
2.1.14. In an attempt to escape from this disorder, a bizarre distinction subsequently appeared
among the various activities entrusted to TAOs, the view being taken that those which
operated ‘for the benefit of the Commission’ should be funded from Part A while
those which operated solely for the benefit of the partner States could be funded from
Part B, as could those operating for the ‘mutual interest’ (to remedy the deficiencies of
the beneficiary States while increasing the Commission’s workload). These acrobatics
further aggravated the disorder.
A new budget structure
2.1.15. It is therefore necessary to establish a budget structure favourable to transparent
management and effective monitoring. The distinction between administrative and
operating expenditure should be abandoned. It could be replaced by a twofold
budgetary nomenclature whose headings would cross to form a matrix.
2.1.16. The first nomenclature, in columns, would identify the activities to which each
Directorate-General was devoted, so that its cost and benefit could be assessed and
expenditure could be optimally divided between staff and procurement of goods or
external services, including technical assistance contracts. The real cost of each
measure could be ascertained and compared with the results achieved. In future, the
budget should be presented along these lines for each policy separately, the number of
Directorates-General being brought into line with the number of policies.
2.1.17. The second nomenclature, in lines, would present the authorisations granted by the
budgetary authority according to type of expenditure for each Directorate-General or
activity, identified in columns. This expenditure of various types would be broken
down in such a way as, in particular, to highlight appropriations for staffing,
procurement of goods, payments for ordinary services, purchases of complex services,
and subsidies.
2.1.18. Thus the budgetary authority would have all the information necessary to exercise its
power of decision and control over the overall cost of policies.
2.1.19. The management of Community programmes would gain in coherence and
transparency from this presentation of the budget, showing both the administrative and
the operational cost of each measure simultaneously. As a result, the Commission
would have an incentive to redeploy its human and administrative resources more
effectively in accordance with priority programmes. The budgetary authority would
retain the guarantee that it could exercise its power of decision over the allocation of
the resources intended for any given measure. The possibility of reducing or
increasing administrative expenditure items would remain its responsibility.
1.1. The rules applicable to contracts
2.1.20. The Financial Regulation, while not providing any general principle other than that of
non-discrimination between the nationals of the Member States on grounds of
nationality (Article 62):
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- purely and simply ignores measures relating to the granting of subsidies9;
- contains a number of provisions concerning the award of contracts: contracts for
the supply of goods or services or the performance of construction work, and
contracts for purchase, lease and hire awarded by the Communities (Title IV),
broadly distinguishing certain major categories (supply, construction work,
services, lease and hire, etc.), none of which corresponds to the particularly
sensitive contracts which have given rise to major difficulties in recent years,
namely those pertaining to complex services, technical assistance or project
management;
- contains a number of specific provisions concerning research contracts (Title VII)
and contracts in the field of external aid (Title IX).
2.1.21. The Financial Regulation has been amended many times. It still does not take due
account of the enormous changes in the role of the Commission (cf. 2.0.9). However,
it has lost much of its coherence. It now needs to be completely overhauled so as to
concentrate on the essential principles while detailed rules should be contained in
regulations relating to each institution. The requirement of a unanimous decision by
the Council, however minor the issue, is a considerable obstacle to the Commission’s
efforts to improve its management. The incorrect recourse to ‘soft legislation’ is one
of the consequences.
General law
Although it is the point of departure, the Financial Regulation is by no means the sole
source of the rules on the award of contracts as a whole. Its provisions directly
regulate only contracts below the threshold of applicability (Article 56) of the public
contracts directives10. Moreover, Regulation 3418/93 laying down detailed rules for
implementation11 contains essential details concerning the application of the
Directives (Title XIX), calls for tenders (Title XV), the determination of the various
thresholds in respect of contracts (Title XVI), the functioning of advisory committees
on procurements and contracts (Title XVII) and guarantees and preliminary deposit
(Title XVIII).
2.1.22. Far more than the Financial Regulation and the implementation rules, it is the public
contracts Directives12 that finally constitute the real body of rules on the award of
contracts. They are far more detailed, from the point of view of the choice of award
                                                
9
 Except, that is, for stipulating that wherever Community funds are granted to beneficiaries outside the
institutions, the recipients must agree in writing that the Court of Auditors may audit the utilisation of the
amounts granted (Article 88).
10
 Directive 92/50/EEC of 18 June 1992 relating to the coordination of procedures for the award of public service
contracts (OJ L 209, 24.7.1992, p. 1), Directive 93/36/EEC of 14 June 1993 coordinating procedures for the
award of public supply contracts (OJ L 199, 9.8.1993, p. 1), Directive 93/37/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning
the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts (OJ L 199, 9.8.1993, p. 54)
11
 Commission Regulation of 9 December 1993 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of certain
provisions of the Financial Regulation (OJ L 315, 16.12.1993, p. 1)
12
 Directive 92/50/EEC of 18 June 1992 relating to the coordination of procedures for the award of public service
contracts (OJ L 209, 24.7.1992, p. 1), Directive 93/36/EEC of 14 June 1993 coordinating procedures for the
award of public supply contracts (OJ L 199, 9.8.1993, p. 1), Directive 93/37/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning
the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts (OJ L 199, 9.8.1993, p. 54)
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procedures, rules on publicity, rules on the participation of candidates allowed to
tender, selection criteria and criteria for awarding contracts. The very fact that they are
Directives presupposes that, in order to make them applicable to the institutions, there
will be reference provisions whose purpose is to coordinate national procedural
provisions: Articles 126 et seq. of the implementing rules.
2.1.23. These rules were conceived more for the use of the Member States than of the
Community’s own institutions, with the aim of ensuring equality of treatment between
candidates and compliance with competition rules. The Directives made no attempt to
lay down all the technical provisions which might ensure the proper use of
Community funds, but each Member State did so itself.
2.1.24. Irrespective of the contracts Directives and the provisions implementing the
Regulation to which the Regulation refers, authorising officers are required to take
account of:
- the international agreement on public contracts of 199413, to which the Community
became a party in the framework of the WTO;
-       various instruments which, while they do not directly concern public contracts, contain
provisions which must be taken into account when awarding them, for example the
Code of Conduct of October 1994 containing general provisions governing relations
between the Commission and certain categories of staff;
- the case law of the Court;
- the practices of the ACPC as codified in its vade mecum and, where appropriate,
financial control practices;
- any specific provisions laid down in connection with a particular programme.
2.1.25. This proliferation is clearly excessive, as authorising officers are required to be
familiar with the details of the various provisions, their development, how they are
linked to one another, and the practices adhered to by other departments.
2.1.26. It is not surprising, therefore, that when it comes to implementation, problems of
consistency arise. This applies to the procedure for evaluating bids: some DGs assign
priority to assessing the technical aspects of a bid and only start to consider the
financial aspects once they have done that. Most DGs assess both aspects
simultaneously. The same applies to the selection method: the criterion of the lowest
bidder, the criterion of the most economically advantageous bid, various conceptions
are acceptable provided that the bidder knows in advance on what basis he will be
judged, which is not always the case. To tell the truth, no matter how good the rules
are, it is impossible to regulate everything in advance: at this level of detail – which is,
however, essential – the observations of the ACPC ought, on an ad hoc basis, to have
helped to gradually develop a doctrine common to all Commission departments.
                                                
13
 Council Decision 94/800/EC of 22 December 1994 (OJ L 336, 23.12.94, p. 1, 2, 10 and 273-289), entered into
force on 1 January 1996: WTO Agreement on government procurement of 15 April 1994, Uruguay Round
- 38 -
2.1.27. In all the sets of rules, which are currently very disparate, the Committee noted a gap
regarding the assessment of bids, which is, however, an absolutely crucial point. The
provisions implementing the Financial Regulation do not include a single provision on
this subject14. In its opinions, the ACPC simply expresses the wish that at least one
member of the assessment committee should be external to the authorising
department. This vague, non-binding clause is not sufficient.
Research contracts
2.1.28. Research grants are contracts governed by autonomous and clear legislation
(framework programme of research, Annex IV). The framework programme is
implemented in three ways: firstly, in the case of grants, ‘calls for proposals’ are
published and the resulting proposals assessed by a panel of experts before the
contract is negotiated. Procurement of supplies and ordinary services is subject to a
standard procedure, albeit with different thresholds. Lastly, a specific procedure of
calls for candidates applies to the recruitment of independent experts to assess
projects.
Contracts arising from cooperation with third countries
2.1.29. Each year, around 10 000 contracts are concluded in the context of the Community’s
cooperation with third countries – awarded either by the Community or by a public
authority of the recipient State, but funded by the Community – and some 2000 of
these involve the publication of a call for tenders.
2.1.30. Title IX of the Financial Regulation contains a set of ‘provisions applicable to external
aid’, covering (Articles 112-119) the award of contracts. However, the situation is
even more complex, as some of the Community programmes concerned themselves
have specific rules attached to them, applicable only under the particular programme,
and these rules in turn may be replaced by provisions laid down in the financing
agreements negotiated with the States or public bodies receiving the aid.
2.1.31. Such aid, which in most cases results in contracts awarded for external beneficiaries,
but under the control of the Commission, nonetheless constitutes Community
expenditure, for the execution of which the Commission bears a twofold
responsibility. On the one hand it must be able to satisfy the authorities of the Union
that its financial management is sound and the expenditure effective. On the other
hand, whether acting on its own behalf or as an agent in its role of executing contracts
arising from the aid granted, it must comply with the basic principles adhered to by the
Union in the field of public contracts, particularly for the Directives adopted in this
field.
2.1.32. The fact that external contracts are governed by as many special sets of rules as there
are different legal bases for the various external operations (EDF, various cooperation
agreements, Phare, Tacis, Meda, etc.) needs to be stressed. Whatever the particular
character of a given activity in relation to the direct management work of the
                                                
14
 Whereas they do incorporate some quite precise provisions concerning the opening of tenders: Article 104 of
the detailed rules for the implementation of the Financial Regulation.
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Commission within the territory of the Union, such diversity – not to say disorder –
cannot be justified. The Commission has recently realised this and has instructed its
new service for the management of cooperation with third countries (Relex joint
service) to draw up an overview of these various contrasting rules and to make
proposals for codifying the procedural rules applicable to all contracts for services,
supplies and public works concluded by the Commission in connection with its
operations in third countries and contracts concluded by the beneficiary States
themselves under cooperation agreements.
2.1.33. However, this codification is constrained by the limited nature of the Commission’s
autonomous regulatory powers. As, under some programmes, the basic act itself goes
so far as to lay down contract procedures, the codified manual15 proposed by the
Commission cannot replace these unless it assumes the form of a legislative act itself,
down to its minutest details: the Commission’s management powers are effectively
subject to a kind of supervision which does nothing to enhance its responsibility. It
would be better to start by reviewing the institutional arrangements governing the
management powers of the various parties concerned so as to prepare the Commission
to adopt rules in this field.
2.1.34. Meanwhile, and while awaiting a Council Regulation, in order to ensure that
Community action is coherent and transparent the Commission could impose on itself
the provisions of the aforementioned manual. In addition, whenever possible, these
provisions would be incorporated into contracts with the bidders concerned. But this
approach would certainly not absolve the institutions of the duty to engage in the
thinking referred to above.
Subsidies
2.1.35. In 1998, more than 7000 commitments related to subsidies. Nevertheless, the rules
concerning them are weak. The only binding provisions are of a general nature, such
as Articles 2, 24 and 87 of the Financial Regulation and the Commission’s
implementing provisions (Regulation 3418/93) of 9 November 1993. The specific
provisions concerning subsidies are not binding. Moreover, they are scattered. They
are to be found not only in the vade mecum on subsidies published in 1988 but also in
the budgetary procedures manual and Annex 17/2 to the vade mecum of the ACPC.
2.1.36. The vade mecum on subsidies published in November 1988 incorporated only part of
the recommendations from the report presented by the Inspectorate-General in 199716.
Moreover, in some cases it did so only in vague or excessively brief terms. In any case
it is not legally binding. DGs V, VI, VIII, X and XIII and the Secretariat-General
interpret it restrictively, on the pretext that they have their own vade mecums.
2.1.37. The fact that the vade mecum contains two types of provisions, some of which are
supposedly compulsory while others are optional, too often results in equivocal
statements which invite recourse to exceptions: ‘ought preferably’, ‘should have’,
‘departments should ensure that’, ‘it is recommended that you ask’, ‘cannot be
excluded a priori’, ‘it may be worthwhile’, ‘it may be asked to provide’, ‘the normal
                                                
15
 Relex joint service – procedural rules (final version – 25.5.99)
16
 Report by the Inspectorate-General: Inspection sur ‘l’attribution des subventions par les services de la
Commission’ (inspection of the award of subsidies by the Commission), IGS, 16 May 1997
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rule is that’, etc. However, it is worth asking what means the Commission had at its
disposal: either it could go down the authoritarian road of binding rules by proposing
amendments to the Financial Regulation, which would require unanimity among the
Member States (a cumbersome and lengthy procedure), or it could opt for persuasion
by means of ‘soft legislation’ in the form of a standard text, intended to educate both
authorising departments and outsiders, thereby highlighting the contractual character
of the award (the vade mecum is incidentally intended for requesters and
beneficiaries). The main weaknesses of this publication lie in the risks of multiple
award to a particular beneficiary (no requirement for authorising DGs to consult the
SINCOM third-party database before selecting their projects in order to check whether
the potential beneficiary has already received commitments or payments), the fact that
there is no requirement to lay down in advance and in writing the rules governing ex
ante assessment in order to limit the discretion of the authorising department, and the
lack of rigour in the composition of the assessment committees.
2.1.38. But the most serious gap in the existing rules concerns the lack of any definition of the
concept of the ‘subsidy’. This gives authorising departments too much latitude in
selecting either the procedure for awarding contracts or that for subsidies. The vade
mecum on subsidies does not provide any clear indication on the subject. The ACPC
vade mecum tries to base the selection of the procedure to be adhered to on
excessively complex criteria: the subject of the contract, the existence or otherwise of
a readily identifiable quid pro quo, who holds the power of initiative and management
of the operation, who owns the ultimate result of the operation, the extent of the
financial participation, and the arrangements for selecting the contractor. Finally, the
internal procedures manual proposes a definition based mainly on the criterion of
property. Where the Commission acquires the ownership of goods or services, there is
a contract. Where this is not the case, even if the Community’s interests are at stake,
there is a subsidy. Although this definition may appear logical, it is in reality far too
reductive.
2.1.39.The concept of quid pro quo, which in most cases is the very essence of a contract,
arises in connection with most subsidies, justifying their award. Indeed, in many cases
it is explicitly formalised in the legal act (agreement) linking the Commission to the
beneficiary. The commitment and active participation of the beneficiary are
indispensable with a view to attaining the objectives set, using the means provided. A
contractual relationship exists even where it is not completely formalised.
In principle therefore, subsidies ought to be treated as contracts.
2.1.40. In cases where there is no element of reciprocity – and only in these cases – there is a
subsidy. Subsidies, therefore, include, for example, financial grants designed to
provide material or moral support. In this case, after all, no immediate and direct quid
pro quo is expected of the beneficiary of the Community funding.
2.1.41. Situations will arise in which there are grounds for hesitation as to how contracts/
subsidies should be classified. It will be up to the authorising department to decide (cf.
2.2.60 et seq.) which management system should apply to the expenditure in question.
In doing so it will be guided by the decisions of the budgetary authority as expressed
in accordance with a nomenclature (cf. 2.1.15) which, within the resources allocated to
a particular DG, distinguishes between appropriations to be used in awarding subsidies
and those to be used to finance contracts.
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2.2.           Management
2.2.1. Agreements relating to subsidies and contracts pertaining to the provision of complex
services (consultancy, research, technical assistance or project management) constitute
legal acts which create financial obligations by means of which Community policies
are implemented. Responsibility for them rests with the authorising departments.
Contracts and subsidies are sometimes awarded too repetitively to organisations
gravitating around the Commission, thereby helping to keep them alive artificially.
2.2.2. In order to identify the causes and mechanisms of this situation, the following
observations are intended to describe the life cycle of a contract, first providing two
concrete examples and then analysing the process whereby contracts and subsidies are
awarded.
The life cycle of a contract: specific examples
2.2.3. When the budgetary authority enters in the Commission budget the necessary
appropriations to carry out a Community project, the authorising department and the
departments managing the operation initiate the procedures which will result in the
conclusion of a contract or the award of a subsidy, in return for which the institution
will receive the required quid pro quo.
The main steps are as follows:
- the decision to contract the operation out
- selection of the procedure: call for tenders and/or negotiation
- selection of contractor
- financing and monitoring of contracts
Each of these steps is attended by dangers of irregularities or even fraud, which the
Committee has identified by studying a limited number of cases; it does not claim that these
constitute a genuinely representative sample but nonetheless believes that certain conclusions
and warnings may be drawn from them.
A made-to-measure contract for complex services
2.2.4. Ten years ago, the Commission awarded a contract pertaining to publicity work in the
field of agriculture which was worth a little over ECU 4 m. Formally, the decision was
taken at the highest level, by the Commissioners, and accompanied by every
imaginable guarantee: a call for tenders, a large number of candidates, favourable
opinions from the ACPC, the legal service and the financial controller, and a proposal
submitted by the appropriate Commissioner in the form of a file several centimetres
thick. The decision by the Commissioners could not fail to be positive, as it duly was.
2.2.5. Yet this whole procedure, although formally regular, was actually biased, as the
Commission gradually came to realise due to the absence of any effective quid pro
quo from its partner.
2.2.6. Firstly, the call for tenders published in the OJ was couched in extremely vague terms.
The purpose of the contract, i.e. what the contractor was to do in exchange for the
payment by the Community, was poorly defined. More seriously still, the criteria for
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assessing the various bids were not stated in the call for tenders. It is not unlikely that
they were decided only after the bids had been received. They were weighted in such a
way as to give a decisive advantage to just one bidder, which could not in any way
have been foreseen from the call for tenders published. The Committee has questioned
the officials who were involved at the time, and they confirmed that there was no
assessment committee to speak of. No minutes of its meetings exist.
2.2.7. The ACPC was required to consider the project in writing, on grounds of alleged
urgency. The records do not contain any hint of a justification for this urgency. The
ACPC delivered a favourable opinion without comment. The same applies to the legal
service. The Commission took a favourable decision, under the circumstances
described above, without discussion, the matter being entered as an A item.
2.2.8. The contract itself contained grave anomalies. Firstly, 40% of the total sum for which
it provided was to be paid immediately after signature, whereas the guarantee provided
by the firm was minimal. Secondly, as already noted, the subject of the contract was
ill-defined. No binding financial commitment was given by the contractor. Thirdly,
there was no way of monitoring subcontracting. This enabled the contractor, within a
very short time, to subcontract 90% of the value of the contract to a company
registered in a Member State but located far away from the Brussels seat of the
Community institutions, contrary to the very heavily weighted criterion which had
resulted in the contractor being preferred to its competitors. What is more, after a time
the subcontractor vanished. An audit by the Commission, whose conclusions were
very negative, finally resulted in the contractor’s receiving only about 75% of the
amount originally provided for by the contract. It was stated that a steering committee
consisting of experts appointed by the Commission would monitor the implementation
of the operations provided for by the contract. The Committee has been unable to find
any evidence either that the members of the committee were appointed or that they
held any meetings.
A technical assistance contract for the performance of pilot projects
2.2.9. The case just described is an old one. The Directives on public contracts had not yet
been published. Even so, it must be said that although these now apply, the practical
progress made is not obvious. The history of a technical assistance contract concluded
recently for the performance of pilot projects bears witness to this.
2.2.10. The authorising department issued a call for tenders, published in the OJ. Seven bids
were registered, all admissible, and five of them met the selection criteria published in
the call for tenders. By and large, the prices offered by the competitors lay between
ECU 1.1 m and 2 m. The authorising department ranked the lowest bid second in
terms of quality of service, immediately behind one of the highest bids, costing ECU
700 000 more and ranked first. The bid ranked first in terms of quality had been
submitted by a non-profit-making association in which another non-profit-making
association occupied a dominant position, and the latter already had a contract with the
Commission and was being liquidated following litigation with the latter.
2.2.11. Rather than awarding the contract to the lowest bidder, the authorising department
wished to declare this bid unsuccessful on the basis of Article 11 of the Directive on
public contracts; with this in view it consulted the ACPC, arguing that, given the
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configuration of the bids, it was impossible to establish a quality/price ratio. The
ACPC delivered a favourable opinion. The authorising department then asked the five
bidders to submit bids amended as to price, while retaining all other aspects
unchanged. The previous lowest bidder raised its bid by ECU 400 000, while the
bidder behind which the association which had already worked with the Commission
had been ranked reduced its bid by ECU 80 000. The difference between the two was
now only around ECU 200 000.
2.2.12. The authorising department now submitted to the ACPC a draft contract relating to the
bid which it had from the start regarded as offering the best services. The ACPC
suspected a possible conflict of interests because of the composition of the
contractor’s board (cf. 2.2.10); the authorising department replied in writing,
supplying reassuring but inaccurate information, particularly regarding the contractual
relations of the association in question with the Commission and the possibility of
conflicts of interest. The replies were quoted verbatim from a document drawn up the
previous day by the president of the association submitting the bid, who was also
president of the association which already held a contract.
2.2.13. An amount representing half of the contract was paid immediately after its signature,
whereas the contractor’s guarantee corresponded to only 1.25% thereof. A few months
later the contracting group subcontracted some services to one of its members. Less
than a year afterwards, its president was forced to resign because of the difficulties of
the aforementioned association (cf. 2.2.11), of which he was likewise president.
2.2.14. Two months before expiry of the contract, Financial Control issued a very critical
report on its implementation, particularly concerning partial performance of the
contract, subcontracting to members of the group which gave rise to conflicts of
interest, inadequate management and monitoring procedures, lack of transparency of
accounting transactions, acceptance of travelling and subsistence expenses claims
without verification, etc., concluding that the contract ought not to be renewed.
In 1998 it was nonetheless decided to renew the contract for one year.
2.2.15. In the light of the observations made while drafting its first report and in view of the
cases considered since, particularly the two examples cited here, the Committee
believes that it should draw attention to the need for a complete overhaul of the
contract and subsidy award system. In the interests of greater transparency, this
overhaul should particularly concern the following stages:
- the procedure for awarding contracts and subsidies
- the hierarchy among authorising officers and their relations with officials responsible
   for negotiating contracts
- relations with interest groups
- management tools
- advice to authorising officers: central contracts unit and ACPC.
These points will each be considered in turn.
The procedure for awarding contracts and subsidies
2.2.16. The procedure to be followed depends on whether the expenditure is classified as
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relating to a contract or a subsidy. This classification is important, as in the case of the
former, the procedure is governed by the rules on public contracts, whereas the award
of subsidies depends on more flexible provisions if governed by the provisions
authorising them or is even exempt from rules altogether if it is not.
2.2.17. As indicated in paragraph 2.1.40, most expenditure which is currently classified as
‘subsidies’ ought in future to be classified as ‘contracts’. Not only does it entail an
element of mutual performance, which determines its contractual nature: above all,
this would bring more transparent procedures into play for it.
The budget nomenclature (cf. 2.1.15 et seq.) should be used so as to ensure that
appropriations for contracts cannot be used for subsidies, and vice versa.
2.2.18. As regards contracts alone, the first stage should be to define and justify the need to be
met. In the instance of technical assistance, in particular, this is a stage which the
Commission tends to forget. The quality of bids and the clarity of definition of the
subject of the contract necessarily suffer as a result. However, some sectors of the
Commission have come to appreciate that needs are mostly enshrined in programmes.
This is a trend which should be encouraged. A contract to provide complex services
should always form part of a programme. This is the ‘political’ framework on which a
decision should be taken by the Commissioner responsible. The programme expresses
the need and indicates the period within which it is to be met. Programming is a job in
its own right. Contracting is another. But it ought not to be possible to propose
entering into contracts which cannot be accommodated within a programme.
2.2.19. Moreover, the Commission should take care not to enter into innumerable small
contracts relating to technical assistance, research, consultancy work, etc., even if they
have a place in a programme. Too many contracts, often for amounts of less than EUR
1 m, make excessive demands on officials’ time. It would be worth investigating
whether this phenomenon might not be one of the reasons for the staff shortages at the
Commission. Moreover, all too often, the authorising officer, assuming that he is not
incurring any risk in view of the insignificance of the amount involved, signs them
without paying sufficient attention. Or – even less creditably – he signs in the
knowledge that he is granting an individual or a firm an undeserved advantage, but
one which will go unnoticed.
2.2.20. The Committee believes that the Commission should set thresholds below which small
contracts would be avoided wherever possible, unless covered by a programme.
Otherwise, technical assistance needs should be met by recruiting auxiliary staff in
accordance with the rules applicable to other staff (cf. Chapter 6).
Awarding a contract – the choice of procedure
2.2.21. Where the rules on contracts are applied, and where the need is recognised, the
authorising officer decides on the procedure to be adopted when awarding a contract.
The general rule is that there should be a call for tenders, either open or restricted,
while the rules applicable permit only two alternatives to these, by way of exception:
private treaty or negotiated procedure.
2.2.22. A contract may be awarded without a call for tenders (1) if the amount concerned is
less than EUR 12 000, (2) on grounds of extreme urgency, (3) if a call for tenders is
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unsuccessful or has resulted in unacceptable prices being quoted, (4) if, on account of
technical necessities or factual or legal circumstances, the service can be rendered only
by one supplier or entrepreneur, or (5) in the case of contracts which, for technical
reasons, cannot be separated from the main contract.
2.2.23. In principle, a call for tenders is preferable, but only if the necessary practical
conditions are met and if there is complete transparency. Authorising officers tend to
issue calls for tenders in every case, which is the procedure advocated by all internal
monitoring bodies. In this way they seek to forestall criticism. This attitude is
regrettable, as each type of procedure is appropriate in the right context, outside which
there is a high risk of fraud. The only thing worse than a false call for tenders (cf. 2.2.4
et seq.) is false negotiation (cf. 2.2.9 et seq.). Where negotiation occurs, it is important
that the administration should have adequate means of analysis (cf. 2.2.27) and the
will to use them.
2.2.24. Drafting a call for tenders requires effort, first to plan and then to write it: the
authorising officer must state his needs and define precisely and exhaustively the
subject of the contract as criteria for selection and award which cannot subsequently
be modified. The call for tenders is the instrument which provides information for
enterprises, the tool for selection among bidders and the first element in the contract
which bidders undertake to perform when they submit their bids. The Committee has
observed that the Commission finds it difficult to draft calls for tenders in sufficient
detail where the object of the contract is concerned.
2.2.25. In some calls for tenders, it appears that one beneficiary is wanted or even preselected,
and that the call for tenders has been organised without any desire to accept the
outcome of the procedure. The procedure is biased. Insofar as it is possible to
determine on the basis of the cases examined, this bias operates at two points, not
necessarily in a cumulative manner: when the call for tenders is drafted and when a
decision is taken on the conclusions to be drawn from the bids (cf. below).
2.2.26. If the Commission’s interests are at stake or if the monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic
situation on the market makes a call for tenders unrealistic, the authorising officer
should not hesitate to recognise this formally (cf. 2.2.23) and conclude the contract
after negotiation with the firm as permitted by Article 59 of the Financial Regulation
and Article 11 of the Directive on public contracts. In fact, in monopolistic situations,
calls for tenders encourage agreements between firms and result in higher prices than
could be obtained through negotiation.
2.2.27. It is essential that those responsible for advising authorising officers should be able to
provide them with negotiating expertise. When faced with monopolies or quasi-
monopolies, the public authorities, be they a State or the Commission, are relatively
defenceless. However, the duration of the contract is for it to decide. It should make
the most of this trump card and make a practice of asking the would-be contractor for
an estimate structured in accordance with its own accounting categories, certified by
an accountant approved by the two parties. Negotiations should be based on the
estimate, and the contract should contain a verification clause making it possible to
ascertain upon its expiry that there has not been any deception. This method depends
for its success on the assumption that the contractor will realise that his reputation is at
stake, as is the possibility of securing future contracts from the public authorities.
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Prior information
2.2.28. The rules on publicity are precise, detailed and binding, as regards both the
information to be supplied and the time limits for candidacies or submission of bids.
Authorising officers abide by them scrupulously, except, until 1998, for the
requirement to provide prior information, which is, however, compulsory if a contract
for services to be rendered in the next 12 months is equal to or exceeds EUR 750 000.
This provision, which is intended to facilitate access to public contracts for small and
medium-sized enterprises and to improve the transparency of policy on contracting,
requires programming of contracts, which authorising officers have some difficulty in
carrying out. Until 1998, no penalties were imposed for failure to comply.
Opening of bids
2.2.29. Bids are opened by a committee appointed for the purpose, which checks whether they
comply with the formal requirements stated in the call for tenders. All bids are opened,
and their opening entered in a written record. This part of the procedure is well
established and does not call for any comments from the Committee.
Consideration of candidacies
2.2.30. Bidders are required to produce declarations and documentary evidence concerning
their legal, economic and financial capacity.
2.2.31. At present, the first step when considering bids is to check whether a bidder ought not
to be excluded from the procedure on account of bankruptcy, liquidation, judicial
settlement or because of a conviction of serious professional misconduct or an offence
with implications for the bidder’s professional morality, that the bidder’s situation as
regards payment of taxes and duties is regular, that it is entered in professional
registers, etc. The second operation is to check its economic and financial capacity by
studying the bank declarations, balance sheets and references which it is required to
produce. The Committee recommends that the strictest precautions be taken.
2.2.32. But familiarity with the above information is not enough to guarantee that the bidder
possesses the requisite capacity, as it does not include adequate particulars concerning
the bidder’s true identity. Certainly, the Commission has its early warning system – cf.
2.2.73 below. It should also check the true identity of its potential partners, requiring
them to state the composition of their board and to provide information about holders
of their capital. In addition the Commission should keep a file on contractors (cf.
2.2.69 et seq. below).
Comparison of bids
2.2.33. Bids are compared on the basis of the award criteria stated in the call for tenders. It is
prohibited to add new criteria, or to alter or delete any of those which have been
stated. Each bid must be analysed, without discrimination, by an assessment
committee whose composition is not regulated by any binding provisions. Failings
have occurred at the assessment stage and when deciding what conclusions should be
drawn from it. The stated criteria are applied to establish an order of merit, generally
in the form of figures, but they may be too vague, permitting discrimination in favour
of the beneficiary desired, or the results of the assessment may not accord with the
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findings based on the criteria.
2.2.34.  It may be necessary to declare a call for tenders unsuccessful if the analysis of the
bids shows that competition has not operated or has operated only imperfectly. In this
situation, it is not desirable to accept without debate the price offered by the front-
runner. An attempt should be made to negotiate over it, either with this firm alone, if it
proves to enjoy a monopoly, or with all the bidders. For this purpose the Commission
should not hesitate to declare the call for tenders unsuccessful with a view to opening
the negotiated procedure (Article 59 of the Financial Regulation). But, as has been
seen above (2.2.27), this measure will be productive only if the Commission has the
requisite means of analysis to provide the negotiating department with the expertise it
needs.
2.2.35. This procedure may be used in a way which runs counter to the Commission’s
financial interests – whether or not the intention is fraudulent – if, before the tender
procedure even begins, the authorising officer intends to conclude a contract with a
particular partner (cf. 2.2.9 et seq. above). In the event of such collusion, if the desired
firm submits a bid which is too high, the negotiated procedure makes it possible to
give that firm a second chance, which opens the way to fraud. This enables the firm to
submit a financially more acceptable bid in a situation where it already offers the best
quality and is possibly aware how much its competitors have bid.
Conclusion of the contract and provision of information to bidders
2.2.36. The department concerned concludes the contract with the successful bidder and
informs the other bidders of their rejection. If the contract is subject to the Directives
on public contracts, the results of the procedure are published within 48 hours of the
award in a notice of award. This states the procedure used to award the contract in the
event of a negotiated procedure without prior publication of a call for tenders, the
justification for the use of this procedure, the date of award of the contract, the award
criteria, the number of bids received, the name and address of the successful bidder,
the price paid or the range of prices, indicating the minimum and maximum, and the
value of the part of the contract which may be subcontracted, if any.
In addition, the authorising officer is required to communicate to each unsuccessful
bidder within 15 days of receiving a request to this effect, the grounds for rejection of
its bid and the name of the successful bidder. If the authorising officer decides not to
award a contract after a tender procedure or if he recommences the procedure, he must
likewise inform any bidder who so wishes of the grounds for his decision.
In the case of contracts which fall short of the threshold for application of the
Directives, bidders are informed that their bid has been rejected. If they request
additional information, this is provided in writing.
2.2.37. It is vital that all businesses should receive clear and complete explanations of the
reasons why their bids have been rejected, which in practice does not by any means
always happen. However, if the rejection is justified, the authorising officer ought not
to have any difficulty in informing the bidder of the reasons. The bidder should be
informed of its own scores and those of the successful bidder for each of the selection
criteria announced. An explanation for ‘educational’ purposes ought to be regarded as
obligatory, because it is not in the Commission’s interests to discourage bidders: rather
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it needs to enlighten them as to their weaknesses in order ultimately to receive more
worthwhile bids.
2.2.38. Because of the transparency requirement, the records concerning the procedure must
be made available to those bidders who so request, including competitors’ bids,
subject to the legitimate protection of business secrets.
Implementation and monitoring of the contract
2.2.39. The Commission generally pays a large percentage of the value of the contract as soon
as the contract is concluded; this is equivalent to actual prefinancing. The two
examples given in paragraphs 2.2.4 et seq. demonstrate how hazardous this practice
can be. The guarantee paid by the contractor becomes valueless, and termination of the
contract virtually impossible: it is hard to imagine an authorising officer pursuing this
option when 40% or 50% of the value of the contract has already been paid at the
outset without any quid pro quo. Any call for tenders and, in general, before any
contract is concluded, the call for tenders pertaining to it, should contain a realistic
schedule for payment by instalments linked to performance, to ensure that bidders are
placed on an equal footing with their competitors. A competitor who is totally
dependent on the Commission for the execution of his contract and who moreover
guarantees only 1.25% of the value of the contract constitutes a real risk to public
funds if the Commission has to bring proceedings against him.
2.2.40. Effective monitoring is imperative to ensure the proper performance of a contract or a
subsidy agreement and, if necessary, terminate it prematurely, taking the necessary
measures to ensure continuity of service in good time. The Commission’s monitoring
of contracts or subsidies is inadequate. Lack of monitoring by authorising officers is a
direct cause of non-performance and poor performance, particularly in the case of
TAOs: reduction of the contractor’s obligations without any compensation for the
Commission, unauthorised subcontracting with members of the bidding group who
cannot simultaneously carry out their duties and monitor the way in which that is
done, inadequate management, etc.
Renewal and termination of contracts
2.2.41. When a contractor fails to give satisfaction, its contract should not be renewed,
although situations can be so complex that this is not always possible. However, the reasons
ought to be explained in great detail when a contract is to be renewed without compelling
need to do so or other contracts are to be awarded to a firm which has not performed
satisfactorily. That said, the reality is often quite different. When no justification has been
provided, any decision to award or renew a contract under the circumstances described above
must be regarded as professional misconduct constituting grounds for disciplinary action.
2.2.42. The cases considered by the committee when it drew up its first report, and the
examples mentioned above, reveal a number of culpable shortcomings. These failings occur at
every stage at which assessment may be brought to bear and are not always detected by the
persons called upon to exercise supervision. Because of the failure to supply proper or
complete information, those responsible for the system cannot take decisions with full
knowledge of the facts, and bidders whose interests have been damaged are likewise not in a
position to seek explanations and assert their rights.
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Award of subsidies
2.2.43. Until the guide to subsidies entered into force on 1 January 1999, there were no
Commission-wide guidelines as regards the rules to follow when making awards. However,
the amounts paid out under that heading are extremely substantial. In 1996, for example,
according to the IGS report of 16 May 1997, the amounts of subsidies falling outside
regulated award procedures were of the same order of magnitude as the value of contracts
submitted to the CCAM (ECU 1 bn and ECU 1.4 bn respectively).
2.2.44. One distinct category of subsidies are those for which the award conditions are
determined by the legal basis. These subsidies are allocated in accordance with criteria laid
down by the legislative and budgetary authority, more often than not when a programme is
launched, and generally granted after committees including representatives of the Member
States have had their say. Subsidies not in the above category are awarded on the basis of
specific criteria under the particular procedure followed by the Directorate-General
administering the relevant chapter of the budget. The arrangements for allocating subsidies of
this latter type are discussed below.
2.2.45. Prior information is provided in the form of a call for proposals published in the
Official Journal or sent to an up-to-date list of potential recipients or, indeed, may be
channelled via contacts with recipients and bodies known to departments which have taken
the initiative of applying for a subsidy. Publication in the Official Journal imposes constraints,
and managing authorities are consequently obliged to supply more detailed information.
Unless the same information is likewise published in the Press, the other two channels of
contact open the way to all kinds of abuses.
In retrospect it can be said that lists of recipients have been published only occasionally and
the media used have frequently proved inappropriate for their purpose.
2.2.46. There is no well-established practice regarding the arrangements for submitting
applications, assessment criteria, or the substance of agreements. The only form of check
made on subsidies before they are awarded is carried out by the Financial Controller.
Monitoring of subsidies and assessment of their aims are the responsibility of the authorising
Directorate-General.
2.2.47. The SINCOM system (see 2.2.70 ff. below) records data relating to subsidies under
the SUB code. However, because the computer codes used in SINCOM are based on vague
definitions, some subsidies are excluded from the list. The data therefore cannot be assumed
to be reliable. With the possible exception of DG XIX, no department or committee has an
overall picture of the subsidies allocated. Owing to the fact that the details are not properly
publicised, the same bodies and organisations may receive subsidies from several DGs at
once. Subsidies may be administered openly, and recipients treated equally, but this does not
happen as a rule. Some authorising officers take decisions on their own, and their staff are not
even asked to compile background documents.
2.2.48. In the light of the proposal referred to in 2.1.40, true subsidies, that is to say, those for
which no immediate or direct quid pro quo is expected from the recipients, ought not to be left
to the discretion of the Directorates-General, but instead should be centrally managed, for
instance by the Secretariat-General, in a transparent way on the basis of an internal
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Commission Directive. The recommendations set out in the recent guide are totally
insufficient.
Authorising officers
2.2.49. Authorising officers are empowered to enter into contractual obligations on the
Commission’s behalf in relation to third parties. Article 73 of the Financial Regulation
stipulates that when they do so, but fail to comply with the proper rules, they may incur
disciplinary and possibly financial penalties, subject to the conditions set out in Articles 22
and 86 to 89 of the Staff Regulations of officials.
Under Article 22 of the Staff Regulations, for example, an official may be required to make
good the whole or part of any damage sustained by the Community as a result of serious
personal misconduct of which he may have been guilty while performing his duties. In
practice, as will be made clear in Chapter 4 of this report, the above provision is hardly ever
enforced.
It is legitimate to ask whether the failure to invoke Article 22 and, moreover, the fact that
disciplinary action against authorising officers is an extremely rare occurrence do not stem
from the workings of the complex delegation and subdelegation system, which, by confusing
the powers of authorising officers, political accountability, and the authority of superiors,
negates the concept of the authorising officer as a party having liability and diffuses
responsibilities.
System in force
2.2.50. The system in force is exceedingly complicated. The Commission may delegate its
powers to implement the budget (Article 22(4) of the Financial Regulation) subject to the
conditions laid down in its internal rules adopted on 20 December 197417. Under those
provisions, the following are entitled to enter into obligations on the Commission’s behalf:
- the Commission itself;
- delegated authorising officers;
- subdelegated authorising officers, provided that they have been empowered to commit
expenditure;
- as regards administrative appropriations, the official to whom a delegated or subdelegated
authorising officer has given formal permission to sign contracts or purchase orders. In
that event, the authorising officer commits the appropriations, and the official signs the
contract under the responsibility of the authorising officer and, in so doing, renders
himself personally liable with respect to the terms of the contract.
2.2.51. The instrument of delegation sets out clear limits which delegates may not overstep.
The list of authorising officers (650 in 1999) is compiled and updated by DG XIX.
                                                
17
 Internal rules on the implementation of the general budget of the European Communities (Commission
section).
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2.2.52. When, in order to deal with particular budget headings considered politically sensitive
(see the example above, points 2.2.4 ff.), the Commission retains the powers normally
devolved upon authorising officers, it takes its decision at a meeting, by a written procedure,
or by conferring the necessary entitlement on one of its Members. The proposal to be dealt
with by one of these three procedures is assessed in an opinion by the Directorates-General or
departments concerned and submitted to the Financial Controller for approval. The final
decision is taken by the Commission or the Member entitled to act. (If a Member of the
Commission has been empowered to act for this purpose, he will decide, and the Commission,
having been duly informed, takes note of what is deemed to be its decision. To that extent, the
above procedure is different from the procedure of delegating powers to a Member of the
Commission). Once the decision has been taken, the expenditure commitment proposal is
signed by the head of the managing administrative unit, who may delegate that power.
Consequently, when the Commission itself exercises the powers of an authorising officer, it
takes the decisions but does not sign the expenditure commitment or the contract, even though
the latter is the only instrument establishing rights and obligations.
The Commission may also delegate its powers to one of its Members. In that event, the rules
applicable are those governing delegations (see 2.2.53 below).
In the cases referred to above, legal commitment falls under the heading of both political and
administrative responsibility. Officials initiate the procedures, examine the documents, and
sign the expenditure commitments and contracts. The fundamental decisions are taken by the
Commission.
2.2.53. When the Commission delegates responsibility for revenue and expenditure operations
as a whole, the only person to whom such powers may be delegated is a Member of the
Commission and not a Director-General or head of department, in other words a senior
official in charge of the main administrative unit (the Directorate-General) or an independent
administrative unit. The person to whom the necessary responsibility has been delegated is
empowered to implement the appropriations entered under the budget headings concerned.
2.2.54. Delegates may themselves subdelegate powers to officials in category A or grade B 1
under their authority or to another delegated authorising officer, who may likewise
subdelegate the powers to A and B 1 officials under his authority. Irrespective of this
possibility, which applies only to Directors-General and heads of department, a person to
whom powers have been subdelegated may not transfer those powers in turn.
2.2.55.. At all events, a delegated authorising officer who subdelegates his powers may at any
time, even when the instrument of delegation has not been altered, continue to exercise the
subdelegated power either on his own initiative or at the request of the subdelegate. A person
who has subdelegated powers is consequently not debarred for that reason from exercising his
responsibilities.
The above provision enables the powers of authorising officers to be reconciled with the duty
of obedience to superiors deriving from Article 21 of the Staff Regulations. When a
subdelegate cannot render himself liable in disciplinary and financial terms for an operation
ordered by his superiors, he may request the delegated authorising officer to commit the
appropriations and conclude the contract in his place. In practice, the delegated authorising
officer refrains from assuming liability in such a case, and the matter is shelved.
2.2.56. When he elects to subdelegate his powers, an authorising officer is free to choose any
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person in his department in whom he has sufficient confidence. However, because the
authority of superiors is exercised in parallel to the powers of authorising officers,
subdelegations in practice follow the departmental order of ranking so as to avert conflicts
between superiors and subdelegated authorising officers. Many Directors-General deplore a
situation that leads them, de facto, to subdelegate authorising officer’s powers to persons not
of their own choosing. Subdelegated authorising officers often regret the fact that their career
may depend on a refusal to sign at variance with the wishes of their superiors.
2.2.57. The delegation system should be reorganised and simplified.
Extricating the Commission as a body and its individual Members from the responsibilities of
authorising officers
2.2.58. When the Commission exercises the powers of an authorising officer, it releases the
administrative hierarchy from all or part of its responsibility, and that state of affairs is
unhealthy. It would be preferable in the future if not just the Commission, but also each one of
its Members were to refrain from directly exercising an authorising officer’s powers. If
delegation of powers were to become the standard practice, the Commission and its Members
would have no cause to strip officials of their responsibilities, and officials, who are obliged
under the Staff Regulations to observe the law, would accordingly take sole responsibility for
the matters entrusted to them. Of course, individual Members and the Commission
collectively, by virtue of the status attaching to their position, would still be empowered to
issue instructions to authorising officers without prejudice to the rights and responsibilities of
the appointing authority and would naturally remain politically responsible.
2.2.59. If an authorising officer were to consider that an order was irregular or contrary to the
principles of sound financial management, he should state the position in writing. If the
Member concerned or, where applicable, the Commission as a whole were to confirm the
order in writing, the Commission would plainly assume political responsibility for the matter.
By the same token, the official would be released from his responsibility in that connection.
How officials can be led to shoulder responsibility
2.2.60. The subdelegation system should be decentralised to a far greater extent so as to
ensure that the party negotiating a contract is the authorising officer or an official ranked
closely to him who can communicate directly with him as soon as it becomes necessary to do
so.
2.2.61. It should likewise no longer be the case that an authorising officer, by signing an
expenditure commitment, renders himself liable in respect of the amount and the identity of
the recipient, whereas a more junior official signs the contract and is consequently liable for
the instrument constituting the grounds for a compliant.
2.2.62. Once he has formally accepted the powers conferred on him, every delegate should be
deemed to have a specific status whereby he would be financially liable in relation to the
Community if he were to be guilty of an error or negligence (see Chapter 4), without
prejudice to any disciplinary proceedings that might be instituted. Furthermore, the list of
authorising officers should be should be updated in real time, which does not happen at the
moment, and circulated widely throughout the Commission.
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2.2.63. Authorising officers in the lower grades (A 6, A 7, A 8, and B 1) could perhaps be
covered by provisions to protect their independence more effectively or indeed, as far as their
career progression was concerned, to offset the responsibilities they exercise and the risks to
which they are exposed, not least compared to officials in the same grades who are not
authorising officers.
Special interest groups
2.2.64. Although they take the decisions and bear responsibility for the operations, authorising
officers and administrators are not the only prime movers in direct management, since they
have to contend with the activities of pressure groups. Special interest groups are very
strongly represented in Brussels. In addition, some national representatives attempt to exert
influence. Furthermore, Members of the European Parliament may approach departments
directly, for instance at the request of national pressure groups, with a view to obtaining
subsidies. They may also enter remarks in the budget in order to specify the recipient of a
subsidy or indeed the amount to be allocated.
There is no cause to challenge the principle of special interest groups. It is their task to
influence the legislative activity of the institutions and obtain subsidies. The Commission
needs them in order fully to understand the factors to be taken into consideration when
dealing with a particular matter.
The Commission’s approach to date has been to maintain open relations with special interest
groups, without treating any one group differently from the rest. A compulsory accreditation
system or registration and codes of conduct have been ruled out. It has been assumed that the
sectors concerned are capable of drawing up and ensuring compliance with their own codes of
conduct based on the minimum criteria laid down in the communication of 5 March 199318.
The Commission has also elected to disseminate information without restrictions. A computer
site given over to its relations with special interest groups thus contains all the working tools
that officials can use to involve socio-economic circles and representatives of civil society in
the legislative procedure. The aim is to encourage officials to consult the circles concerned as
a matter of course. The site also includes the codes of conduct of trade unions and
professional organisations brought to the Commission’s notice.
2.2.66. Experience shows that the above arrangements are not enough. The Commission does
not have to regulate special interest groups as such, but should take more binding steps to
guarantee transparency. Groups should be required to make a declaration specifying their
legal status and financial situation in order to be eligible to attend meetings at which the
Commission wishes to consult them on a particular subject. It goes without saying that all
groups without exception should invariably be involved in such consultations if they have
completed the declaration formalities. Undeclared groups, however, should not be invited to
take part. The Commission has to proceed openly when consulting lobbies, and special
interest groups must do likewise when dealing with the Commission and consequently make
no secret of their legal and financial position. Notice of meetings should be published, and the
proceedings recorded in minutes.
                                                
18
 OJ C 63, 5.3.1993.
- 54 -
2.2.67. Certain precautions should be taken before permitting undeclared special interest
groups to approach Commission departments. Officials should be required to observe an
internal Directive governing their contacts with such groups and, within 24 hours, submit a
written record of their conversations to their immediate superior. Officials in most
departments do so as a matter of routine when they meet politicians or senior officials from
Member States. It would make little sense if they were to elude that obligation when dealing
with relatively obscure pressure groups.
Management tools
2.2.68. If appropriations are to be managed efficiently, an authorising officer, before awarding
a contract or subsidy, must ascertain whether the bidder has had any previous dealings with
the Commission, that is to say contracts, whether concluded directly with the bidder or
through the intermediary of other companies or organisations, subsidies granted, difficulties
encountered, or disputes.
2.2.69. A central database for contracts and contractors should be compiled first and foremost
for authorising officers and also for supervisory, auditing, and advisory bodies, which need to
have a complete picture. No such database exists at the present time. Whether they are dealing
with contracts or subsidies, decision-makers have no overall view of the Commission’s
activities, so much so that ‘the right hand does not know what the left hand is doing’.
The Commission became aware of that fact in the mid-1990s as a result both of the growing
volume of disputes and pre-litigation procedures relating to the award or execution of
contracts and of mounting criticism from Parliament, the Court of Auditors, and for that
matter the Ombudsman (50% of complaints addressed to the Ombudsman relate to problems
connected with the Commission’s contracting activity).
2.2.70. Since it did not go beyond what was required to ensure compliance with the Financial
Regulation, the official SINCOM financial and accounting system did not make for very
accurate understanding of the statistics (on the question of subsidies, for example, see 2.2.45).
SINCOM does indeed include a ‘third-party file’ (i.e. listing persons who have received
payments from the Commission), but the file, which is designed to be used to make payments,
is based on bank accounts and does not indicate how many contracts the Commission has
concluded with a recipient of payments or whether a company owes money to the
Commission.
Such information as might be available on the administration of contracts can be obtained
only via the local systems operated by the Directorates-General, which interface with
SINCOM. By making step-by-step inquiries, it is possible to work a way back to these data,
which hinge on the information standard of the local system but are not comparable to those
which would be provided by a central database for contracts and contractors.
2.2.71. The CCAM operates its own database, ADAM, a record of all public procurement
matters considered since 1993. This database makes for exhaustive analyses because all types
of sorting are possible. However, once it has delivered its opinion, the CCAM no longer keeps
track of a matter (according to one plan, authorising officers were supposed to input the
number of the CCAM opinion concerning each expenditure commitment, but, for cost
reasons, this has never been done). It records information on the award of a contract but
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plays no role in the financial and accounting procedure related to its execution. The ADAM
database consequently offers little help to non-CCAM users.
2.2.72. The fact that there is no central database has gradually led to numerous difficulties for
the Commission. In the first place, legal proceedings in which the Commission is involved are
considerably more complicated to handle. Secondly, the Commission cannot respond quickly
or efficiently to problems connected with a contract, as the committee discovered in its
various investigations for its first report when it encountered difficulties in identifying the
total number of contracts concluded with a given company by the different departments.
Finally, the lack of a central database reduces the likelihood of bringing about organised
solutions to recurrent problems arising from the award and execution of contracts, since
overall assessment becomes more difficult and ‘good practice’ cannot, therefore, be so readily
disseminated.
2.2.73. In 1997 the Commission, mindful of this state of affairs, set up a computerised Early
Warning System (EWS), based on the SINCOM third-party file and designed to be consulted
at the earliest possible stage of the pre-contract procedure (calls for expression of interest or
invitations to tender)19. The system is intended to identify actual or potential recipients of
Community moneys who could legally be excluded under the public procurement Directives
either because they have been mentioned in the findings of investigations by UCLAF, the
financial control departments, or the Court of Auditors, or because they are parties involved in
legal proceedings or liable under recovery orders issued by the Commission.
The fact of being identified by the EWS (at any rate in the three cases referred to above) does
not necessarily debar a recipient from having dealings with the Commission. On the other
hand, the department intending to enter into a contract with that recipient will be more likely
to take precautions, for instance by making enquiries to the Directorate-General which entered
the relevant details in the system. The EWS is a useful initiative, but no substitute for the
indispensable back-up tool for contract policy that would be provided by a database for
contracts/contractors.
2.2.74. Following on from ‘SEM 2000’ and in conjunction with the new ‘Central Contracts
Unit’, which will be discussed below (2.2.78), the Commission has decided in principle to
compile a contract register (a register of standard contracts will be compiled first) and process
contractors in great detail (monitoring of company mergers, newly established subsidiaries,
changes of name, etc.) by setting up a contractor register, again based on the third-party file
but which, as well as being used for payment purposes, as is presently the case, could also be
used for the purposes of commitments.
However, more than three years have passed since that decision was taken, and it has proved
impossible, on account of the numerous technical difficulties and the huge development costs
of the SINCOM II system, for the projected combined third-party/contracts/contractors file to
be put into operation.
2.2.75. One alternative to consider, therefore, is expansion of the CCAM’s ADAM database.
The development project already begun, ADAM module 2, was initially intended purely to
ascertain whether the Commission should make use of external studies20. There is no reason
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 Communication SEC(97)1562 of 30 July 1997.
20
 ADAM 2 has replaced CERES, the centralised database run by DG XIX, which has never worked well,
because the information it contained depended on the goodwill of the authorising departments. The second
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why the same method should not be used to process information about other types of contracts
(consultants and subsidies), apart from the difficulty of ‘interfacing’ such a database with the
SINCOM II system21. To guarantee success, the discussion must be pursued in cooperation
with the authorising officers, the only sources capable of loading the central system.
Advice to authorising officers
2.2.76. Advice to authorising officers is clearly a corner-stone of the direct contract
management system, in which the committee includes all subsidies requiring the recipient in
return to render services of direct use to the Commission in the performance of its tasks.
2.2.77. The committee believes the above point to be especially important because this report
is endeavouring above all to lay emphasis on the concepts of transparency and responsibility.
In return for the transparency and responsibility which they have to bring to bear, authorising
officers are entitled to a high standard of technical assistance at all times.
Central Contracts Unit
2.2.78. To maintain control over and harmonise its contracting activity and in conjunction
with its decision to equip itself with a central database for contracts and contractors, the
Commission has set up a new unit within DG XIX, the Central Contracts Unit.
2.2.79. This unit, currently in the process of organisation, will act as a channel of contact
between the Legal Service, the financial control departments, and the CCAM. Its task is to
identify consistent categories of contracts in order to establish a more accurate typology,
standardise contracting practices, and encourage authorising departments to use standard
contracts in as systematic a way as possible. The Central Contracts Unit should also provide
specific assistance to authorising officers, in particular when they wish to draw up more
specialised contracts, and compile a register of standard contracts with a view to developing
the contract/contractor database.
2.2.80. The Central Contracts Unit has no supervisory or advisory power and no seat on the
CCAM. To perform its role of bringing coherence to contracting activity, it will have to rely
on the other departments and wait to be consulted: public procurement matters are not
automatically referred to it, and it has no power to deliver opinions on its own initiative. To
offset this relative remoteness from the subject with which it is supposed to deal, it should
either anticipate departmental needs, and its staff complement would accordingly have to be
increased to enable it to do so, or computerise the drafting of contracts so that authorising
officers would be obliged to follow the prescribed models or else would have to consult the
unit if they wished to depart from them. However, the existing management tools would have
                                                                                                                                                        
module, grafted on in 1997, enables the ADAM database to record all research contracts, including those which,
because their value falls below the mandatory threshold, do not have to be referred to the CCAM, and to pool
together all useful references (‘local’ reference in ADAM 2, CCAM number, number of the CCAM decision)
and essential qualitative information.
21
 It would be essential to provide the interface because there is virtually no prospect that data could be entered
into a database of this kind in a systematic and reliable way if the database were separated from the financial
flows generated by execution of contracts. Unfortunately, an interface is difficult to achieve on account of the
technical problem of defining budget commitment references in SINCOM II.
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to afford the opportunities for the unit to proceed in that way. The committee’s proposed
solutions to this problem are discussed below (2.2.97 and 98).
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Advisory Committee on Procurements and Contracts (CCAM)
2.2.81. The CCAM performs a dual supervisory and advisory role. To enable it to exercise the
supervision that it is required to provide, it has to deliver an opinion, before the authorising
officer takes his decision, on all draft works, supply, or service contracts, including research
contracts, worth not less than EUR 46 000. This threshold is extremely low, but a higher value
applies where contracts are to be concluded by the Joint Research Centre.
2.2.82. All subsidies, by definition, fall outside its terms of reference, as do contracts worth
less than the threshold value necessitating an opinion and those covered by Title IX of the
Financial Regulation (‘Special provisions applicable to external aid’), with the exception of
service contracts ‘awarded in the interests of the Commission’ (Article 119 of the Financial
Regulation). It is legitimate to ask what kind of contracts might not be awarded in the interests
of the Commission, since, by nature, every contract implies that the Commission will derive
some form of benefit in return for the amount disbursed. This example is indicative of the
depths of inanity plumbed by certain definitions which have recently gained currency in the
Community.
Even though it is impossible in practice to distinguish between service contracts awarded in
the interests of the Commission and those awarded in the interests of a recipient of funds, the
Commission nevertheless decided in 1988 that all contracts relating to technical assistance
offices22 would be submitted to the CCAM.
2.2.83. The opinions of the CCAM relate to the question whether the procedure followed is in
accordance with the provisions applicable, the selection of the proposed successful bidder,
and, in general, the conditions specified for the award of contracts.
The CCAM is called upon to ascertain that the projected expenditure is not out of proportion
to the aims being sought and that those aims cannot be achieved at less cost. It is therefore
entitled, if not to say whether a contract should be awarded, then at least to consider whether
the measures proposed are economically the most appropriate to attain the appointed
objective. In general terms, it seeks to ensure that the rules for putting projects up for tender
are applied in such a way as to make for transparency in the proceedings and treat all bidders
equally.
2.2.84. CCAM opinions are of a purely advisory nature: they do not in themselves constitute
any form of veto. Even if, in practice, an authorising officer withdraws his project, when he
continues the procedure and submits the project to the Financial Controller, the latter quite
often adduces the views of the CCAM in support of his refusal of approval. Furthermore,
there have been a great many cases in which the Financial Controller has withheld his
approval whereas the CCAM has delivered a favourable opinion.
Under the Financial Regulation and the implementing rules, the CCAM is required in addition
to play an advisory role. It may thus be called upon to deliver an opinion, at the request of the
appropriate authorising officer or one of his staff, on especially important or highly specific
projects put up for tender, matters arising from the award or execution of contracts
(cancellation of orders, requests for remission of penalties for late fulfilment of obligations,
                                                
22
 At this point the term ‘technical assistance office’ accordingly needs to be defined (see section 2.3 below). It
would have been preferable if the CCAM had been called upon to consider technical assistance contracts or
simply project managership contracts (a contract regrettably unknown to the Commission).
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exceptions to the terms and conditions set out in the contract documents), or contracts falling
below the opinion threshold that raise questions of principle (Article 68 of the implementing
rules). This advisory role is not very extensive in practice and confined mainly to procedural
matters.
2.2.85. Although, under Article 112 of the implementing rules, the CCAM may exercise
wide-ranging powers in its advisory capacity and, for example, conduct investigations or
instruct other parties to do so, its activities tend to be confined to modest proportions. In
conjunction with its opinions it makes recommendations on specific points and distributes
circulars to authorising officers on matters arising from contracts, for instance to alert them to
problems posed by conflicts and delegation of the tasks of public authorities and contractors.
It ceased some years ago to put forward recommendations to the Commission, and its annual
report, addressed to the Commission, does not refer directly to the Commission’s contract
policy.
Membership and operation of the CCAM
2.2.86. Article 64 of the Financial Regulation stipulates that the CCAM must include at least
one representative of the department responsible for overall administration, a representative of
the department responsible for finance, and a representative of the department responsible for
legal matters. In addition, a representative of the Financial Controller attends meetings as an
observer. Those provisions apart, membership decisions rest with the Commission. At
present, the CCAM consists in theory of ten members, mostly in grade A 2, representing the
Directorate-General for Personnel and Administration (DG IX), the Legal Service, the
Directorate-General for Budgets (DG XIX), the Directorate-General for the Internal Market
and Financial Services (DG XV), the Directorate-General for Competition (DG IV), the
Directorate-General for Industry (DG III), the Joint Service for the Management of
Community Aid to Non-Member Countries (SCR), the Publications Office, and the Statistical
Office. The chairmanship is held by the Directorate-General for Budgets, represented by a
Deputy Director-General.
Each DG or unit represented on the CCAM also appoints a substitute. With the exception of
the chairman, those who serve on the CCAM are in fact substitutes. They occupy much more
junior positions than the full members and are sometimes employed under temporary
contracts. They change from one year and one meeting to the next. This regrettable practice
scarcely fosters a sense of cohesion and responsibility within the committee and detracts from
the standard and status to which the committee’s opinions should aspire.
2.2.87. The Commission’s explanation for the situation is indicative of a decline in the role of
the CCAM. The Commission maintains that, because the public procurement Directives have
been adopted, it is acceptable to make use of substitutes, or even substitutes for substitutes,
since their attendance suffices for the ‘routine’ implementation, as it were, of now perfect
rules. Moreover, because an increasing number of matters are submitted for consideration, the
workload of a member of the CCAM is too heavy to be assumed by senior officials.
2.2.88. Each CCAM representative is appointed for a given year to report on matters
originating from a DG other than his own. Committee offices rotate every year.
2.2.89. The CCAM is assisted by a secretariat comprising six officials, including two in
category A. The Deputy Director-General who chairs it devotes much of his work to
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committee activities. Apart from providing assistance, the secretariat advises authorising
departments, especially when contract documents are being drawn up, and arranges their
training.
2.2.90. Before each full meeting, a preparatory working party examines all the reports tabled
and proposes that they be adopted as ‘A’ items, without debate, or considered at the meeting
(‘B’ items). The working party consists of members and substitutes from the Directorates-
General represented on the CCAM.
2.2.91. The CCAM meets about once a month (13 times in 1997). Meeting days are very long
(from 9 a.m. to 8 p.m. or indeed 10 p.m. or later). Opinions are delivered by a simple
majority, and the chairman has a casting vote in the event of a tie. Individual votes are not
recorded in the minutes, and CCAM proceedings are secret.
2.2.92. According to its annual reports, 914 matters were placed on the agenda in 1996, in
other words 100 matters per meeting, and 1 014 in 1997, or 78 per meeting. The number of
matters treated as A items was 560 in 1996 and 533 in 1997. As a result, 354 contracts in
1996 and 481 in 1997 were, in theory, considered in detail. On average, 39 matters were
considered at each meeting in 1996, and 37 in 1987, but the average figure is meaningless
because, on account of budget annuality, most matters are dealt with at the end of the year. In
1997, for example, the CCAM dealt with as many as 72 B items at a single meeting, giving a
total of five to ten an hour. Under those circumstances, thorough consideration, dialogue with
the departments responsible for contracts, and education become complete impossibilities.
2.2.93. Each matter is the subject of an opinion which may give endorsement, sometimes
coupled with a recommendation for forthcoming contracts or qualified by reservations, in
which case the department concerned is called upon to alter certain points in the draft
contract, more often than not in consultation with the Legal Service, suspend judgment until
the authorising officer has supplied further information, or advocate rejection. Explanatory
statements attached to opinions, which are sometimes not produced, are frequently brief or
vaguely worded.
In 1997 the CCAM delivered 912 favourable opinions and 27 unfavourable opinions. In 42
cases the authorising officer withdrew a draft contract while the procedure was in progress,
for the most part to avoid an unfavourable opinion.
Out of the 912 favourable opinions, 24% related to studies or consultancy contracts.
Consequently, only 23.5% of the matters submitted for consideration were sensitive issues
(research and consultants) giving rise to difficulties. A total of 643 contracts were concluded
after the project had been put up for tender, and 274 were concluded by the negotiated
procedure.
2.2.94. To obtain a favourable opinion, a department has to wait for about three weeks to a
month, when the matter poses no problems, and two months if it raises difficulties. The time
required is invariably the same, regardless of the classification by the preparatory working
party, in spite of the fact A items have virtually no prospect of being considered by the
CCAM, which cannot even manage to deal properly with all of the matters classed as B items.
Furthermore, as mentioned above, a favourable opinion does not guarantee that the Financial
Controller will give his approval, bearing in mind that he observes different criteria from the
CCAM.
- 61 -
Should the CCAM be abolished?
2.2.95. The CCAM has gradually confined itself to the role of junior inspector (checking the
date and content of publications, compliance with time-limits, proper observance of the
criteria for selecting bidders and awarding contracts, and so forth). It endorsed most of the
service contracts which have recently been called into question. It is legitimate to ask whether
rapporteurs are in a position (in terms of time, expertise, and independence, not least in
relation to superiors) to subject the matters under their responsibility to accurate scrutiny.
2.2.96. Given that it slows down contracting procedures and the value added that it generates
is not always plain to see, the CCAM could conceivably be abolished.
2.2.97. On the other hand, if the CCAM were to be abolished, Commission authorising
officers would no longer be able to seek enlightened advice from colleagues having an overall
picture of contract policy which the Contracts Unit in its present form cannot replace.
20. In fact, the Central Contracts Unit needs the CCAM and should use it to resolve its
specific problem (see 2.2.71).
2.2.98. The CCAM must therefore be reorganised. Its full members should be Directors or
Directors-General, and their substitutes, officials in grades A 3 to A 6, as a minimum, selected
on account of their authority, individual skills, and independence in relation to their superiors
when performing their duties. The membership should be reduced to one representative of the
Legal Service, one or two members of the Contracts Unit (DG XIX), and a representative of
the Secretariat-General. Their operational expertise should be matched by an equal number of
authorising officers chosen on the basis of their experience and administrative position in DGs
very actively involved in public procurement.
2.2.99. Independent rapporteurs should be appointed, where appropriate former officials on a
list to be compiled by the chairman of the CCAM. This point is important because the current
arrangement does not guarantee the independence of rapporteurs in relation to fellow
rapporteurs.
2.2.100. Given that members themselves should attend meetings, the organisation of CCAM
business should be changed. Instead of considering about fifty contracts per meeting, at an
average speed of ten an hour(!), the CCAM should examine three or four, selected either
because they could serve as examples and material for case-studies or because they might be
of use for an individually tailored consultation policy. Opinion thresholds should be increased
substantially, and distinctions made according to the types of contracts. Intellectual service
contracts and in particular project management contracts should be considered with special
care. The threshold for normal supply and service contracts could be raised to EUR 3 m,
whereas the threshold for intellectual service contracts – apart from project management
contracts – could be set at the lower level of EUR 100 000. All project management contracts
(TAOs) should continue to be submitted to the CCAM, as is the case at present.
2.2.101. Higher thresholds would not remove the need for selection, since the number of
contracts submitted to the CCAM would still be very high. The selection should be made not
by the preparatory working party, which should be abolished, but by the chairman of the
CCAM, acting under his own responsibility and assisted by a secretariat whose staff
complement could to some extent be increased. Projects not selected by the chairman to be
considered by the CCAM would instantly be ‘jettisoned’ so as to avoid needless. If
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necessary, the CCAM should in addition be split into specialist sections according to the types
of contracts. The matters which the CCAM should be called upon to consider for the purpose
of delivering an opinion should not exceed a hundred a year.
2.2.102. Any authorising officer who so wished should be permitted to ask the CCAM to
consider a draft contract under an accelerated procedure, if the contract has not been selected.
Responsible authorising officers ought to understand, however, that they would be given little
credit if they were to make such requests too frequently.
2.2.103. To preserve the independence of committee members, the confidentiality of CCAM
proceedings should be very carefully protected. Its opinions, on the other hand, should be
supported by detailed statements of reasons and distributed as a matter of course to all
authorising officers.
2.2.104. The reforms advocated would enable the CCAM to revert to the spirit of the role
assigned to it by the legislative authority and, aided by the resulting synergy, combine with
the Central Contracts Unit to form a consultative focal point offering practical experience,
overall vision, and hence the necessary authority to help authorising officers and guide the
Commission’s contract policy, not least by refining the typology of contracts to gear them to
new needs.
2.3  Contracting-out of Commission tasks
2.3.1. The Commission will in future have a huge number of tasks to perform, the
temporary and specialised nature of which requires them to be contracted out -
subcontracting being justified on the grounds of efficiency, expediency and cost. It may be
noted that recourse to technical assistance on the part of the Commission has never been
challenged either by Parliament or by the Council.
2.3.2. In practical terms the concept of technical assistance (or, rather, technical and
administrative assistance) covers a very varied range of tasks relating to the running of a
Community programme or initiative, all of which are possible candidates for contracting out:
for example, the dissemination of information concerning the programme in question, the
collection and processing of data, the performance of checks to ensure that work has been
paid for, the preparation of payments (administrative assistance tasks), the assessment of the
technical soundness of tenders submitted, the provision of an operational interface between
the authorities of third countries and the Community, the organisation of conferences and
seminars, and the carrying out of checks on, and assessments of, the progress made in the
implementation of the programme (technical assistance tasks). This list is by no means
exhaustive23.
2.3.3. The fact that such tasks are carried out in such close proximity to the
Commission’s activities as a public authority and the major likelihood that conflicts of interest
could occur would have justified the performance of very careful checks on the subcontracts
concluded. Quite the opposite has occurred, since the way in which those subcontracts have
been carried out has  highlighted the most disturbing aspects of the Commission’s contractual
practices: arbitrariness in budget entry, poor understanding of the rules governing the
                                                
23
 In accordance with the description contained in the Inspectorate-General’s report on the inquiry into the
Commission’s use of technical assistance offices, 4 February 1998. See Annex III.
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conclusion of contracts, a dilution within the hierarchical chain of the responsibility of
authorising officers and a poor standard of advice and monitoring from the centre. All of the
weaknesses described earlier concerning the Commission’s direct management system were
graphically illustrated during the 1990s by the TAOs (Technical Assistance Offices), some of
which have recently featured in news reports concerning Community affairs24.
What are TAOs?
2.3.4. The first report made the point that ‘As may be seen from several of the files
discussed in this report, the concept of having European public programmes implemented by
private contractors needs to be carefully considered and managed25’. A TAO is in practice
nothing more than a Commission contractor. It is not its status vis-à-vis the Commission or its
legal form (which may vary: non-profit-making body, university, private company, etc.)
which makes it a TAO but, rather, the substance of the contract which it concludes with the
Commission: a contract for the contracting out by the Commission of some or all of the tasks
involved in the implementation of a programme for which the Commission is responsible.
2.3.5. It would therefore be artificial to seek a generic definition of a TAO as a structure –
a point made by the Inspectorate-General (I-G) in the introduction to its 1998 report26: ‘[at the
Commission] there is no single definition of the term Technical Assistance Office’. Many
definitions are possible, depending on the conventions within which a definition is sought.
Hence the I-G report considers only TAOs taking the form of legal persons providing
technical assistance to the Commission itself (and not to the programme’s beneficiaries) over
a period exceeding one year in duration and by means of outside human resources. However,
although the guide to technical assistance offices which is being prepared under the leadership
of DG XIX (see above) maintains the concept of outside service provision as a criterion for
identifying a TAO, it takes the view that the term covers not only assistance provided solely
to the Commission but also assistance provided to the mutual advantage of the Commission
and the beneficiaries of Community programmes. (Assistance provided solely for the
beneficiaries of Community programmes was deemed to be outside the scope of the guide.)
2.3.6. Presentation of technical assistance from the point of view of TAOs is not only
artificial but also deceptive, since the administrative status which is conferred on them tends
to divert attention from the essential consideration, namely the legal act (often poorly
monitored) represented by the conclusion of a public contract for the provision of services.
Furthermore, such a presentation makes it impossible for technical and administrative
assistance, which may take a variety of forms, to be managed in a comprehensive fashion.
2.3.7. In the light of the above it is not surprising that caution should be exercised when
assessing the extent of such assistance. For 1996 the I-G listed 51 TAOs involved in 45
Community programmes or initiatives, employing 653 persons from outside the Commission
at a cost of approximately ECU 80 million and responsible for administering appropriations
totalling ECU 270 million. However, a later assessment27 based on a different method
estimated that TAOs represented the equivalent of approximately 1000 men per year costing a
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 First report by the CIE: ARTM (MED programmes) – paragraphs 3.1.1. to 3.8.4, AGENOR (Leonardo
programme) – paragraphs 5.1.1. to 5.8.7. in  particular
25
 First report by the CIE, paragraph 5.8.1.
26
 op.cit.
27
 Inquiry into the use of outside technical and administrative assistance by the Commission; memo dated 30
November 1998.  This document also details the TAOs by DG; see Annex IV.
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total of approximately 190 million euros (although technical and administrative assistance
provided from sources other than  TAOs represented the equivalent of 710 men per year at a
total cost of 64 million euros).
2.3.8. Be that as it may, technical and administrative assistance is extensively used and the
increase in such use during the 1990s is due to a combination of factors:
- the application to the EU budget, as part of the convergence process leading to the
establishment of a single currency, of a degree of austerity similar to that applied to the
Member States’ domestic budgets. This austerity has most severely affected
administrative expenditure, with the effect that departments have tended to compensate
by making increased use of technical assistance financed from operational headings;
- a major increase in the Commission’s management tasks, stemming from the
implementation of numerous multi-annual programmes relating both to internal policies
(Leonardo, Socrates, Media, Raphaël, Kaleidoscope, Ariane) and to external activities
(Phare, Tacis, Meda), an increase which the Commission has been unable to cope with
adequately by means of measures to redeploy the available resources;
- emphasis on the objective of implementing the various programmes, particularly in the
case of the European Parliament which has sought to link the allocation of further
appropriations to the satisfactory implementation (in quantitative terms) of the
appropriations relating to previous years.
2.3.9. Irrespective of the extent of the assistance provided, analysis reveals in particular
significant differences between TAOs as regards the DGs which use their services, the source
of their budget funding (either Part A or Part B), the average cost of a job in a TAO (ranging
from ECU 14 420 to 214 000), the nature of the services provided (see below), the checks
carried out by the Commission on the activities of its fellow contractors, the share of the
appropriations allocated to a Community programme which passes through the hands of the
TAO (between 6% and 90%), etc.
Difficulties associated with using TAOs
2.3.10 Using TAOs first of all raises the question of where to draw the dividing line
between Commission tasks which can be subcontracted without any risk to the public service
(and even with certain benefits in terms of efficiency) and those in respect of which the
Commission would be abandoning its responsibilities if it were to delegate them to private
companies. Within the Commission it is customary for the latter category of tasks to be
described as ‘public-authority tasks’28 and it is agreed that they should not be entrusted to
outside staff. This at least is what was ‘recommended’ in a 1997 staff memo from the
Secretary-General29 which, under the pretext of laying down minimal rules (vague and non-
binding into the bargain), surreptitiously legitimised TAOs. In the absence of any other
directive30, of bodies to advise and assist Commission staff and of any system for
disseminating sound practices (shortcomings which were openly condemned in the I-G
                                                
28 In other words, public-service tasks which cannot be entrusted to the providers of technical
assistance.
29
 SEC(97) 1542 of 30 July1997
30
 Other than a single vague definition in the 1994 Code of Conduct relating to the use of outside
personnnel : ‘These tasks include in particular duties relating to the representation, the negotiation,
the monitoring and the observance of Community law’.
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report), TAOs were entrusted with tasks such as checking and paying for work, managing
contracts concluded with the final beneficiaries of Community initiatives and assessing
tenders.
2.3.11 The development of the TAOs has brought to light the frequent failings and the
extremely diverse nature of the Commission’s contractual practices, as illustrated by the care
taken with the drawing up of tender specifications, the introduction of schemes for checking
on the resources used by TAOs in implementing their contracts, the concern to avoid the
repeated use of certain TAOs so as to prevent them from becoming privileged partners of the
Commission, the selection of the procedure for the conclusion of service contracts, and the
criteria for the awarding of such contracts and the role of the CCAM  (a body which was
aware that things were going awry but which had no real power to intervene).
2.3.12.  Furthermore, the use of TAOs has highlighted the unsuitability of the budgetary
framework (see section 2.1.5 above). The restrictions on the appropriations allocated to
administrative expenditure had led from a very early stage to the financing of such
expenditure from operational headings in the form of ‘mini-budgets’, in blatant contravention
of the rules laid down in the Financial Regulation concerning the entry of resources into the
budget. Following criticism of the matter by the budgetary authority the mini-budgets were
progressively absorbed from the 1993 budget onwards, the corresponding appropriations were
‘repatriated’ to Part A and at the same time ‘converted into jobs’ (1830 jobs created) and new
rules on the entry of resources into the budget were issued. However, those rules, which were
based on vague definitions and were accompanied by numerous exceptions, did nothing to
ensure transparency and by their very wording they laid themselves open to circumvention: in
particular they allowed the appropriations intended to cover the cost of technical assistance to
be entered in different parts of the budget according to the identity of the ‘beneficiaries’ of
that assistance (Commission or third countries). Hence the rules in no way prevented further
operating appropriations from being entered in Part B: back in 1996 the Commission
indicated that it needed extra staff on account of the Phare and Tacis programmes and the
funding was drawn once again from both Part A and Part B (the ‘Liikanen facility’). At no
point did the Council, Parliament or the Commission take the extent of the problem seriously.
The Commission’s response
2.3.13 Although as early as 1993 an I-G report condemned the risks inherent in
subcontracting the running of Community programmes to private bodies31, although (apart
from the abolition of mini budgets) the Financial Regulation continued to be constantly
infringed and although spectacular reforms relating to structures (SEM 2000) and the staff
(MAP 2000) were announced, the TAOs continued to develop with impunity, the
Commission reacting only belatedly and half-heartedly.
2.3.14 A guide is currently being drawn up, the principles of which were adopted by the
resigning Commission at its meeting of 22 June 1999. The guidelines it contains are certainly
an improvement over the vacuum which they have replaced. As a response to the problems
described above they are, however, incomplete and insufficient. In the first place the very idea
of issuing a guide to TAOs is based on an error of analysis. It has already been pointed out
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 IG report on private bodies, 11 March 1993: risks to the Commission’s image; financial risks; risk of conflict
of interest for officials (in the event of service provision which is not in accordance with the
requirements of contracts); risk of deviation from financial procedures; risks relating to the
establishment of special permanent links with certain service providers; risk of unfair competition.
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that TAOs do not constitute a legal category which can be defined other than by means of the
contractual relationship between them and the Commission. It is therefore this contractual
relationship which needs to be analysed and firmly regulated, as stated above. Behind every
TAO there is a contract. Why has the Commission failed for so long to recognise this fact,
thereby losing control over technical assistance? Because the Financial Regulation has never
adequately spelt out the law on contracts and in particular it does not allow for the special
nature of contracts covering intellectual services and especially, within such contracts, the
concepts of technical assistance and project management.
2.3.15 Furthermore, the proposed guidelines are not sufficiently firm as regards the essential
issue of the tasks which TAOs may not carry out on the grounds that they are constituent parts
of the ‘hard core’ of public service duties which should not be delegated under any contract.
If, for example, a contract delegates the examination of files to a TAO, the Commission’s
power to approve applications for funding is merely a token one.
2.3.16. Doubt may be expressed regarding the wisdom of setting up a TAO monitoring
agency within DG XIX, as mentioned in the guide. Central monitoring is certainly essential
but responsibility for the task could surely be given to the Central Contracts Unit which works
closely with the CCAM secretariat (see paragraph 2.2.78 et seq). The Commission tends to set
up one unit after another in order to create a good impression, but in so doing it runs the risk
of making them redundant or of creating rivalry between them.
2.3.17. The guide perpetuates the questionable distinction between TAOs based on the kind of
beneficiary they serve in order to justify the entry of the appropriations relating to some of
them in Part B of the budget. This constitutes an infringement of the Financial Regulation
which once again demonstrates the obsolescence thereof (see section 2.1). At least the guide
takes note of the three conditions laid down by the budgetary authority which have to be met
if the funding for TAOs which ‘provide assistance in the mutual interest of the Commission
and the beneficiaries of Community programmes or actions’ is to be entered in Part B:
appropriate authorisation of the legal basis, a reference in the budget remark relating to the
programme concerned and an indication of an annual ceiling on TAO-related expenditure.
Better contracting-out
2.3.18. Any planned new action or programme adopted by the legislative and budgetary
authority should be assessed in advance from the point of view of the resources needed for it
to be implemented.
Stricter contracts
2.3.19. To start with there must be improved monitoring of the conclusion and
implementation of contracts in accordance with the following principles: public service
responsibilities must never be entrusted to TAOs; TAOs must be used only if they represent
the most economic way of having specific tasks carried out; an appropriate system based in
particular on an internal audit department, the establishment of which is recommended in
Chapter 5 of this report, must be devised for the purpose of overseeing and monitoring all
their activities; conflicts of interest must be avoided; the cost of TAOs may be funded from
Part B of the budget only if the agreement of the budgetary authority is secured. The difficulty
lies entirely in determining what constitutes public service responsibilities and in this respect
there is a considerable gap between principle and reality.
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2.3.20.  A case in point is one in which a contractor, on behalf of the Commission and on the
basis of a number of separate contracts concluded with different Directorates-General,
performs a range of precise tasks which can be clearly specified. In such a case, no objection
can be raised if each of the DGs concerned deals individually with the TAO, which acts as a
multiple service provider.
2.3.21. Things are very different when it comes to contracting out an integrated set of
indissociable tasks (or, at least, a set of measures) with a view to implementing a programme
on a permanent basis. In such a case a contractual arrangement comes up against three
limitations:
- It presumes that the substance of a contract can be perfectly defined in the contract
specifications whereas, in practice, although a thorough analysis may be sufficient in
many cases, there will still be others in which neither the precise result to be expected
from the technical assistance nor the actual resources needed for that assistance to be
provided can be known in advance.
- It supposes that the distinction between public-authority tasks and other, non-public-
authority tasks can always be translated into organisational terms, so that the former
can be reserved for the Commission and the latter delegated to the providers of
technical assistance. Simple clerical tasks such as, for example, information
dissemination or data processing, may fall within the public authority domain if they
cannot be separated from the exercise of powers of assessment. On the other hand,
high-level tasks may call for specific skills which are more likely to be found in the
private sector than within the Commission (implementation of a tourism promotion
programme, for example).
- Subjecting TAOs to the tighter discipline of a more binding contract is no substitute for
the daily monitoring which may in certain cases be necessary, particularly where the
management of major projects relating to the implementation of an entire large-scale
Community programme is concerned.
2.3.22.  In the above case, improved monitoring of contracts may not be sufficient to ensure
that the Commission has satisfactory control over the tasks which are contracted out.
Consideration should therefore be given to the various ways which could enable the
Commission, acting under its own responsibility, to entrust  them to external bodies (existing
or to be created) which it could monitor effectively.
Recourse to private bodies
2.3.23.  Recourse to non-profit-making bodies is not a generally acceptable arrangement since
conflicts of interest would be inevitable if such bodies were to be set up by Commission
officials acting in an individual capacity or by persons close to such officials. Furthermore,
those officials could be accused of using a non-profit-making body to circumvent the
provisions of the Financial Regulation and the requirements imposed by the principle of
transparency.
2.3.24.  This does not of course apply in cases where the non-profit-making body, rather than
being an artificial construction, is a credible entity capable of existing independently and
having a large number of members, genuinely active social sections and a humanitarian (or at
least disinterested) social purpose. In such a situation, either the body in question has a range
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of perfectly acceptable contractual links with the Commission (see 2.3.20 above), or the
service provision is restricted to a single supply and is not subject to contract (see 2.3.21
above), and the non-profit-making formula is inappropriate.
2.3.25. The involvement of the Commission in private companies which it would monitor in
its capacity as majority (even sole) shareholder is an alternative to be considered. It has
certain attractive features such as a definite legal framework and well-structured management
bodies, but also the flexibility characteristic of the private sector, particularly as regards staff
recruitment.
2.3.26. However, setting up such companies would be cumbersome since the Commission
would be unable to secure the funds needed for the requisite capital to be constituted without
obtaining the budgetary authority’s consent. Furthermore, its decision-making and
supervisory powers within the company would be subject to the provisions of national
company law (as regards the secondment of officials, the powers of the internal audit
department referred to in chapter 5 of this report, the removal of the chairman and managing
director, etc.). Successful contracting out of certain Commission tasks by this means calls for
a skilful balancing act. On the one hand, if the company concerned is dependent on the
Commission for its survival, this could distort competition in the sector and give rise to
conflicts of interest. On the other hand, if the company has a range of customers the
Commission would be required, as a shareholder, to assume commercial responsibilities
which lie outside its field and which would be a distraction from its desired objective, namely
to concentrate on its public service tasks.
Implementing agencies
2.3.27. As has already been done in certain Commission departments32, consideration
should therefore be given to securing access to technical assistance through the development
of new Community legal structures which could be described as ‘Commission executive
agencies’. In putting forward this suggestion the Committee would straight away point out the
need to avoid various stumbling blocks which have already been encountered in the past:
- The Commission should not be surrounded by the type of agencies which currently
exist: these, far from providing a means of more flexible management enabling the
Commission to tap skills which it lacks internally but which are present in the private
sector, represent permanent structures within which the Commission’s management
powers are undermined by the Member States (which sit on the governing bodies). In
addition they are very cumbersome to set up on account of the requirement for a
unanimous Council decision and they are often monitored less stringently as regards
the setting and the implementation of their budget.
- Any risk of creating permanent bodies should be avoided by insisting that
Commission executive agencies should be set up only if specific, temporary needs
(relating to the implementation of a programme) have been identified.
                                                
32
 Contradictory response from DG IX to the IG inspection report on TAOs, memo 0367 of 3 February
1998 from Director-General IX; memo 0200 of 25 January 1999 from Director-General IX on European
Programme Implementation Offices, etc. A reference to these considerations may be found in paragraph
7.2.3.2 of the DECODE report.
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2.3.28.  An appropriate solution could therefore be to use implementing agencies having a
distinct legal personality and financial autonomy. A framework regulation based on Article
308 (ex Article 235) of the Treaty and adopted by the legislative authority would establish the
conditions and the arrangements for the setting up of such agencies, to which the Commission
would resort on a case-by-case basis.
2.3.29. The implementing agencies would make it possible for officials seconded in order
to perform certain strategic tasks (general running, book-keeping, legal services) within the
agency to be combined in a pragmatic fashion with staff from the private sector who would
carry out clerical duties or specialist tasks directly related to the nature of the agency and the
programme. Under no circumstances should temporary or auxiliary staff recruited under the
Community rules relating to other servants be on the staff of an agency. The risk of creating a
permanent body would be avoided if the agency were established, and the private staff
recruited, solely for the duration of the programme for which it had been set up.
2.3.30. The establishment of agencies should not lead to any increase in the size of the
Commission’s permanent staff, i.e. in the number of officials. The on-going nature of the
Commission’s tasks requires it to have officials who have received a generalist training (in the
legal, economic and financial spheres), whilst in order to meet specific, temporary needs it
may have to call on the skills of specialist workers, the permanent recruitment of whom is not
desirable. Certain TAO employees who are replaced by agencies could of course obtain an
employment contract with those agencies on an individual basis.
2.3.31. In the light of the above comments the Committee therefore encourages the
Commission to give greater consideration to the establishment of a ‘new  category of bodies
based on Community law’. In so doing it must insist on issuing the following warning:
although using executive agencies would make Commission management more flexible and
would obviate the need for idle discussions concerning what falls into the public authority
category and what does not, a distinction would still have to be made between political
missions and management tasks: there can be no question of delegating the political aspects
of Community action to agencies.
2.4.           Recommendations
A genuine contracting philosophy, a remodelled legislative, regulatory, and budgetary frame
of  reference, and greater responsibility entrusted to authorising officers should help to
restore order to the Commission’s management, in which the most disturbing anomalies have
been brought to light by the TAO phenomenon.
2.4.1 The Commission should treat contracts as a whole as a priority in their own right in
order to make for the utmost transparency. Instructions should be laid down and proper
training provided. Community public procurement law is marred by a jumble of disparate
source texts. Its codification is a matter to be studied, without seeking to overregulate, but
rather to achieve rationalisation to facilitate the work of practitioners (see 2.1.17).
2.4.2. Given that it is not suited to the requirements of modern management and effective
supervision, the Financial Regulation is in need to fundamental revision. In any event, it
should form part of a clear-cut hierarchy of Community acts and be confined to the essential
principles which all institutions must observe. As regards the details, it should make reference
to specific rules applying to each institution (see Chapter 2 as a whole).
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2.4.3. Conclusion of a contract – following an invitation to tender or by a negotiated
procedure – funding of a project under the heading of external aid, or award of a subsidy are
different forms of disbursement of Community moneys. The Financial Regulation should
accordingly lay down the basic rules to be observed by all institutions, namely transparent
decision-making, non-discrimination,  and ex post assessment of use, and dispel the
fundamental confusion as regards contracts. The concept of a contract and the different types
of contracts should be spelled out (see 2.1.21 ff.).
2.4.4 The present budget nomenclature, based on the distinction necessitated by the
Financial Regulation between Part A (administrative expenditure) and Part B (operating
expenditure) is impracticable. It is frequently circumvented when appropriations are
earmarked under the budget. A nomenclature based on policies whereby the aggregate cost of
the latter would be specified and the various expenditure assigned for a given purpose would
be identified according to its nature must be established in order to facilitate assessment and
enable the budgetary authority to exercise complete supervision (see 2.1.15 to 2.1.19).
2.4.5 Expenditure under the heading of  cooperation with non-member countries is at
present a self-contained, chaotic area, given the numerous and diverse legal rules by which it
is governed. The principles deriving from Community Directives must apply not only to the
public contracts awarded by the Commission itself, but also to those it awards as the agent of
external recipients of Community funds (see 2.1.33 to 2.1.35).
2.4.6. Rules must be laid down to govern subsidies. Since they entail a quid pro quo, and
are awarded for that reason, they should be treated in the same way as contracts as regards the
award procedure (putting up for tender), supervision (consideration by the CCAM), and
administration (monitoring by means of databases) (see 2.1.40).
2.4.7. The serious gap in terms of the membership of the assessment committee has to be
remedied (see 2.1.28).
2.4.8 Intellectual service contracts must be systematically planned. Human and financial
resources should not be scattered over a myriad of contracts too small to be overseen, the
different procedures must be properly understood, accurate definition of the subject of the
contract should be treated as a matter of crucial importance, and the Commission must have
the means to monitor the proper execution of contracts (see 2.2.17 to 2.2.48).
2.4.9 The Commission should ask its contractors and special interest groups, where
applicable, to specify the membership of their board of directors and the identity of their
shareholders. Both to educate them and to treat them absolutely equally, it must allow
unsuccessful bidders to consult the documents relating to a tender procedure (see 2.2.36 to
2.2.38 and 2.2.60 to 2.2.63).
2.4.10 Authorising officers must be responsible, consider themselves responsible, and
held responsible. Their role should be enhanced, for instance by offering them the necessary
guarantees of independence, or indeed certain career advantages, and all the requisite training
and information. Their disciplinary and financial liability must not remain a purely theoretical
possibility. The fact that a decision to commit expenditure is separate from the signing of the
commitment proposal runs counter to a sense of responsibility. The authorising officer and the
signatory to a contract (the only instrument legally binding on the Commission in relation to
third parties, whereas commitment is merely an internal decision) must be, if not one and the
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same person, at any rate close associates (see 2.2.49 to 2.2.59).
2.4.11. The Commission, or a Member whom it has empowered to act, must be debarred
from acting as authorising officers (see 2.2.58).
2.4.12. Authorising officers should be advised more extensively where contracts are
concerned. The Central Contracts Unit, recently set up by the Commission, should
accordingly be equipped with increased human resources in order to provide the necessary
prior assistance to authorising officers to help them compile the requisite documents and
thereafter monitor the execution of the main contracts and draw the appropriate conclusions to
enable constant adjustments to be made to the rules. The unit thus needs to be acquainted,
through the Advisory Committee on Procurements and Contracts (CCAM), with the most
important or typical contracts. Its representatives should therefore serve on the committee and
constitute the principal technical element (see 2.2.75 to 2.2.77).
2.4.13 The CCAM, which at present does no more than carry out near-routine
implementation checks and is slowing down what is already an excessively cumbersome
procedure, has to be reformed. Very strict limits should be imposed on the number of matters
considered. Draft contracts should be selected under the personal responsibility of the
chairman of the CCAM, assisted by the secretariats of the committee and the Central
Contracts Unit, working in synergy. Contracts not selected must be abandoned immediately,
and, instead, those few matters deemed to serve as example should be studied in depth. In
hierarchical terms, CCAM meetings should take place at a sufficiently high level, but not so
high that full members would more often than not be prevented from attending. The CCAM
must be constituted as a joint body in order to provide a forum for dialogue between
administrative and operating DGs. Opinion thresholds should be raised substantially, broadly
according to the types of contracts (see 2.2.78 to 2.2.98).
2.4.14 The Commission must finally equip itself with a central database for contracts and
contractors. If this cannot be done under the SINCOM system, the central departments should
consider the alternatives (expansion of the CCAM database) in collaboration with the
authorising officers (see 2.2.64. to 2.2.73).
2.4.15. Since the Commission’s management tasks are increasing in both number and
range and the complement of officials cannot be expanded continuously to tackle them, a
policy of outsourcing should be pursued. The use of private sector resources should be
regulated so as to meet the requirements of public service. In addition, the committee believes
that implementing agencies under the exclusive control of the Commission is an option
deserving thorough consideration (see the entire section 2.3).
1.2. Annexes
I. Subsidies: number and value of commitments by year and by DG
II. Subsidies: breakdown of the amounts allocated; cost of subsidy management
in terms of human resources
III. TAOs: description of the tasks which TAOs were asked to perform
IV. TAOs : breakdown by DG
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ANNEX I
SUBSIDIES
Number and value of
commitments by year
and by DG
DG Number of
commitments
Value of commitments
V 2 074 125  121  959 .38
VIII 867 321  267 932 .00
X 833 38 565 327 .59
XXIII 739 31 576 579 .30
XXII 395 16 792 928 .26
XI 366 25 526 499 .93
I B 255 119 247 115 .00
I A 222 57 088 036 .46
XXIV 205 17 378 498 .00
Secr. 121 31 003 406 .00
VII 120 18 326 444 .00
III 109 14 517 171 .59
XVII 106 16 494 207 .87
XII 104 3 405 455 .19
XIII 66 4 414 064 .49
I 60 5 588 711 .00
XVI 60 168 886 202 .00
XIV 57 40 149 074 .00
VI 50 5 550 434 .00
SOEC 30 4 668 844 .87
XX 18 136 200 .00
II 13 387 000 .00
XXI 11 1 074 248 .00
XV 6 69 069 .38
IX 2 40 000 .00
JICS 1 155 550 .00
TOTAL 6 890 1 067 430 958 .31
 Source :I-G report(May1997)
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ANNEX II
SUBSIDIES
Breakdown of the amounts allocated
Bands (in euros) Amounts Number of
commitments
0-10 000 5  153  223 964
10 000-20 000 13  132  395 947
20 000-30 000 25  921  598 1  167
30 000-40 000 16  402  266 486
40 000-50 000 18  227  930 420
50 000-60 000 20  322  270 383
60 000-70 000 16  945  653 266
70 000-80 000 17  183  048 230
80 000-90 000 14  789  794 176
90 000-100 000 15  129  427 160
100 000-110 000 19  107  976 187
110 000-120 000 10  937  540 96
120 000-130 000 11  902  068 96
130 000-140 000 7  942  146 59
140 000-150 000 8  410  694 58
 + de 150 000 745  922  925 1  194
Total value of
commitments 967  430  952 6  889
Cost of subsidy management
in terms of human resources
Tasks Total %
-  operational 366.37 72.8
-  assessment 36.38 7.2
-  financial 100.75 20.0
Total 503.5 100.0
The staff engaged in subsidy management tasks may be estimated at 503.4 men/year
Source : I-G report on the Commission’s use of TAOs (4 February 1998)
ANNEX III
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TAOs
Description of the tasks which
TAOs were asked to perform
Number of TAOs
performing the task
A. – ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE TASKS:
A1. Management of administrative contracts concluded
with the beneficiaries of Community action
15
A2. Dissemination of information concerning the
programme
21
A3. Secretarial work in connection with the programme 14
A4. Collection and processing of data, creation and/or
management of databases
19
A5. Checks on payments for work 14
A6. Preparation of payments 9
A7. Other 5
T. – TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TASKS:
T1. Recruitment of experts to assist in projects 3
T2. Analysis of the soundness of tenders submitted 9
T3. Assessment of the technical soundness of tenders 12
T4. Checks on and assessment of the progress made in the
programme
9
T5. Attendance at technical and information meetings
concerning the programme
18
T6. Participation in the assessment of tenders 8
T7. Participation in discussions on project financing,
drawing up of annual activity reports
14
T8. Drawing up of programme action plans 7
T9. Operational interface between the authorities of third
countries and the EEC
6
T10. Organisation of conferences and/or seminars 13
T11. Establishment of terms of reference for a
project/definition of the tasks to be performed
2
T12. Other 16
I-G report on the Commission’s use of TAOs (4 February 1998)
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ANNEX IV
TAOs
Breakdown by DG
(Euros)
Parts A and BDG M/yr* Appropriations
1 0 0
1A 191 40   608   010
1B 324 44   379   000
2 0 0
2FOS 19 2   968   350
3 0 300   000
4 0 0
5 83 20   010   499
6 21 5   574   248
7 0 0
8 67 19   328   891
9 0 0
10 56 5   273   230
11 0 0
12 0 0
13 0 964   165
14 0 0
15 0 476   224
16 0 12   432   695
17 0 0
19 0 0
20 0 0
21 0 171   000
22 86 8   604   000
23 51 6   789   759
24 0 0
ESA 0 0
SO 0 0
JRC 0 0
SC 0 0
ID 0 0
ECHO 0 0
I-G 0 0
OOPEC 0 0
SOEC 52 4   693   000
JICS 0 0
RSC 24 14   597   082
TS 0 0
Secr 0 0
LS 0 0
SS 0 0
ANTF 0 0
TOTAL 974 187   170   153
*Men/year (indicative data for 1998
Source : Inquiry into the outside technical and administrative assistance used by the Commission in
implementing Community programmes or actions (Memo of 30 November 1998)   
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3. SHARED MANAGEMENT IN GENERAL
3.1. Introduction
3.1.1. The first report of the Committee dealt with subjects related to direct management by the
Commission. The preceding chapter of this report also deals with such matters. Although during
the last ten years problems have become manifest in that field this should not divert attention
from longer established difficulties in other sectors such as agriculture and the Structural
Funds33 where management is shared between the Commission and the Member States.
3.1.2. In both sectors management of policy has been inadequate for many years. The
European Court of Auditors in its annual reports, special reports and opinions repeatedly
criticised weaknesses, in particular those leading to a high incidence of irregularity ranging from
simple errors to serious frauds and a lack of effectiveness. The problem of a high level of
irregularities was recognised at the time of the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty. The Treaty
required the Court of Auditors to publish an annual Statement of Assurance as to the reliability
of the Community’s accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions34.
3.1.3. The insertion of a new article 280 (formerly 209a) in the same Treaty (effective from
1993) which states that “Member States shall take the same measures to counter fraud affecting
the financial interests of the Community as they take to counter fraud affecting their own
financial interests” was a breakthrough in approach. Member States themselves had by this time
become aware of the need to take a more committed approach to protecting Community funds
even when they had no immediate financial interest in so doing . The new article in the
Maastricht Treaty reflected this change in attitude which lead, although with too long a delay for
the Structural Funds, to amendments to the Regulations in these fields (agriculture from 1995,
Structural Funds from 1999).
3.1.4. It is important to bear in mind that although Member States are the principal disbursers
of Community monies in their own territories, where a fraud or irregularity goes undetected or
unreported it is the Community budget, and not the Member State, which pays (see below at
3.7.3. and ff.).
3.1.5. The history of shared management demonstrates the difficulties the Commission has had
as a manager of money, policy and programmes vis a vis the Member States. Strengthening
financial management, tighter controls, reducing the number of irregularities and better fraud
detection were long overdue. Recognition of this also gave rise to the creation of UCLAF (see
chapter 5 of this report).
3.1.6. The Treaties have given wide –ranging  powers, and a considerable area of discretion in
their deployment to the Commission. The everyday relationship between the Commission and
the Member States is sometimes delicately balanced and this can lead to the Commission
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 The Structural Funds are the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, Guidance Section, and the Financial Instrument for Fisheries
Guidance.
34
 Article 248 (ex article 188c)
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showing a lack of courage and exhibiting laxity in order supposedly to preserve this balance.
The Commission has even been prepared to negotiate when faced with improper pressure from
Member States. But a compliant Commission is not in the interests of sound management nor in
the longer-term interests of the Member States as a whole. It is the Commission which
implements the budget on its own responsibility, a responsibility not shared with the other
Institutions or the Member States (see paragraph 3.3.4 below). Community legislation in the
fields of agriculture and the Structural Funds must respect this Treaty provision by giving the
Commission the powers to exercise this responsibility and to fulfil its obligation of
accountability to the discharge authority.
3.1.7. The question is whether the right balance has been found between the Commission’s
responsibilities and the legal and material means of which it disposes to exercise its
responsibilities. This point also merits careful attention not least because of the enlargement of
the Union now being prepared. The realisation of the 'acquis communautaire' in this field should
not be limited to legal texts. It should also be understood to include the requirements of control
in executing Community policies.
3.1.8. This chapter will examine shared management as it is applied in practice to the
implementation of Community policies and not as an abstract concept. In budgetary terms
shared management characterises most of the Commission's and the Member States’ activity to
implement Community policies. Some of the issues raised will be discussed from different
perspectives in other chapters of this report. Shared management and the areas to which it
applies are considered separately and distinctly here because of its prevalence, history and
financial importance. The field of its application is so wide that it will not be possible to
consider every area to which it does apply nor to examine its application in all its diverse ways
and circumstances. The focus of this chapter will be on certain aspects of the shared
management of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) Guarantee
section and the Structural Funds.
3.2. Definitions
3.2.1. Shared management is nowhere specifically defined in Community legislation. The key
regulations governing the EAGGF and the Structural Funds simply set down the respective roles
and tasks of the Commission and the administrative authorities of the Member States in such a
way as to make it clear that the legislator's intention is that the management of the EAGGF and
the Structural Funds should be shared. These Regulations will be considered in greater detail
below where the operation of shared management in these areas is discussed.
3.2.2. For the purposes of this chapter shared management will be understood to refer to the
management of those Community programmes where the Commission and the Member States
have distinct administrative tasks which are inter-dependent and set down in legislation and
where both the Commission and the national administrations need to discharge their respective
tasks for the Community policy to be implemented successfully. Direct management in contrast
is where the Commission directly manages programmes without the necessary involvement of
Member State administrations, for example the PHARE programme.
3.2.3. Shared management is a long established practice and is a feature of the Common
Agricultural Policy, the biggest common policy in terms of budgetary expenditure. The
Guarantee section of the EAGGF accounts for 48 % of the European Union's 1998 annual
budget and comprises direct income support, price support payments, export refunds, set aside
premiums and other financial aid to agricultural production. Shared management is also used to
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implement the Communities’ Regional and Social Funds as well as the structural element of the
EAGGF, the Guidance section. In total these Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund35 account
for 36 % of the European Union’s annual budget. Only a very limited part of the Structural
Funds, for example pilot studies to help direct policy development and research contracts within
the EAGGF Guarantee section are directly managed by the Commission. For ease of
understanding the reader will find at annexe 1 a table showing the distribution of
Community expenditure by broad category.
3.2.4. Shared management varies in its operation from one area to another but its defining
financial characteristic is that payments to beneficiaries made in respect of Community policies
are made by national authorities designated by the Member States within the framework of the
Regulations governing those policies. Although there are different legal arrangements specific to
each policy area, the disbursement of funds by Member States and their subsequent
reimbursement subject to financial corrections by the Commission is a constant.
3.3. Shared Management and the Commission’s Responsibilities
3.3.1. Shared management implies shared responsibility between the Commission and national
administrations for the efficient administration of Community policies and for the ensuring that
the law as expressed in the Regulations as well as in the Treaties is respected. Nevertheless the
Commission has a particular and over-arching responsibility for Community policies which
cannot be shared even where day to day management is. Article 211 (ex-155) of the Treaty
establishing the European Community states that the Commission shall "ensure that the
provisions of this treaty and the measures taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are applied.
The Commission shall also exercise the power conferred on it by the Council for the
implementation of the rules laid down by the latter."
3.3.2. The Commission’s ultimate responsibility for ensuring the application of Community
policies is clear. Shared management although a long standing and clearly necessary
arrangement is a contingency whose legal basis is in secondary legislation, mainly the various
Regulations concerning the EAGGF Guarantee section and the Structural Funds. Ultimate
responsibility for implementation rests with the Commission by virtue of the Treaty itself. This
responsibility cannot be delegated even to a national administration and shared management is
therefore not a form of a delegated responsibility.
3.3.3. This point is eloquently expressed in the European Parliament’s resolution postponing
the 1997 Discharge decision36 which says: ”la Commission est la responsable ultime au niveau
communautaire de l’action des administrations nationales coresponsables de l'exécution des
politiques nationales gérées en partenariat.”
3.3.4. On the financial side the matter is if anything clearer. Article 274 ( ex-205) of  the Treaty
states that "the Commission shall implement the budget …on its own responsibility ... having
regard to the principles of sound financial management." The key phrase in the context of this
chapter is "on its own responsibility". The distinction between responsibility which is
established in the Treaties and management which is shared by virtue of secondary legislation is
crucial to what follows. Management may be shared but financial responsibility is not.
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 The Cohesion Fund contributes to the strengthening of economic and social cohesion in the
Community in Member States where GNP per capital is less than 90 % of the Community average.
36
 PE 230650, page 7, point 0
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3.4. Shared Management and the Member States’ Responsibilities
3.4.1. Notwithstanding the above the Member States do have Treaty derived responsibilities
which are relevant in this area. In particular, and this is important for parts of the discussion
which follow, Article 280 ( ex-209a) of the Treaty as amended by the "Amsterdam Treaty"
reads:
“1. The Community and the Member States shall counter fraud and other illegal
activities affecting the financial interests of the Community through measures to be taken
in accordance with this Article which shall act as a deterrent and be such as to afford
effective protection in the Member States.
2. Member States shall take the same measures to counter fraud affecting the financial
interests of the Community as they take to counter fraud affecting their own financial
interests.” (The full text of article is quoted at paragraph 5.5.1).
The Amsterdam Treaty also amended article 274 (ex 205) cited at paragraph 3.3.4 above by
further adding the words ”Member States shall cooperate with the Commission to ensure that
the appropriations are used in accordance with the principles of sound financial management.”
3.4.2. In addition Council Regulation 2988/9537. of the 18 December 1995 requires Member
States to take measures to ensure the regularity and reality of transactions involving the
Community’s financial interests including by carrying out checks and inspections Other specific
requirements are set down in sectoral legislation.
3.4.3. Given the foregoing, two questions arise. Do the Council regulations which establish the
various shared management arrangements take sufficient account of the Commission’s
indivisible responsibility for implementing the budget and ultimate executive responsibility? In
the areas of shared management do the practices of the Commission and the Member States
reflect the respective Treaty articles? These and other questions are best answered through an
examination of aspects of the EAGGF and the Structural Funds’ implementation.
3.5. Other Considerations Relevant to Shared Management in General
3.5.1. The Statements of Assurance published by the Court of Auditors to the accounts from
1994 onwards have confirmed the high level of errors in underlying transactions, especially in
relation to payments made by the Member States in the fields of shared management. On the
basis of information, both quantitative and qualitative, in the successive statements, it is
believed that the rate of substantive errors for payment for the budget as a whole is a good 5 % (
substantive errors are those legality and regularity errors which have direct, measurable effects
on the amount of the underlying transactions financed by the Community budget). This has
prevented the Court giving a positive Statement of Assurance on the payments made. For
EAGGF, Guarantee the percentage seems to be somewhat lower and for the Structural Funds
much higher.
3.5.2. The partial or complete separation of the financing of a Community policy from its
implementation, as is the case in the area of shared management, is a point which merits
particular attention. In general in the Member States such structures are avoided. In the
Community they cover 85 % of its budget.
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3.5.3. The Member States have a conflict of interest. On the one hand as members of the
Council it is their duty in adopting regulations to create conditions for their implementation that
are readily implemented and controlled by the Commission. On the other hand as nation states
they favour their own systems of management and control. This hybrid arrangement leads to a
lack of clarity on mutual responsibilities and obligations and fails to give any guarantee that the
right balance has been struck in the interests of good management of Community monies.
3.5.4. The occurrence of irregularities and frauds is an extremely important element in the
consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of partnership with Member States and
decisions on the modalities of shared management. In any case, the Commission must be always
in the position to exercise its own responsibilities via monitoring, control and evaluation of the
effectiveness of its partners and make financial corrections when necessary.
SHARED MANAGEMENT OF THE EAGGF GUARANTEE SECTION
3.6. The Agricultural System and its Evolution
3.6.1. In European Community terms the Guarantee section of the EAGGF has a very long
history. The original six Member States  set up a single agricultural fund as far back as 1962
(Reg. 25/62-OJ 30/1962). In 1964 two distinct sections were established (Reg.17/64-OJ
34/1964). The Guidance section covered Community expenditure incurred under the policy
relating to agricultural structures while the Guarantee section covered Community expenditure
incurred under the policy relating to agricultural markets. In the period to 1970 expenditure
under the Common Agricultural Policy was gradually taken over by the Community budget. The
key regulation governing the EAGGF adopted in 1970, although amended since, is Council
Regulation 729/70 of 21 April 1970.38
3.6.2. This Regulation confirmed the existence of two sections of the Fund: the Guidance
section to finance the structural adaptations necessary for the proper working of the market and
the Guarantee section which is discussed here. The Guarantee section was to finance refunds on
exports to third countries and intervention intended to stabilise the agricultural markets. Broadly
put the Guarantee section operated through a system of price support to ensure a fair income for
producers and price and supply stability for consumers. Export restitution payments
compensated producers when world  market prices, estimated for each product and for all
destinations on the basis of mercurial factors such as the price of wheat on the Chicago
Exchange, were below Community reference prices. Furthermore, a system of storage at the
same level of support was implemented in order to regulate the internal markets.
3.6.3. Community prices have been constantly maintained at a level very much higher than
market prices and storage has become a quasi-permanent phenomenon. The system led,
especially from the end of the seventies, to massive agricultural surpluses and costs which
placed an enormous burden on the Community budget. From the eighties onwards the
mechanisms for supporting producers’ incomes have been progressively modified. Community
prices have been somewhat lower, especially for cereals. Nevertheless, overall they have
remained clearly above world prices and considerable surpluses are still in place. The system of
subventions for export has been diversified to take account of destinations. It has thus become,
not only a technical arrangement for the management of agricultural markets, but also a tool of
commercial and humanitarian policy. At the same time a complex system of direct aid for
agricultural production has been developed.
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3.6.4.  For the period 1988-1992 and then for the period 1993-1999 an "agricultural guideline”
within the context of an overall financial perspective agreed by the Parliament and the Council
succeeded in slowing growth in agricultural expenditure and reducing its share of the
Community's budget. The "MacSharry" reforms introduced from 1992 onwards began a move
away from price support to direct support to producers usually on an acreage or stock basis. In
the Agenda 2000 document39 the Commission proposed deepening and extending the 1992
reforms through further shifts from price support to direct payments from the Community
budget. Forms of direct payment now account for 70 % of Guarantee section expenditure and
will increase to 80 %.
3.7. The Basic Control Regulation
3.7.1.  Regulation 729/70 established that from 1970 onwards management of the EAGGF
Guarantee section should be shared. Article 4 reads :
“Member States shall designate the authorities and bodies which they shall empower to effect,
from the date of application of this Regulation the expenditure referred to in articles 2 and 3.
They shall communicate to the Commission, as soon as possible after the entry into force of this
regulation, the following particulars concerning those authorities and bodies: - their name and,
where appropriate, their statutes;
. .. the Commission shall make available to the Member States the necessary credits so that the
designated authorities and bodies may, in accordance with Community rules and national
legislation, make the payments referred to in paragraph 1.”
These payments by the Commission to the Member States were on a monthly basis originally by
way of an advance followed by a declaration after the month end and are now by way of
reimbursement on the basis of a monthly declaration by the Member State. In fact those
agencies which had made payments under the previous national agricultural regimes by and
large became the paying agencies for the Guarantee fund.
3.7.2. Article 5 of Regulation 729/70 required Member States to pass to the Commission the
annual accounts and documents for making up the balance sheets of these bodies and to "Satisfy
themselves that transactions financed by the Fund are actually carried out and executed
correctly; to prevent irregularities; recover sums lost as a result of irregularities or
negligence.” This article provided the basis for a clearance of the annual accounts by the
Commission resting on information supplied by the Member States. Initially and in
implementing legislation the term "making up of accounts" was used.
3.7.3. The same Regulation made Member States responsible for preventing and detecting
irregularities and recovering sums lost because of them. At Article 8 it states
“In the absence of total recovery the financial consequences of irregularities or negligence
shall be borne by the Community, with the exception of the consequences of irregularities or
negligence attributable to administrative authorities or other bodies of the Member States.”
3.7.4. It is this article which gives rise to the situation referred to at paragraph 3.1.4. If a fraud
or irregularity is undetected the cost is borne by the Community. Only in the event of detection
can the consequences of irregularities or negligence be attributed to the administrative
authorities of a Member State. At this point it is worthwhile recalling the sometimes extreme
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complexity of the market regulations and that it is the Member States themselves in Council
who have adopted a corpus of complex legislation with all the “loophole” possibilities this
entails.
3.7.5. It is difficult to believe that the administrative authorities or other bodies in the Member
States are always inclined to highlight for the Commission instances of irregularity or
negligence on their part which would result in them bearing the resulting financial
consequences. It is also difficult to believe that they are never negligent. In other words the
arrangements which this basic Regulation established and which still pertain do not provide the
immediate disbursers of 48 % (at one time this figure was as high as 70 %) of the Community's
budget, the EAGGF paying agencies in the Member States, with any immediate incentive for
rigour and tight control of what is in effect someone else's, that is the Community's, money.
3.7.6. This observation will be revisited below but it does strongly suggest that the
Commission must at all times be able legally and in terms of its resources to act decisively and
independently to protect the Community's financial interests in accordance with Article 274 of
the Treaty.
3.8. The History of the Clearance of Accounts
3.8.1. Since 1970 the Clearance of Accounts procedure has been crucial to the protection of the
Community's financial interests and while not the Community budget's first operational line of
defence in the EAGGF Guarantee section it is its most important. The Clearance of the accounts
by the Commission leads directly to closing the accounts. In doing that the Commission accepts
what may be charged definitively to the Community budget. It should therefore have full
responsibility for checking and evaluating the systems in operation and the documents it
receives both in Brussels and on the spot in order to clear and then close the accounts. All other
acts including audit by Member States are no more than technical preparations for this final
management act which the Commission undertakes on its own responsibility.
3.8.2. The complexity of the various systems has always made Clearance difficult. The
recurring temptation is to stray from the strict application of the legislation to something more
akin to bargaining between the Commission and each Member State. These difficulties led, at
the end of the seventies and beginning of the eighties, to delays in clearance often of more than
five years. Finally, the Clearance of Accounts procedure underwent a major change in 1995
after the adoption of two new regulations, Council Regulation 1287/95 of 22 May 199540 and
Commission Regulation 1663/95 of 7 July 199541 both applicable from the 15 October 1995 and
considered below (at 3.9.1 ff.). To examine the significance of that change and to place it in its
context it is necessary briefly to describe the previous procedure, the difficulties it gave rise to
and the reasons for its reform. It is important to recall that both before and after the adoption of
the new regulations the Commission made and makes monthly payments to the paying agencies
in the Member States and thereafter seeks to make recoveries where it believes undue payments
have been made.
3.8.3. Under the pre-1995 arrangement the Commission was required to clear the EAGGF
Guarantee accounts by the 31 December of the year following the financial year concerned, that
is by the 31 December of year n+1. Member States submitted the accounts of paying agencies
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by the 31 March of year n+1. Thereafter the Commission opened an enquiry phase based on the
information submitted and its own checks. There followed a contradictory procedure during
which the Member States had an opportunity to contest the Commission’s proposed corrections
and which brought in informal but substantial elements of political pressure and negotiation
which invariably reduced the amounts recovered through clearance. The accounts were rarely
closed on time. More usual was for the accounts to be closed at the 31 December of year n+ 2.
The delay began with the Member States who very largely failed to respect the deadline for the
submission of the paying agencies’ accounts. The delays meant that the accounts were not closed
by the time the Court of Auditors drafted its Annual Report and its Statement of Assurance and
even on occasion had not been closed before the Parliament had begun the discharge procedure
for the year concerned. After the Commission’s formal decision Member States also enjoyed the
right to take a case to the Court of Justice.
3.8.4. In addition the whole procedure was seen in some quarters as too conflictual. When
interviewed in connection with this report one senior Commission official expressed the view
that the Member States had lacked confidence in the Commission's judgement when it came to
determining corrections. This led to an initial reform to the procedure that took place in 1994
when a Conciliation body of five "wise" persons was set up by the Commission to consider
disputed corrections. A further observation on conciliation will be made below (paragraph
3.11.1 and ff.). Notwithstanding any effect this may have had on Member States' perceptions of
the outcomes, it had the effect of adding a further six months to the clearance procedure.
The amounts involved in the annual clearance decisions were substantial. The total disallowed
in respect of 1992 was 788 million ECU. The amount for 1993 was 755 million ECU. These
sums represent respectively 2.6 % and 2.3 % of the yearly total of Guarantee expenditure but are
above average because of exceptional corrections related to the implementation of milk quotas.
The amounts so far for 1994 and 1995 are 307.6 million and 430 million ECU or about 1% of
yearly Guarantee expenditure.
3.8.5. There were and are two types of correction dealt with in the context of clearance. The
first type of correction is made when a particular irregularity or mistaken payment is uncovered.
The second type is more important. Flat rate corrections are made where the Commission on
inspection has identified a systematic weakness in a paying agency's procedures which it is
reasonable to suppose has led to a series of irregular payments over time. The underlying
principle is that the rate of correction must be clearly related to the probable loss. From 1990 the
Commission applied flat rates of 2 %, 5 % and 10 % depending on the extent of the systematic
weakness and the estimated loss to the Community. At the Parliament's insistence a 25 % rate
was added from 1998. The Court of Justice has upheld the Commission's prerogative to apply
flat rate corrections of up to 100 %42.
3.8.6. For the period from 1989 to 1993, some 3200 million ECU were recovered from Italy
and Spain after those Member States’ failure properly to implement the milk quota regime. The
Commission had originally favoured allowing all of this expenditure but had been obliged to
reconsider following observations from the Court of Auditors supported by the Parliament. The
Council subsequently decided that the states involved could repay in four separate tranches. This
case clearly showed the Commission’s weakness in the face of the political pressure that was
brought to bear, although it was clear that the amounts should be recovered. Political pressure
eventually obtained the “compromise” of staggered repayment. The case also illustrated the
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weakness of the then clearance procedure the outcome of which the Commission was prepared
to disregard on this occasion despite, or perhaps even because of, the very large sums involved.
3.8.7. The 1993 clearance procedure was particularly contentious. In fact for that year two
distinct clearance decisions had to be made in April and July 1997 because at the time of the
earlier decision an amount was still eligible for or subject to the conciliation procedure. Even so,
and despite the amount of 755 million ECU disallowed, of which 27% concerned milk products
in Italy, 1566 million ECU or 4.8 % of the total expenditure declared was excluded from the
clearance decision and carried forward to future clearance years43.
3.9. The  New Clearance of Accounts: Accreditation and Certification
3.9.1. The impetus for reform, set in the context of a more general concern about frauds and
irregularities, was now well established. As mentioned above it led to the 1995 reforms laid
down in Council Regulation 1287/95 which amended the provisions of the basic Regulation
729/70 dealing with the Clearance of Accounts.
3.9.2. This Regulation refers in its preamble to the difficulties created by a single annual
decision and the need to shorten the time limit for the clearance decision. Crucially it established
two distinct types of clearance decision, one accounting and the other relating to compliance.
Commission Regulation 1663/95 of 7 July 1995 lays down the detailed rules which reform the
clearance procedure.
3.9.3. In summary these two regulations introduced three new  substantial features
- paying agencies must now be formally accredited by the Member State. Only these
agencies may make payments. The annex to Regulation 1663/95 gives the criteria
which paying agencies must meet. These include the existence of an internal audit
service and a structure which separates the authorisation, execution, and the
accounting for payment44
- certification of the annual  accounts of  the  paying agency before their transmission to
the Commission by “a department or body which is operationally independent of the
paying agency45” (only the correctness of  the accounts from an accounting point of
view and not as regards the legality and regularity of the underlying transaction is
concerned here)
- a distinct accounting clearance decision based on the annual accounts submitted with a
definite decisional timetable; and a distinct compliance clearance decision based on
the Commission’s checks46 on the legality and regularity of the underlying transaction.
Each of these new features is discussed below: accreditation and certification at 3.9.4
ff., and the separation of accounting and compliance clearance at 3.10.1 ff.
3.9.4. The accreditation of paying agencies and the certification of accounts really concern the
operation of shared management at Member State level. The Court of Auditors Special Report
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21/98 examined in detail the accreditation of paying agencies and the certification of accounts
by the Member States as well as the accounting clearance of accounts for the first year of the
new system. Although it found shortcomings and delays leading ultimately to two accounting
clearance decisions for 1996 (5 May and 30 July 1997, both after the deadline date of 30 April
given in Regulation 1663/95) it concluded that "both the Member States and the Commission
made significant efforts to comply with the new Regulation" (paragraph 5.1, page 10)47. The
Court did point out however that no decision had been made at the time of writing of its report
in regard to compliance either for transactions in 1996 or 1997.
3.9.5. Accreditation is new. It is a central feature of the new regulations. Council Regulation
1287/95 requires the Member States to “limit the number of accredited paying agencies to the
minimum necessary in order to effect the expenditure ...... under satisfactory administrative and
accounting conditions.”
3.9.6. Before 1996 there were hundreds of unnotified, small de facto agencies making EAGGF
Guarantee payments in the Member States without any structured procedures for checking on
their activities or accounts in terms of EC Regulations. This was clearly illegal but tolerated by
the Commission and practised by the Member States. Given that officially they did not exist for
the purposes of making payments any payments they were making must have been legally
questionable. The original Regulation 729/70 was quite clear. There were no exceptions. It
required the Member States to communicate to the Commission the names and statutes of all
authorities and bodies making payments as well as their annual reports and accounts (article
4.2). This certainly did not happen. Shared management here amounted to not much more than
shared acceptance that the Regulation could be flouted. The Commission is most at fault. In this
situation it is difficult to see how it could be sure that bodies about which it officially knew
nothing (although of course it was fully aware of their existence) were properly disbursing funds
for decades for which the Commission was ultimately responsible.
3.9.7. The number of de facto paying agencies has decreased since 1996 largely because of
Commission pressure. In consequence the number of properly notified agencies which keep
accounts of EAGGF Guarantee expenditure has increased from 55 in 1995 to 90 now as
Member States have been finally obliged, after 26 years, to respect the law which they adopted.
3.9.8.  Criteria for accreditation are laid down in the Annex to Regulation 1663/95.
Nevertheless the Commission has in practice decided that these need not apply to smaller paying
agencies for which it has allowed the Member States to use less stringent criteria. In view of this
and in the event of irregularities or a future legal challenge will the Commission be able to insist
that accreditation be withdrawn or withheld in respect of a particular agency?
3.9.9. Certification of the accounts is new. It too is a central feature of the new Regulations.
Certifying bodies must be operationally independent of the paying agency (Regulation 1663/95,
article 3).Notwithstanding this in Denmark and more often than not in Germany they are the
internal audit departments of the paying agency as the Court of Auditors confirms in its Special
Report 21/98. In effect the paying agencies certify their own accounts in these Member States
which is in direct contradiction to the requirements of the Regulation and negates the idea of an
external audit.
3.9.10. In fact the overall situation is neither transparent nor reassuring. The leeway which the
Commission has allowed the Member States on accreditation and certification amounts to a lax
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implementation of the Regulation. In these circumstances there is a real risk that the number of
paying agencies will again increase. The Committee is of the opinion that the Commission
should ensure conformity with the letter and spirit of the Regulation in the interests of
transparency and efficiency.
3.10. The New Clearance of Accounts : Accounting and  Compliance separated
3.10.1. The third strand of reform was the separation of the accounting (based largely on
accreditation and certification) from the compliance clearance of accounts. The objective here
was to speed up the clearance procedure. The Community’s overriding  interest remains the
recovery through  clearance of amounts unduly paid within a reasonable period of time
3.10.2. It is difficult to see how the separation of the clearance into accounting clearance and
compliance clearance has in practice contributed to attaining this objective.
3.10.3. The timetable set down in Regulations 1287/95 and 1663/95 for accounting clearance is
straightforward. Member States must provide the certified accounts to the Commission by 31
January of year n+1.The Commission must clear these accounts by 30 April of year n+1.This
accounting clearance decision covers the integrity, exactitude and veracity of the accounts
submitted (Article 1 of Reg.1287/95). In other words this decision is limited to an examination
of the accounting documents but does not require an examination of the acceptability of the
underlying transactions.
3.10.4. Nevertheless the Commission has not made one single accounting clearance decision by
the date fixed in the Regulation for any of the years 1996,1997 or 1998. It continues to ‘disjoin’
expenditure (in effect postpone consideration of it) and make two accounting clearance
decisions for each year. This is largely because not all Member States respect the timetable for
presentation of the certified accounts of paying agencies to the Commission.
3.10.5. The timetable for the compliance clearance decision is not straightforward. There is no
overall deadline given in the Regulations for the completion of this exercise. It is true that the
Commission may only refuse to finance expenditure incurred in the 24 month period preceding
its formal communication to a Member State on a given matter. For example formal letters sent
by the Commission on 1 June 1999 cannot result in the recovery of expenditure effected by
paying agencies before 1 June 1997 (although this does not apply to specific instances where an
irregularity has been uncovered). When, as is usually the case, the amount to be recovered is
disputed the Commission and the Member State are enjoined to resolve the matter bilaterally.
Thereafter the Member State can call for mediation by the Conciliation body which gives an
opinion. The matter could go to the Court of Justice if the Member State is still not satisfied
with the definitive decision of the Commission which is taken in cognisance of the Conciliation
body’s opinion.
3.10.6. Compliance clearance is based on the Commission's checks on transactions themselves
and on systems of transaction and not on a reading of the accounts, as with accounting
clearance. The Commission's clearance of accounts unit carries out about 120 on-the-spot
compliance check missions in an average year. Given that the certificate for the accounts
obtained by the Member States does not concern the validity of the underlying transactions there
is no reason to weaken compliance, in fact it will be argued below that this should be
strengthened.
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3.10.7. There are two problems here. Obviously the Commission must be quick off its mark in
sending out formal communications to Member States given the 24 month limit. In view of this
the Commission is urged to adopt a conscious policy of making these formal communications
within as short a period as possible after the transaction to which they refer. The second problem
is the absence of a deadline date for compliance clearance.  Unless the Commission is energetic
and the Member States co-operative corrections identified through checks could be in abeyance
for very long periods of time. It is hard to see how from the Community’s perspective this
represents an improvement on the previous situation.
3.10.8. In fact there are good grounds for concern. The first compliance clearance decision for
the first year to which the reformed procedure was applied, 1996, was taken in March 1999. To
date under compliance clearance 111.2 million ECU has been recovered for 1996 and 1997
together; nothing for 1998. In total 276 formal communications have been sent for a total
estimated recoverable expenditure of 1214 million ECU. The overall situation as at the 25 June
1999 looks like this:
No. of letters
in the year
Est. Sum to be
recovered for year
Sum recovered
For year
Amount
in abeyance
Mio ECU
1996 20 415 77.3 337.7
1997 66 406 33.9 372.1
1998 139 393 0 393.0
1999 (to date) 51 ? ? ?
Totals 276 1214 111.2 1102.8
(source: Commission’s services)
3.10.9. Interest cannot be charged on these sums owed to the Community. It is believed that the
total amount in abeyance for 1996 will not be completely recovered until 2000. As far as the
Committee can determine this is because of the slowness of the procedures in general including
within the Commission. Time scales of this duration are not an improvement on the previous
clearance arrangements that were in place before 1996. In this regard it is important to point out
that the Member States have five distinct opportunities in the procedure, before the
Commission’s collegiate decision, to influence or contest the amount the Commission seeks to
recover.48
3.10.10. Seen from this optic the reform represents no improvement. The total amounts so far
recovered through accounting clearance are small (77.33 million ECU for 1996; 33.9 million
ECU for 1997). This, it has been argued, is because of the introduction of accreditation,
effective internal control and certification. These three new requirements have resulted, so the
argument goes, in better control of payments in the Member States with as a consequence less to
be recovered. But equally the small amounts being recovered through accounting clearance
could be because large sums are being held over for compliance clearance. Moreover the time
taken to close the dossiers and recover the amounts involved is still being measured in years
rather than months after the market year concerned.
3.10.11. It is important to recall that corrections need not await the final compliance clearance
decision. The monthly reimbursement payment system referred to at paragraph 3.7.1. above
allows for a minimum of monitoring during the year. Individual cases can be examined urgently
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where there is a suspicion of serious irregularity or fraud and settled after examination one way
or another. Sound management depends on everyday actions in the implementation of the
EAGGF Guarantee Fund.
3.11. The Conciliation Procedure
3.11.1. Conciliation is a win-win procedure for the Member States as things stand. From the
Community’s standpoint conciliation at best leads to a delayed recovery of undue payments in
cases won by the Commission or at worst to a delay and reduction in repayment in cases won by
the Member State. Nor do Member States have to accept the Conciliation body’s opinion. They
retain the right to appeal to the Court of Justice after the Commission’s final decision. Since
1995 115 conciliation recommendations have been made and the Commission has accepted
reductions totalling of 275 million ECU in recovery payments or 17 % of the total value of all
cases submitted to the Conciliation body. Of course no decision has resulted in an increase in
recovery. 54 Commission decisions following conciliation have nevertheless been subject to
further appeal to the Court of Justice. So far the Commission has won 14 of these and 40 are still
before the Court.
3.11.2. A number of senior officials and the Commissioner responsible when interviewed by the
Committee suggested that conciliation helps to deflect improper pressure from the Member
States who are simply referred to the Conciliation body. The overall adjustment proposed by the
Conciliation body over the years of its operation does not seem enormous. If however it is used
to provide additional assurance to Member States there can be no case, in normal circumstances,
for the Commission’s final collegiate decision on clearance being anything other than as
proposed by its services after conciliation. It seems however that notwithstanding conciliation
the Commission does not always adhere to the proposal put before it by its services and
sometimes makes a further adjustment in favour of a Member State or States.
3.11.3. Conciliation takes time and, although the examination by the body is rigorous and
professional, the procedure is open to abuse. Almost half of the cases submitted to the
Conciliation body by the Member States have subsequently been brought before the Court of
Justice by the same Member States. One Member State, Italy, seems to send cases to
conciliation as a matter of course (it accounts for 30 % of all cases). Some Member States use
conciliation to retain for as long as possible sums they know in all probability will eventually
have to be returned to the Community. The Conciliation body itself reports that "the risk is
clearly apparent that certain member States (and more particularly Italy) refer systematically
any correction notified by the Commission to the Conciliation Body, and not only those likely to
be genuinely debatable".49
3.11.4. Member States also introduce new evidence and arguments to the Conciliation body
which could just as well have been presented to the Commission during the preceding bilateral
phase. The Evaluation Report states that “it is not rare that an important obstacle to the smooth
operation of the conciliation procedure (and the clearance in general) is created by the Member
States when they produce at the conciliation stage new explanations and/or evidence, not
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provided to the Commission departments at the time of the audit or at the time of the earlier
bilateral discussions".50
3.11.5. One option is for a provision that interest be paid to the Community on sums held for
months and years by the Member States and subject to conciliation, calculated from the date of
the expenditure concerned by the paying agency until the formal clearance decision for
Commission proposed corrections brought before the Conciliation body. This would discourage
the over-ready appeal by Member States to the conciliation procedure. The legislation in force is
on this point weighted in the Member States favour. When corrections are contested the onus of
proof and recovery lies with the Commission even though paying agencies are ultimately acting
on the Commission’s behalf in a common policy area.
3.11.6. An alternative to charging interest on the Community’s behalf on sums eventually
recovered after the formal clearance decision as suggested above would be to grant the
Commission the right to recover immediately and fully pending resolution of the dossiers with
the Commission paying interest on any reduction in recovery. An immediate incentive for
Member States to expedite files would be created.  The option described at paragraph 3.11.5
above is preferred by the Committee.
3.12. The Resources of, and Pressures on, the Clearance of Accounts Unit
3.12.1. Given the amounts involved and the complexity of the market regulations, the personnel
resources devoted to Clearance of Accounts in the Commission are still not adequate. Although
the unit has doubled in size since 1990 the total number of professional staff is 55. Set against
the average annual amount cleared in recent years, 40 billion ECU, and the average amount
recovered or expected to be recovered of 400 million ECU, this does not represent an enormous
staff input. It is 6 % of the total Agriculture Directorate General staff of 1100. The Commission
should consider to what degree an increase in expert staff working on clearance could result in
increased recoveries and strengthen this unit accordingly by reallocating resources to it. This
would also help authorising officers the better to discharge their duties.
3.12.2. In this context the Committee observes that the amount recovered through clearance is
lower than the error rate for agriculture in the Court of Auditor’s Statement of Assurance would
suggest. The Statement of Assurance's error rate is between 3 % and 4 % implying an additional
amount over clearance corrections of about 1000 million Euros. In the Committee’s view the
reasons for this difference should be examined in detail by the two Institutions concerned. The
Committee has found a number of factors which may largely (or even wholly) explain the
situation.
   *The Court uses the whole of the Guarantee section as its sampling frame to draw a sample
from which it extrapolates to an overall error rate. Clearance checks focus on particular sectors
in particular years.
   *The Court systematically examines transactions to the level of the final beneficiary. The
Commission does not.
    *It may well be that the flat rate corrections applied by the Commission are too low to ensure
adequate recovery.
    *The number of occasions where Member States can state their case and enjoy “the benefit of
the doubt” tends to a lower than desirable recovery rate.
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These considerations confirm the Committee in its view that there is significant scope for an
increase in the amounts recovered through clearance if the clearance unit is reinforced.
3.12.3. In preparing this report the Committee heard from sources within the Commission and
elsewhere but not connected to the Clearance of Accounts unit, of frequent pressure brought to
bear in the past on the unit from national governments, sometimes in conjunction with trade
lobbies, from Commissioners’ cabinets and senior officials to adjust corrected amounts in
Member States’ favour for reasons which had no legal basis or technical justification.
3.12.4. It is important to emphasise however that since structural and other changes were made
in the Directorate General for Agriculture which roughly coincided with the arrival of the new
procedures such practices have become less common. Officials who resist these kinds of
pressures are to be encouraged in their endeavours and although some of the criticisms above
are trenchant they should not be read as damning. Nevertheless it has been confirmed to the
Committee that the Commission as a college still adjusts recoveries when its final position is
established in the light of factors which are subjective and sometimes connected to national
considerations. The Commission must not reduce the amounts recovered after a long and
detailed process in conformity with the Regulations has established how much should be
recovered for the Community taxpayer for reasons such as these.
3.13. Other Observations on the Control of Expenditure
3.13.1. The Clearance of the accounts as described  in the previous paragraphs is the final
management act by the Commission in that field. The Committee would not want to leave this
subject however without emphasising that the volume of work in this field very much depends
on control in general over policy and the systems implemented. In the past systems of export
refund in particular gave rise to irregularities and fraud. The scale of export refunds has
diminished (see paras. 3.6.3. and 3.6.4.) because of the gradual change from market assistance
to direct support to farmers. Nevertheless the export refund policy still exists and will exist in
the near future as long as EU prices are higher than world market prices. The “new” policy of
direct support also poses its own problems from a control viewpoint. Direct support to farmers
raises a number of issues which need attention. Both export refunds and direct support are dealt
with hereafter at paragraphs 3.12.2 to 3.12.5. and 3.12.6 to 3.12.7 respectively.
Export Refunds
3.13.2. Export refund payments are intended to bridge the gap between Community prices for
agricultural produce and world market prices. The Community’s practice has been to
differentiate these payments as a function of the produce type, sometimes very finely defined,
and the export destination. Experience has shown that this system of differentiation is vulnerable
to fraud. It necessitates careful verification that the product really is of the type which attracts
the export refund claimed and that the final destination is the country stated and not another
where prices are higher, and for which a lower refund would have been paid. Experience has
also shown that it is very difficult to police this export refund policy, even when traders are
obliged to lodge guarantees  to be forfeited in the event of fraud by , for example, changing the
destination of the produce. A system without differentiation would have been more readily
controlled. The problem is even more serious and control more difficult in cases of export to
countries in the context of  special food aid when lower prices and higher refunds are in play.
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3.13.3. The following example may serve as an illustration of how the system of differentiation
described above is very much open to fraud, especially when the Commission’s services fail to
apply sound management and to treat fraud adequately. This example which occurred in the
early nineties is certainly not a unique case, but is an obvious one for two reasons. Firstly
because it constitutes a case of poor management on the part of the Commission under the
pressure of commercial interests which was transmitted by a Member State, as well as a fraud
by an exporter and secondly it shows how a system of export restitution payments differentiated
by destination encourages trade distortions prejudicial to the Community budget when they
result from frauds as in the example below. Actually such distortions may also arise when
export refunds are undertaken, completely legally, since there is nothing to prevent an exporter,
after clearing customs at the point of arrival and while remaining within the law, organising re-
export in conjunction with a local partner.
3.13.4. It appears from information in the file to which the Committee had access, but which it
could not check, that the trader concerned imported the goods to a country other than the
country of destination and presented forged proof of import to the intended destination in order
to liberate his guarantee. When this became known to the Commission’s services, they asked the
national authorities of the country from where the goods in storage were exported to block the
release of the trader’s security. From then on matters went wrong. After the authorities of the
trader’s Member State (which was another than the one from which the goods were exported)
had intervened on the trader’s behalf, the national authorities of the exporting country were
informed, to their surprise, that the Commission would not press for recovery of the guarantee.
In fact, the Commission’s services produced a draft amendment to the Regulation which would
have the effect of retroactively reducing the amount of the guarantee the trader would lose . In
addition there is no indication that the Commission’s services asked the national authorities to
pursue the fraudulent aspects of the case indicated by the forgery of import documents.
The aforementioned draft Regulation was strongly opposed by the Legal Service and the
Financial Controller of the Commission. As a result a new amendment to the Regulation was
prepared but was finally adopted on the basis of no retroactive effect thanks to the resistance of
the national authorities of the Member State of export and the Commission’s Financial
Controller.
That was not the end of the story. The Commission’s services now drafted a decision with the
effect of applying the adopted amendment regulation nonetheless with retroactive effect.
Notwithstanding objections from the Financial Controller and initially also from the Legal
Service (which later on changed its attitude) and after a new intervention of the authorities of the
trader’s Member State with the Commission’s senior hierarchy a letter was finally sent to the
national authorities of the exporting Member State informing them of the Commission’s
decision to apply the amended Regulation retroactively anyway. In the end, it was decided that
the trader should forfeit less then 20% of the guarantee.
3.13.5. As indicated (at 3.12.2.) the example shows how the systems of export refunds
differentiated as a function of the destination of export is extremely difficult to police. Even
more importantly, and most regrettably, it also shows how the senior hierarchy of the
Commission has been influenced by national authorities of the Member State of the beneficiary
of the refund and has chosen, notwithstanding opposition from its own administration and from
the national administration of the exporting Member State, to take a decision of doubtful legality
at the expense of the Community’s finances which it has a duty to preserve. On a more general
level the example shows that a possibility of an a posteriori reduction of a guarantee ,which
aims to be dissuasive and proportionate to the risk involved to assure a proper execution of
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export transactions, undermines the purpose of the guarantee as well as legal continuity and
equality of treatment.
Direct support
3.13.6. The move from price support to direct support to farmers, and thus to income aids
entailed the establishment of an Integrated administrative and control system (IACS) which has
been operational in most Member States since January 1997. For plant products the system
reposes on aid applications by farmers indicating all their agricultural parcels; a computerised
data base recording this information; an alphanumeric identification system for agricultural
parcels and an integrated control system for administrative control and field inspections. For
animals the IACS necessitated the establishment of an alphanumeric system for their
identification and registration. The system is governed by Council Regulation 3508/92 of
27/11/9251
3.13.7. It is probably to early to say with confidence that the new system  has been successfully
established but it is clearly vital to the future control of EAGGF Guarantee expenditure and
depends to a large extent for its implementation and execution on the Member States. A two -
year delay in its full implementation was largely due to tardy preparation of the relevant systems
in the Member States. As for the partial implementation which did take place, the Court of
Auditors in its Annual Report for 1996 found for plant products that “the result of on-the-spot
checks was that on average 20% of the applications checked on the spot were found to be
incorrect” 52. The successful establishment and use of the IACS system is probably one of the
most important tasks for shared management in the EAGGF Guarantee section in the immediate
future.
3.14. Conclusions
3.14.1. The error rate in EAGGF transactions is still too high. An error rate of about 3.5% as
reported by the Court of Auditors (error not fraud rate) amounts to about 1400 million Euros.
Recovery through clearance is running at 400 millions Euros per annum.
3.14.2. Member States complain that when their own controls, Commission controls, and Court
of Auditors controls are taken into account there are too many on-the-spot controls. The
Commission’s Clearance of Accounts Unit makes 150 control visits (compliance and
accounting) in a year to cover 40 000 million Euros of annual expenditure. Can this really be too
many or even enough in order for the Commission to exercise its responsibilities as authorising
officer?
3.14.3. One of the questions posed at 3.4.3 was whether the Council Regulations which establish
the various shared management arrangements take sufficient account of the Commission's
financial and executive responsibilities. Regulation 729/70 generally, and the more recent
Regulations on Clearance of Accounts in clearly spelling out the Member States obligations in
respect of the provisions concerning the accreditation of paying agencies and certification of
accounts certainly do. The second question was whether practices on the ground respect the
Commission's responsibilities. Not as far as the long term acceptance of undeclared paying
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agencies is concerned. In the same way there is a clear danger that with the passage of time the
Commission’s responsibility to ensure that agencies are properly accredited and accounts
certified will be eroded, especially if, as is the case, the Commission itself fails rigorously to
implement the provisions of the new regulations from the start.
3.14.4. There existed up to 1995 a climate in the EAGGF area whereby Member States were
allowed unduly to influence Commission clearance decisions against a background of a set of
complex market regulations. This has prevented a proper equilibrium being established in the
shared management of the EAGGF Guarantee section by the Commission and the Member
States. Responsibility for this is shared between Member States who fail to respect the
Commission’s role and the Commission which is too ready to accommodate the Member States.
The ultimate loser here is the Community taxpayer.
3.14.5. A more promising regulatory framework has been established since 1995 for the
Clearance of Accounts with some improvements in practice in the Member States under
Commission pressure.
3.14.6. However a failure to take the broad view means that this activity is still under-resourced.
A target for amounts recovered linked to the error rates found by the Court of Auditors, together
with an unbending application of the regulation and real efforts to reduce the timescales, would
result in more and speedier recoveries.
3.14.7. In general for clearance it can be said that the overall situation has been improved when
compared to the laxity which reigned before 1995 but that further improvements are clearly still
required.
3.14.8. The work in connection with clearance would be lightened if Member States were
obliged to exercise more stringent controls in implementing the different market regulations.
Equally the error rate would be lower.
3.14.9. Generally beyond clearance the key is an independent Commission with the capacity to
act, even when opposed by the Member States, to protect the Community’s financial interests.
SHARED MANAGEMENT IN THE STRUCTURAL FUNDS
3.15. History and Background
3.15.1. The Structural Funds, which include the EAGGF Guidance section, is the other main
area of joint management between the Commission and the Member States. They differ from the
EAGGF Guarantee in that expenditure to meet their objectives always comes from both the
Community and the Member States’ national budgets, although to varying degrees. Whereas the
Guarantee section of the EAGGF is a common policy area in which the Community has
exclusive competence, the Structural Funds concern a Community policy where political and
funding responsibility is shared between the Community and the Member States. The historical
development of the Structural Funds is also different from that of EAGGF Guarantee section. It
will be briefly outlined below to allow a better understanding of the current situation.
3.15.2. The EAGGF Guidance section is contemporaneous with the Guarantee section and the
legislation which established it is discussed above at paragraph 3.6.1. The Guidance section is
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concerned with agricultural structures and measures to assist producers in the processing and
marketing of agricultural produce and it also provides a system of aid for investments in
agricultural holdings. The European Social Fund was established by Regulation 9/196053 and
has been substantially adjusted and modified since that date. The European Regional
Development Fund was established by Regulation 724/75 in March 197554 and has also been
adjusted and amended since its inception. There has been a pattern of change and development
in the area of the Structural Funds, which in summary has had three inter-related features.
Firstly the share of the Community budget devoted to the Structural Funds has increased in
absolute and in percentage terms over time. Secondly greater efforts have been made to co-
ordinate the activities of the different funds to meet a set of common objectives. Thirdly there
has been an accelerating devolution of decision making on project selection and management to
the Member States. This part of the report will focus in the main on problems connected to the
shared management of the Social and Regional Funds which together account for almost two-
thirds of all structural measures.
3.15.3. Council Regulation 2396/71 of 8 November 197155 allowed the Social Fund already
foreseen in the Treaty of Rome to assist operations aimed at solving problems arising in areas
suffering "a serious and prolonged imbalance in employment." 60 % of appropriations were
reserved for tackling long term structural unemployment. The Council on a Commission
proposal drew up a list of qualifying aid measures and Member States submitted particular
projects. The Commission would assess their eligibility on the basis of the Council’s decision.
Reimbursement was on the basis of project costs actually incurred. The operation of the Social
Fund was refined by Council Regulation 2950/8356  which implemented the Council decision
83/516/EEC of 17/10/8357. Fund assistance was directed to vocational training and recruitment
and wage subsidies for young workers, the long term unemployed, women and others deemed
particularly vulnerable on the employment market. Fund assistance was granted at the rate of 50
% of eligible expenditure. For the first time some detailed control provisions and a clear
delineation of the Member States’ and the Commission’s respective tasks was established.
Member States were to certify the accuracy of the facts and accounts in payment claims. The
Commission was to carry out on the spot checks on the basis of representative sampling.
3.15.4. Following adoption of the Single Act in 1986 the European Regional Development Fund
became the main Community instrument for the correction of regional imbalances. Its history
goes back further. The Council Regulation 724/75 of 18 March 1975 which established the
Regional Fund set as its principal objective the correction of  regional imbalances particularly
those resulting from the preponderance of agriculture and industrial change and structural
unemployment. Assistance was not however to lead to Member States reducing their own
regional development effort. Up to 50 % of public authority aid could be met from the Fund.
The decision to support lay with the Commission except in instances where a Fund Committee
decided effectively to refer the matter to Council. Individual investment proposals were
considered by the Commission with a view to the regional development programmes also
prepared and submitted by the Member States. Project and programme submissions had to
include detailed information on, inter alia, their anticipated effect on economic activity and
employment. Payment was made on the provision of statements certifying expenditure and
detailed supporting documentation. The Commission having consulted the Fund Committee
could reduce or cancel payments. Sums paid in error were to be repaid. Member States were to
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provide the Commission with all information necessary for the effective operation of the Fund
and the Commission could conduct on-the-spot checks.
3.15.5. The clear intention of the legislator at this point for both the Social and Regional Funds
was that individual projects should have clear objectives which accorded with the provisions of
the Regulations and that payment should be conditional on progress to those objectives, for the
Regional Fund within the framework of a wider programme. The Commission under these
arrangements had a much more “hands on ” role in project selection, monitoring and control in
the Structural Funds. Later, as will become clear, there was a shift in the management balance
between the Commission and the Member States.
3.15.6. The first major reform of these arrangements was in 1988 with Council Regulation
2052/88 of 24 June 198858. This was aimed at concentrating expenditure and moving to co-
ordinated programmes rather than individual projects. Five common objectives for all of the
then Structural Funds were set down. These were the promotion of development and structural
adjustment in regions “lagging behind”; the redevelopment of regions suffering industrial
decline; combating long term unemployment and facilitating young people’s entry to the labour
market; facilitating workers’ adaptation to industrial change; facilitating agricultural structural
adjustment and promoting rural development (objectives 3 and 4 were the exclusive domain of
the Social Fund and 5a of the EAGGF Guidance section). Regulation 2052/88 also established
arrangements to set overall Structural Fund expenditure over a number of years and distribute it
by Member State. This is a recurring and important feature in the Structural Funds. Levels of
Community expenditure by Member State are set down in the Regulations or by the
Commission on the basis of the provisions of the Regulations using “transparent procedures”.
Member States thereby negotiate target levels of expenditure before any scientific information
on needs or absorption capacities is brought to bear on resource decisions. In short for the
Structural Funds the ceiling of expenditure in each Member State is also a target and this is
bound to have a knock-on effect in the areas of project selection, evaluation and control. There
is pressure on the national administrations to find and on the Commission to accept sufficient
projects to attain the predetermined levels of expenditure in each Member State. An inter-
institutional accord of 29 June 1988 provided that the total amount available under the Structural
Funds should be doubled in the period 1987 to 1993. Fund specific regulations were also
adopted to dovetail each fund with the new horizontal regulations discussed here and below.
3.15.7. The implementing Council Regulation 4253/88 provided for co-ordination between the
Funds based on a system of multi-annual planning. Member States were to submit integrated
plans for specified regions upon which Community Support Frameworks detailing the forms of
intervention and its financial volume over a three to five year period would be prepared by the
Commission in conjunction with the Member State and followed up by operational programmes.
Projects would be proposed within these frameworks by Member States and the Commission’s
decision would cover an operational programme  “package”.
3.15.8. Member States were supposed to prevent and pursue irregularities, recover amounts lost
or themselves meet the cost except if they could show they had not been negligent and inform
the Commission accordingly (article 23 of Regulation 4253/88). As well as conducting on the
spot checks the Commission could reduce or suspend financial assistance from the Funds post
facto (article 24 of Regulation 4253/88) if it was not satisfied with project implementation.
Monitoring Committees of Member State and Commission representatives were established to
verify progress towards programmes’ stated objectives.
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3.15.9. Changes were introduced in revised regulations in 1993 that had the effect of
maintaining or consolidating the main principles adopted in 1988. New regions were
incorporated, planning procedures were adjusted and provision made for Community funding of
new types of measures. Five new regulations modified those of 1988, in addition to the
adjustment of a Regulation on the financial instrument for fisheries guidance. Once again the
financial volume of the Funds was almost doubled over a six year period and a new fund, the
Cohesion Fund, set up to further economic and social cohesion by providing additional support
in Spain, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Greece.
3.16. The New Regulations and their Implications
3.16.1. The Structural Funds again stand on the threshold of a major reform. The Council has
recently adopted a series of proposals encapsulated in five new regulations59 based on the
Commission proposal, COM(1998) 131 final, of which the key Regulation is again the
“horizontal” one, Regulation 1260/99 of 21 June 1999. On the policy side these bring the
number of common objectives down to three. These are to promote the development and
structural adjustment of less developed regions; support economic and social development in
regions with structural difficulties and support the adaptation and modernisation of education
and training systems and employment. The first objective is assisted by four Funds (Regional,
Social, EAGGF Guidance and the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance), the second by
the Regional and Social Funds as well as EAGGF Guarantee for rural development and the third
by the Social Fund alone. A second major intention is to concentrate resources on a smaller
overall population. By 2006 the percentage of the 15 Member States’ population eligible under
objectives 1 and 2 will be reduced from 51 % to between 35 % and 40 %. Funding will be
maintained at 1999 levels (286.4 billion for the period 2000 to 2006). One important aim of the
reform is to clarify the respective roles of the Commission and the Member States.
3.16.2. On the management and administration side significant changes discussed in greater
detail below are envisaged which impact on the roles of both the Commission and the Member
States and which again pose questions about ultimate responsibility and the distribution of tasks.
These will be considered from four standpoints, financial control and irregularity; project
eligibility; additionality; and evaluation, ex ante, current and ex post. They will be examined in
turn below and the new Regulations will be considered in the light of current and previous
arrangements where this is appropriate. General remarks on organisation will also be made.
3.17. Financial Control and Irregularity
3.17.1. There has been a history of legislative change and development in this area. Articles 23
and 24 of Regulation 4253/88 dealt with financial control and the reduction, suspension or
cancellation of assistance respectively. Article 23 required Member States to verify that
Community financed operations had been carried out properly, prevent irregularities and recover
any amounts lost. The Commission was to be informed of the measures taken and in particular
of the progress of administrative and judicial proceedings. It was also permitted to carry out its
own on the spot checks. Article 24 empowered the Commission to reduce, suspend or cancel the
Community’s financial assistance, if the operation did not appear to justify the assistance,
having asked the Member State for its comments. On paper control was further reinforced by the
adoption of Commission Regulation 2064/9760 which came into force in November 1997.This
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laid down in some detail what was required of Member States’ control systems. The
certification of payment claims was introduced. A sufficient audit trail was to be provided.
Sampling controls of systems and expenditure declarations were to be introduced on the basis of
risk analysis. The requirement already established in existing legislation to report irregularities
to the Commission was reiterated and not later than final payment Member States were to
submit to the Commission a statement summarising the conclusions of their control
examinations in previous years. This provision has in effect not been implemented because for
the current programme period no final declarations of expenditure have been submitted.
3.17.2. Under the new Regulation 1260/99 Member States are again to be the Community’s first
line of defence against irregularity and fraud in the Structural Funds. They are to ensure that
management and control systems are in place, vouch for the expenditure declarations presented
to the Commission (this time prepared by someone independent of project management) and
recover sums lost through irregularity. Many of its provisions restate in other terms the
requirements established in Regulations 4253/88 and 2064/97. For example the requirement to
verify management and control arrangements (article 38 (1)(a) of Regulation 1260/99 and article
4 of Regulation 2064/97). What is new in article 38 of Regulation 1260/99 is a clear statement
that the Commission “shall ensure that Member States have smoothly functioning management
and control systems so that Community funds are efficiently and correctly used.” To this end the
Commission’s on the spot checks to be conducted with a minimum of one day's notice are to
cover not just transactions but Member States' management and control systems. Thereafter the
Commission may make observations including on the management shortcomings found and
after observations from the Member State suspend all or part of any interim payment made.
Article 39 of the same Regulation deals with recoveries and allows the Commission to effect
recoveries after verifications where there are serious failures in management and control
systems. Corrections are to be proportional and are to follow a structured attempt to come to an
agreement with the Member State. This provision could be read as an embryonic clearance of
accounts arrangement or the basis for developing such an arrangement.
3.17.3. The Committee’s view is that the new Regulation does clarify responsibilities but
whether or not in practice it leads to better control will be determined by how it is implemented.
Experience to date of the implementation of current control provisions does not permit an
optimistic forecast of this. It is also evident that resources devoted to control in the operational
Directorates General with responsibilities for the Structural Funds are woefully inadequate to
ensure proper implementation of the current legislation, never mind ensure implementation of
the new Regulation. The Commission must also find the will and courage to implement the
Regulation even if this means a Member State does not attain its expenditure target. It is also the
Committee’s view that although Regulation 1260/99 brings clarity in certain areas it also strikes
the wrong balance between Member State and Commission responsibilities and powers in
others. For example, if national rules are to be the primary criteria for determining eligibility
(article 30 of Regulation 1260/99), then the Commission must at least be in position to monitor
their application and be able to assess if the differences between national rules are giving rise to
serious distortions between Member States in the pursuit of Community policy objectives.
3.17.4. It is important to recall the observation made at paragraph 3.1.4 above. For the Structural
Funds as for the EAGGF Guarantee section it is the Member States who are almost always the
disbursers of Community monies on their territories. However where an irregularity or fraud
involving Community resources goes undetected or unreported it is the Community budget and
not the Member State that pays. It is sometimes argued that because programmes and projects in
the Structural Fund’s sector are co-financed with Member States that there is an identity of
interest in recovering undue payments and that Member States have an immediate incentive so
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to do. The Committee is surprised, if this is the case, that for 1997 during which about 500,000
projects were current and total Regional Fund expenditure was 13 billion ECU only 79
irregularities for a total value of 27.5 million ECU were communicated to the Commission by
national authorities under the terms of Council Regulation 1681/9461 which requires them to
inform the Commission of judicial and administrative action taken in the event of irregularities.
3.17.5. The new and former regulations allow the Commission to conduct on-the-spot checks
which may be followed by a suitable reduction in the amounts paid from the Community budget
in accordance with article 24 of Regulation 4253/88 or article 39 of Regulation 1260/99 when it
enters into force. In 1998 the Commission undertook 37 on the spot missions for the Regional
Fund. Since July 1996 to date the Commission has made formal recovery decisions for 8
Regional fund cases covering 14 million ECU for the programme period 1989 to 1993.This is
not credible as an indication of the sums lost to the Community to Regional Fund irregularities.
During 1998 the Commission cancelled two interventions worth 2.8 million ECU on evidence of
irregularity. However when asked the Commission was unable to provide information on the
number of instances, and the value of these, where it had refused to pay the full amount
requested by Member States at the closure of an intervention during the period 1989 to 1993.
This was because the Commission’s routine record keeping did not allow it to distinguish these
instances from those where Member States requested a final payment which was less than the
sum initially committed. In these circumstances the Commission can have no overview of the
effect, financial and other, of its checking of final payment requests from Member States.
3.17.6. When asked by the Committee for information on the number of instances of formal
application of article 24 of Regulation 4253/88 and their outcomes the Commission’s services
were unable initially to provide an elementary breakdown of the number of cases or their
financial consequences. It emerged that information in this form was not routinely maintained
by the Directorate General for Regional Affairs although assurances were given that it would be
henceforth. This failure by the Commission to monitor the application of an important article on
financial control in a basic Regulation confirms the Committee in its view that the article has
been a dead letter and that it is the implementation of Regulations’ provisions which is lacking
rather than inadequate legislation per se.  In part this situation arises because of Member States’
aversion to the application of the Regulation.
3.17.7. For the Social Fund in 1997 123 irregularities were reported by the Member States and
21.2 million ECU were recovered. In 1998 86 control missions were undertaken by the
Commission to cover a budget of  7,600 million ECU. If anything the Social Fund is more
exposed to irregularities and even frauds because it deals in intangibles such as training courses
and the like. Recent  reports in one Member State indicate widespread Social Fund irregularity
and fraud in two  regions and there are indications from a larger Member State of irregularity
rates in the Social Fund of up to 50 %. Notwithstanding this and subsequent investigations by
the national authorities in the smaller Member State, as at 15 June 1999, these same authorities
had not communicated to the Commission in respect of 1998 one single Social Fund irregularity
which had been the subject of initial administrative or judicial investigations, as they are
required to do by article 3 of Commission Regulation 1681/94 of 11 July 1994.
3.17.8. The new Regulation 1260/99 does provide for more co-ordination between the
Commission and the Member States in the area of on the spot checks but its basic provisions as
set down at its article 38 are not very different from the analogous provisions in the preceding
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Regulation 4253/8862 at its article 23. The same is true for these articles’ provisions on Member
States reporting of irregularities to the Commission. If the Member States failed to respect the
provisions of the old Regulation in these areas and the Commission was lax in enforcing the
Regulation why should the adoption of a new regulation, of itself, necessarily change these
practices? In the Committee’s view the problem is more one of attitudes and a lack of respect
for the rules rather than the rules themselves. Nevertheless the clarifications included in the new
Regulation 1260/99 give the Commission more opportunity to insist on their application.
3.17.9. The Court of Auditors’ annual Statements of Assurance indicate a material payment
error rate in Structural Fund transactions present in the accounts of perhaps as much as 10 %,
representing between 2 to 3 billion Euros. This must not be read as an indication of levels of
fraud. The point is that there is an enormous gap between what the Commission is appraised of
as irregularities as described at paragraphs 3.17.4 and 3.17.7 above and error levels determined
by neutral and scientific auditing. There are two possibilities. The Commission and Member
States have no idea of what is going on or the Member States know but the Commission does
not. In either case the extent of the Commission’s ignorance is culpable. This situation is at least
in part the result of widespread project substitution and over-declaration (see paragraph 3.18 and
ff.). More will be said on material error rates and the attitude of the Commission and Member
States representatives on this question at 3.22.5.
3.18. Eligibility
3.18.1. The original arrangements for both the Regional Fund and the Social Fund allowed
project eligibility to be considered by the Commission on a case by case basis within the
framework of agreed programmes. By 1988 the volume of projects and the imminent expansion
of Structural Fund activity made separate Commission decisions on individual projects an
impracticable option. Regulations 2052/88 and 4253/8863 in instituting a system of
programming based on Community support frameworks and operational programmes allowed
Member States to determine the projects that made up these programmes and moved the key
decision about eligibility to that level. The Commission was to make one single decision for
each operational programme as an entity (Article 14 of Reg. 4253/88). The real opportunity the
Commission enjoyed to assess project eligibility was in effect transferred to the point where
Member States submit expenditure declarations on programme completion. It became clear over
time that the lack of clear definitions in the area of project eligibility was causing difficulties for
both the Commission and the Member States. The practice of project substitution was used from
the outset and became ever more frequent. If a project is declared ineligible by the Commission
Member States simply submit a replacement project introduced to the operational programme
post facto for just this purpose and often at a point where the new project is underway or even
completed. The new Regulation 1260/99 now specifically permits this. Its article 39.2 reads “
the corrections made by the Member State shall consist in cancelling all or part of the
Community contribution. The Community funds released in this way may be reused by the
Member State for the assistance concerned.”
3.18.2. The basic objective is that come what may, Member States be permitted to spend up to
their financial targets. The real concern is to identify enough on- going projects to achieve that.
In this respect and to provide a kind of “cover” against the possibility of a decision that a project
is ineligible certain Member States routinely over-declare expenditure. This is clear from the
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report prepared under the auspices of the Commission entitled SEM 2000-etape III: 5eme
rapport d’avancement.64“
“In the case of the structural funds, an irregularity in terms of eligibility does not necessarily
mean a loss of resources, since the Member States’ requests for pyament often contain more
eligible items of expenditure than necessary so as to justify the Commission’s payment.”
(paragraph 2.2.3)
In essence the Member State has a programme and submits a total of, for example, 80 million
ECU’s worth of expenditure and expects the Commission to identify  say 50 million ECU of
expenditure from that total, being the sum already earmarked for the Member State from the
Structural Fund budget. If a project within the 50 million is found to be ineligible it will be
replaced by another project identified by the Commission from within the additional 30 million.
3.18.3. The Commission has in any case always accepted  project substitution and from 1988
onwards came to accept over-declaration. In a recent letter to the President of the European
Council (19/5 /99) the Court of Auditors concludes that “in many cases the over-declaration of
eligible expenditure is insufficient to ensure that those errors do not have a definitive impact on
the total of the Commission’s payments in respect of the programs concerned.” The errors to
which the Court of Auditors makes reference here are those uncovered in the preparation of its
annual Statement of Assurance on the accounts. The substantial point is that over-declaration
does not of itself remove the risk that errors are present in expenditure accepted by the
Commission. A further comment on error rates, the Court of Auditors concerns and the reaction
of the Commission and senior civil servants from the Member States will follow at paragraph
3.22.5.
3.18.4. A related difficulty which arises here is that equal treatment between Member States and
between programmes within a Member State cannot be assured. If a Member State includes the
whole field of action in the operational programme then there will be no possibility for it to
substitute one project for another or to over-declare.
3.18.5. Following a process of consultation in the context of phase 3 of the SEM 2000 exercise
the Commission prepared a package of 20 fact sheets or guidance notes dealing in detail with
aspects of eligibility judgements to guide Member states and its own services in this area. The
consultation was with the Group of Personal Representatives composed of senior civil servants
in the main from Finance ministries in the Member States. The legislation now adopted, so the
Commission argues, incorporates elements of these fact sheets that are consequently being
revised. However the same legislation states in Article 30 of new Regulation 1260/99 dealing
with eligibility that the “relevant national rules shall apply to eligible expenditure except where,
as necessary, the Commission lays down common rules on the eligibility of expenditure”.
Moreover in proposing the new Regulation the Commission stated that “le contenu plus détaillé
de la programmation, ainsi que la gestion des interventions, seront par contre de la
responsabilité pleine et entière des Etats membres”.65 Revised fact sheets will continue to be
available as points of reference but the basic eligibility decision will move substantially into the
domain of the Member States. The Commission argues that because of co-financing the interests
of the Member States and the Community run in parallel as far as project eligibility is
concerned. However in many instances the Community’s share of a programme cost is much
greater than the Member State’s.
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3.19. Additionality
3.19.1. Clearly if Community expenditure merely substitutes for national expenditure then it has
no added value. The preamble to the Regional Fund’s initial regulation (Reg. 724/75) insists that
"the fund’s assistance should not lead Member States to reduce their own development efforts
but should complement these." Article 4 of Regulation 2052/88 covering all of the funds says
that “the Commission shall take the steps and measures necessary to ensure that Community
operations …impart to national initiatives an added value”.
3.19.2. Additionality has never been easy to verify. It is difficult to determine its presence either
in the context of specific projects or programmes or more globally. The move from individual
project approval by the Commission  to programme approval which occurred with the
introduction of the 1988 reform effectively removed the possibility for the Commission of
verifying additionality at this level at least ex ante. The 1993 regulations began to consider
additionality at a global level only. Article 9 of Reg. 2082/9366 states that “the Commission and
the Member State concerned shall ensure that the Member State maintains, in the whole of the
territory concerned, its public structural or comparable expenditure at least at the same level as
in the previous programming period, taking into account however the macroeconomic
circumstances in which the funding takes place ……and business cycles in the national
economy.” This is already a very generalised and highly qualified interpretation of additionality.
The new Regulation 1260/99 attempts to work with this broad interpretation and proposes a
verification by the Commission of its application at the ex- ante, mid-point and ex-post stages of
the programming period. For new objectives 2 and 3 the Commission and the Member State will
establish the reference level of national expenditure for the programme period. It is clear
however that this new definition of additionality merely reflect the fact that the Commission has
no longer any effective means to ensure additionality below the macro-economic level. It is also
difficult to believe that it disposes of any effective means to ensure additionality at the macro-
economic level. What could the Commission do at the mid point or ex post stage if after its
verifications it concluded that a Member State had reduced its level of public spending because
of the availability of Structural Fund monies? The Regulation does not provide for a sanction of
any kind. At no level, macro-economic or other can the Commission act independently of the
Member States to observe, confirm or ensure additionality.
3.20. Evaluation
3.20.1. Evaluating and monitoring are different activities. Evaluation involves assessing the
impact of the assistance while monitoring entails having an overview of implementation. The
two activities have been linked in this field by the role established in successive regulations for
the Monitoring Committees composed of Member State Representatives and chaired by the
Commission. A key component in the matter of evaluation was the monitoring Committees set
up in accordance with article 17 of Regulation 2052/88 which also provided for ex ante and ex
post evaluation against the five objectives set at that time for the Funds. Their role was
significantly reinforced in this area by the provisions of Regulation 2082/93 and the new
Regulation further formalises this by providing for ex ante, mid point and ex post evaluation. In
the case of ex ante evaluation especially a more systematic approach is introduced to allow a
reference point for subsequent mid point and ex post evaluation. Monitoring is to be against
both physical and financial indicators and is to be used to measure the impact of measures
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overall, at Community Support Framework level and at programme level. This being the case
the monitoring Committees might better have been styled monitoring and evaluation
Committees. While acknowledging the Commission’s role in persuading Member States of the
importance of evaluation the Court of Auditors made remarks in its Special Report 15/98 that
the Committee finds disquieting. Despite the Commission’s best endeavours on evaluation the
Court reports that "according to information gleaned orally during the (Court’s) audits, only
some of the results and recommendations are of any real use in terms of assisting decision-
making, managing projects, re-programming or preparing the next generation of interventions"
(paragraph 6.7)67. Other reports of the Court of Auditors have been critical of the relative
passivity of the Monitoring Committees for whom progress has been measured almost
exclusively in terms of the amount of expenditure effected.
3.20.2. Notwithstanding this the new Regulation will limit the Commission’s role in the
monitoring Committees to a purely advisory one. Article 40 of Regulation 1260/99 speaks of
evaluation being a joint responsibility. The structure of these arrangements however leaves the
Commission with little opportunity to conduct an independent evaluation the results of which
may not accord with an evaluation entirely dependent on information from the Member State.
3.20.3. A further consideration is the overall impact on the objectives set out. Evaluation at this
level is difficult not least because a major increase in levels of expenditure in a given limited
area resulting from fund activity would have a “keynesian” effect whether or not the resources
used were deployed in the interests of long-term structural development.
3.21. Organisational Aspects
3.21.1. At an administrative level the Committee noted a recent development in parallel with the
introduction of the new Regulation. As the Community moves from 6 to 3 objectives the
number of instruments involved increases yet again with the introduction of the  “contribution”
of the EAGGF Guarantee (as opposed to Guidance) section to objective 2. The argument
advanced, that objective 2 sometimes entails rural development is hardly convincing. Does
objective 1 not also entail rural development? A consequence of the new arrangement is that
there will be different programme methods for rural development between objective 1 and
objective 2. If the rural development element for objective 1 can safely be left to the Guidance
section which has years of Structural Fund experience then why is the intervention of the
Guarantee section necessary in respect of objective 2. The argument that the expenditure would
be subject to clearance of the accounts has some merit. However if a clearance procedure is to
be recommended for some objective 2 expenditure then why not all, indeed why not all
Structural Fund expenditure. The Committee’s view is that this hybrid administrative
arrangement now reflected in the Regulation results from pressure from the agricultural lobby
and internal bureaucratic considerations within the Commission related to the probable
continuing decrease in agricultural price support expenditure.
3.21.2. The first objective (promoting the development and structural adjustment of regions
lagging behind) and the second objective (supporting the economic and social conversion of
areas facing structural difficulties) could be better attained, in the Committee’s view, if both
were covered by one unified fund managed by one Directorate General. This would allow easier
co-ordination and control and achieve economies of effort and personnel resources for the
Commission. It has been suggested to the Committee that such an arrangement would be
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opposed by the Member States because they prefer the structure of the Commission’s services to
mirror that of national administrations with a “corresponding” Directorate General for each
national ministry. The Committee also believes that bureaucratic opposition within the
Commission has so far precluded a rationalisation of this kind.
3.22. Conclusions
3.22.1. The legislative and administrative development of the Structural Funds tends to the
conclusion that the balance of decision-making power and effective control of direction and
expenditure has passed decisively to the Member States. The Commission has not acted
energetically to protect the resources involved from irregularity and the gap between the
irregularities uncovered and the rate of material errors revealed by audit is startling. As
ultimately responsible for the implementation of the budget the Commission has no right to
complacently suppose that irregularities are routinely uncovered and corrected in sufficient
numbers in the structural fund area by the Member States. This point is linked in particular to
the question of eligibility. The loss of the possibility of systematically verifying the eligibility of
individual projects and substitution of projects has not been compensated on the Commission’s
side by a mechanism which would allow it to take an independent, informed decision to exclude
expenditure and protect the integrity of operational programmes. Experience has shown that the
Commission has great difficulty in ensuring the application of the key control articles of
Regulation 4253/88, 23 and 24. Despite their greater clarity there is no reason to believe that the
key control articles of the new Regulation 1260/99, 38 and 39, will of themselves be any easier
to apply. Effective control in and of the Member States requires more staff resources.
3.22.2.  Additionality is now almost impossible to verify and verification at the level of Member
States national expenditure by region and policy is so problematic as to be pointless. The
Commission has made serious attempts to promote evaluation but it is difficult to see why its
role here should not be reinforced while that of the monitoring Committees is. In general it is
difficult not to conclude that there has been a gradual erosion of the Commission’s position in
shared management of the Structural Funds. In this the Commission, if it has not lost sight of its
primary Treaty derived responsibility to implement the budget, has at least allowed its vision of
it to be obscured. This erosion of the Commission’s position should not be confused with a
clearer delineation of responsibilities. A clearer delineation of responsibilities is worthwhile in
itself but it does not guarantee that the right balance has been struck between the powers and
responsibilities of the Commission on the one hand and those of the Member States on the other.
3.22.3. Although control has passed to the Member States, six factors tend to divest them of
responsibility.
• the separation of responsibility for financing and executing, where the
Commission co-finances a policy for which the day to day management is the
responsibility of the Member States.
• expenditure ceilings are also targets.
• Community support can be as high as 70 %
• project substitution which undermines project selection from the outset
• over-declaration which undermines project selection and control in general.
• the procedures for control and recovery by the Commission are difficult to apply
under the old and probably under the new Regulations (4253/88 and 1260/99)
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3.22.4. Other provisions of the new horizontal Council Regulation 1260/99 do have the benefit
of making some matters clearer, for example how, by whom and when evaluation should be
conducted. However its provisions on the reporting of irregularities and Commission on-the –
spot missions are not very different from the previous provisions which have had very little
practical impact. They have been more or less dead letters, in part because of project
substitution and over-declaration by Member States, both tending to undermine their
responsibility from the outset to take due care in selecting projects. What really matters is
whether the Commission is energetic in implementing the new Regulation and in pushing for
further reform while adjusting its administrative structures. It is the Committee’s view that if
this does not happen there will be no further reform of the Structural Funds but that under the
strain of enlargement and the administrative difficulties faced by new Member States from
central and eastern Europe the Community policy approach will give way to a simple
redistribution mechanism, for which for the moment there is insufficient political support.
3.22.5. Part of this Committee’s remit is to consider the Commission’s administrative culture.
The Personal Representative’s Group of senior finance Ministry officials was constituted on the
Commission’s initiative to consider the whole area of shared management in the context of the
SEM 2000 initiative. In this group’s most recent document cited at paragraph 3.16.2 and
prepared in conjunction with the Commission discussion turned to the Court of Auditor’s
Statements of Assurance. Remarks made here are illustrative of a joint reluctance on the part of
the Commission and the national administrations to accept the existence of problems when their
resolution might be difficult for Member States. On the Court’s decision not to give a positive
Statement of Assurance on payments in successive years following its scientific audit the
document reads ”la situation n’est guère encourageante pour la Commission: pour la quatrième
année consécutive, la Cour des Comptes n’a pas été en mesure d'établir une DAS positive sur
les paiements.” The context of this remark, wherein the Court’s methods are compared with a
national Court of Auditors and its definition of error tendentiously questioned, would lead the
reader to believe that the problem is the Court’s unwillingness to give a positive Statement of
Assurance rather than the underlying error rate which gives rise to that unwillingness. This is the
world on its head. The Court is supposed to produce a positive statement, irrespective of the
facts, to aid the Commission’s morale at the behest of national civil servants. This is illustrative
of an administrative culture that has difficulty with objectivity. The Court’s reply in its letter of
19 May 1999 to the Council advises “caution before any decision is taken which would involve
a commitment to the achievements of a positive DAS on the transactions underlying the
Commission’s payments within a given timetable. Of course, where expenditure directly
managed by the Commissioners concerned, it should be within the Commission’s powers to
make the necessary improvements within such a time scale. But the Member States will also
have to ensure that their own monitoring and control procedures are strengthened – for
example, implementing correctly the new higher structural fund’s regulations and that their
financial reporting to the Commission is improved, if the Commission is to be able to deliver
reliable financial statements whose underlying transactions are legal and regular.” The
Committee shares this view.
RECOMMENDATIONS
3.23. Shared  Management in the EAGGF
The extreme complexity of the legislation renders the EAGGF Guarantee section vulnerable to
fraud and makes its control very difficult. The control of EAGGF Guarantee expenditure
remains an important current issue despite the gradual reduction in the EAGGF Guarantee
section’s percentage share of the total Community budget. Sensitive sectors such as export
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refunds and direct income support are also key sectors which merit the Commission’s particular
attention. The recent clarification of the respective responsibilities of the Commission and the
Member States for payments and control may have a positive impact if given the correct follow-
up. The clearance of the accounts with the Member States is the final, overall management act
by the Commission in its exercise of control over expenditure by the Member States under the
Commission’s responsibility. The findings of the Court of Auditors annual Statements of
Assurance suggest that there should be an increase in the amounts recovered through the
Clearance of Accounts.
3.23.1. All decisions taken by the Commission in the EAGGF Guarantee area, either as an
administration or as a college, must be taken in conditions of complete independence. The
Commission must ensure that the Clearance of Accounts unit can work independently and
without being subject to any inappropriate external or internal pressure or influence (3.12.3.-4).
3.23.2. The Commission should ensure a more stringent application of the provisions of
Regulations 1287/95 and 1663/95 which deal with the accreditation of paying agencies and the
certification of their accounts (3.9.8.-3.9.10).
3.23.3. The Commission should make full use of its right of on-the-spot controls in the Member
States for accounting and compliance clearance and exclude from the certified accounts those
amounts relating to accounting errors and underlying transactions which are irregular (3.10.6.).
3.23.4. Where systematic weaknesses are found higher rates of flat rate correction for the
amounts to be recovered should be applied (3.8.6., 3.12.2.)
3.23.5. There remains scope to recover greater amounts through a reinforced clearance effort. To
this end the Clearance of Accounts unit needs a further increase in staff to allow a wider
coverage each year and checks through to the level of the final beneficiary. It should set a target
for amounts recovered linked to the error rates found by the Court of Auditors in its annual
Statements of Assurance ((3.12.2.).
3.23.6. Interest should be charged by the Commission from the date of payment by the paying
agency on those amounts recovered which have been subject to the conciliation procedure
(3.11.1-3.11.5-6).
3.23.7. The threshold for amounts in dispute which can be presented to the Conciliation body
should be increased if need be by expressing it as a fraction of the value of the average
transaction in each Member State (3.11.3.).
3.23.8. The Commission should seek to reduce the length of time taken in the clearance
procedure by reducing the number of steps and in particular the number of distinct occasions
which Member States have to comment on proposed recoveries and the Commission’s
observations leading to them (3.10.9.).
3.23.9. The Commission should ensure that the cycle of Clearance of Accounts’ inspection of
market and direct payment regimes is short enough to guarantee that all major areas are covered
in a 24 month period in view of article 1 of Regulation 1663/95 (3.10.7.).
3.23.10. In the new system the compliance clearance decisions can refer to transactions in
different years. The Commission should therefore ensure that in the interests of transparency its
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records and reporting show how much is recovered through compliance clearance for payments
made for each accounting year (3.10.5.-8).
3.23.11. The Commission should pay particular attention to the area of export refunds
differentiated by destination and ensure that guarantees are recovered in full when frauds are
uncovered (3.13.2-5).
3.23.12. The Commission should give priority to ensuring the proper implementation and
correct application of the Integrated administrative and control system (IACS) (3.13.6-7).
3.24. Shared Management of the Structural Funds
The size of the Structural Funds means that day-to-day control of expenditure must be exercised
by the Member States. The fact that the division of responsibilities between the Commission and
the Member States has recently been clarified in legislation does not mean that the right
balance in the division of responsibilities has been struck. A certain number of factors tend to
divest the Member States of responsibility. The Commission must ensure that the Member States
have put in place effective control systems.
3.24.1. There has to be a strengthening of control within the Commission through reinforced
internal control units in the Directorates General. This is necessary to avoid the Commission
being almost entirely dependent on the Member States for information on implementation and
irregularities and the subsequent possibilities of pursuing these. This recommendation accords
with proposals made in Chapter 4 of this report concerning decentralised financial control and
modern internal and professional auditing (3.17.2-9).
3.24.2. Checks by the Commission in the Member States must be reinforced both in number and
in quality, that is to say they should go beyond checks which lead simply to the provision of
advice by the Commission and an exchange of views. Checks should be designed to result in the
detection of irregularities and consequently in financial corrections. They should be most
frequent in countries and regions with relatively weak administrative structures. This implies
more Commission resources devoted to control in the Member States This implies stronger and
more effective control by the Commission of such structures in all the Member States (3.17.2-
9).
3.24.3. The number of administrative units involved in the management of the Structural Funds
should  be decreased and not increased. To this end the EAGGF Guarantee Directorates in DG 6
should have no role in rural development measures which should be left to the Guidance
Directorates. The Committee’s view is that only one Directorate General should have
responsibility for the new objectives 1 and 2 (3.21.1.-2).
3.24.4. The use of diverse national rules to determine project eligibility if compatible with the
provisions of the Treaties, should be carefully monitored by the Commission to ensure equality
of treatment in respect of Structural Fund assistance for all citizens of the Union. Where the
national rules cannot ensure this then the Commission should come forward with one or more
additional eligibility datasheets to function as guidance notes (3.18.5.).
3.24.5. The Commission should refuse to accept over-declarations for reimbursement from
Member States and return them for proper presentation (over-declaration occurs where Member
States in claiming submit more expenditure than their entitlement leaving to the Commission the
task of  selecting eligible expenditure from within this larger sum). It is the Member State’s
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responsibility to present its claims for payment in a transparent and detailed way so that all
parties can be satisfied that the expenditure concerned was eligible and its effects can be
evaluated (3.18.1.-4).
3.24.6. Member States should inform the Commission of all project substitutions and their
value. The Commission should systematically retain this information to form an overview of the
integrity and coherence of the programmes. Member States should prepare for comparison the
initial proposal without substitutions with the final outcome with substitutions. This would
allow the Commission to intervene to assess certain instances of re-use and to ensure it may
recover sums unduly paid from the Community budget(3.18.1-4).
3.24.7. If the reforms refered above at paragraphs 3.24.1. and 3.24.6. were not to be
implemented, the Commission should take the initiative by preparing a distinct legislative
proposal.
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Annex 1
CHAPTER 3 : SHARED MANAGEMENT
European Union Budget 1999
Expenditure by broad category (1999 payment appropriations)
mio EUROS in % of total
budget
EAGGF – Guarantee 40735 48.5
EAGGF – Guidance 3774 4.5
Regional Fund 12702 15.1
Social Fund 7246 8.5
Other Structural Funds 3846 4.7
TOTAL Structural Funds 27568 32.8
Cohesion Fund 2887 3.4
TOTAL Structural &
Cohesion Fund
30455 36.2
Other expenditure 12798 15.3
TOTAL budget 83978 100.0
Source: OJ L 39 - Final Adoption of the General Budget of the European Union for the
Financial Year 1999.
110
4. THE CONTROL ENVIRONMENT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
4.1. The basics
4.2. Ongoing reforms
4.3. Other control mechanisms
4.4. Approach taken
4.5. The First Report: Identifying problem areas
INTERNAL CONTROL
4.6. The need for change
4.7. The principles of responsibility in financial management
4.8. What is internal control?
4.9. A new framework for internal control
Oversight and support
Delegation of authority
Financial operations – procedures
Accounting and reporting
Enforcement of authorising officers’ responsibility
INTERNAL AUDIT
4.10. Internal v. External Audit
4.11. The weakness of the present internal audit function
4.12. What is internal audit?
Definition
Objective and scope
Responsibility, authority and independence
4.13. A framework for internal audit in the Commission
Status and position within the organisation
Selection of audits
Conduct of audits
Follow-up of audits
Relations with the Court of Auditors
Resources
4.14. General Inspectorate of Services (IGS)
4.15. Organisational consequences
4.16. The use made by the Commission of the audit findings of the Court of Auditors
Audit coverage
Nature of audit observations
DAS
Timing of reports
The Contradictory Procedure
4.17. Parliamentary budgetary control
4.18. Recommendations
Annex 1: SEM 2000 Recommendations
Annex 2: DG XX – Facts and Figures
-111-
INTRODUCTION
4.1. The basics
4.1.1. The present chapter will examine the mechanisms in place within the Commission for
the control of revenue and expenditure68.  Such mechanisms include the measures taken to
verify the legality and regularity of expenditure before it is made - ex ante control - and those
which occur after or during expenditure - ex post control.
4.1.2. These functions, currently grouped under the responsibility of the Directorate-General
for Financial Control (DG XX), are in fact substantially different in nature.  The former category
is essentially an administrative process whereby proposals for expenditure (both commitments
and payments) are checked for conformity with the appropriate rules and procedures and
validated by the Financial Control service.  Approval for an operation must explicitly be given
before it can take place.  This procedure is known in Community jargon as the granting of a
"visa".  The second category of control takes the form of audits, which may be of specific
services, programmes, projects, etc., carried out by a specialised service within DG XX, the
conclusions of which ultimately take the form of reports by the Commission’s Financial
Controller.  For the purposes of this chapter, the two functions will be referred to as internal
control and internal audit.
4.1.3. Both functions, though different in nature, include verification of conformity with the
financial rule-book of the European Union, the Financial Regulation.69  This document, the
application of which is further elucidated in Implementing Rules adopted by each institution, is
the basic text of financial control.  It lays down the ground rules for the basic budgetary
procedures: the establishment, structure and presentation of the budget, the implementation and
management of the budget, the presentation of the accounts, the external audit of the accounts
and the discharge to be granted to the Commission for its implementation of the budget.  It also
contains a number of special provisions for specific areas of expenditure. For present purposes,
the key provisions are those concerning implementation of the budget by the Commission and
the oversight exercised over them by DG XX.
4.1.4. One key provision of the Financial Regulation is that each institution shall appoint a
Financial Controller with two principal tasks: monitoring (i) the commitment and authorization
of all expenditure, and (ii) the establishment and collection of all revenue.70  The Financial
Regulation is also concerned with the status of the Financial Controller.  Each institution shall
make its own provisions in its implementing rules, but in all cases these "shall be such as to
                                                
68 For those familiar with audit terminology, the title of this chapter, "control environment", is used here
with this restricted meaning.  It will not concern itself with the wider connotations of the term (e.g.
corporate ethos, disciplinary regime, etc.) as these are covered abundantly elsewhere in the report.
69 The "Financial Regulation of 21 December 1977 applicable to the general budget of the European
Communities" (OJ L356 of 32.12.77), amended on eleven occasions.
70 Article 24, first and third indents
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guarantee that they are independent in the performance of their duties".71  In the case of the
Commission, the Financial Controller is the Director-General of DG XX.
4.1.5. Another fundamental of the financial control system, also contained in the Financial
Regulation, is the separation of functions between the person authorising expenditure and the
person  actually carrying out the financial operation concerned, or, as the text has it, the
authorizing officers and accounting officers are different individuals"72. Consequently, any
commitment or payment order requires the agreement of three individuals: the authorizing
officer, who enters into financial commitments and issues payment orders, the Financial
Controller, who gives his/her visa for the operation, and the accounting officer, who carries out
the operation in question.  These duties, in the words of the Financial Regulation, are "mutually
incompatible".73
4.2. Ongoing reforms
4.2.1. In some respects, the Committee is dealing with a moving target in this field, notably
because of the processes underway as part of the "SEM 2000"74 initiative.  The purpose of this
initiative is to address failings in the Commission’s financial management identified by the
Santer Commission at the beginning of its mandate.  SEM 2000 was billed as a wide-ranging
reform not only of formal structures and procedures, but also of the entire financial management
"culture" of the Commission.  (The eleven "recommendations" of SEM 2000 are reproduced in
Annex 1 to this chapter.)
4.2.2. Latterly linked with the SEM 2000 process, several batches of amendments to the
Financial Regulation (picturesquely known as "trains") have been put forward by the
Commission in response to the changing circumstances of financial management.  While each
"train" has been proposed for good reason, the overall result, inevitably, has been to complicate
the Financial Regulation to the point that it is becoming unworkable.  Under pressure not least
from the Court of Auditors, the Commission has therefore stopped the process of partial revision
and launched a complete review of the Financial Regulation under the banner "the Recasting of
the Financial Regulation"75.  Its reflections have not yet, nor will for some time, taken concrete
form.  However in its introductory document, the Commission, after acknowledging that the
repeated amendments of recent years have "robbed the 1977 text of some of its coherence and
readability"76, outlines the nature of the modifications it intends to propose.  These relate both to
                                                
71 Idem. eighth indent
72 Financial Regulation, Article 21 (first indent)
73 Idem. (fourth indent)
74
"Sound and Efficient Management 2000"
75 Title of Commission Working Document - SEC(1998)1228 of 22.7.1998
76 Idem. Introduction, paragraph 2  (see also the Court of Auditors: "As a result of the successive
proposals for revising the Financial Regulation, a good many "facilities" have been arranged, or
allowed to emerge; these discretionary arrangements are regarded as useful for managers ... but tend
to run counter to a disciplined approach and hugely complicate the accounting and financial
management" - Court of Auditors opinion 4/97 (10.7.97) para. 14 - Quoted by Commission in
introduction)
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form (clarity of text and consistency with other legislation) and to the substance of the
provisions laid down in the Regulation.  The task is a vast one, which will potentially take
considerable time to complete.  It is also subject to complex legislative procedures and involves
a substantial input notably from the European Parliament, the Council and the Court of
Auditors. As such, it would be inappropriate (not to say impractical) for the Committee to
attempt to "second guess" these procedures by indulging in its own systematic review of the
Financial Regulation.  It will therefore restrict itself to indicating its ideas on specific reforms, as
they arise in its analysis, and assumes that, insofar as the Committee’s recommendations are
considered useful, they will be "built-in" to the new Financial Regulation as necessary.
4.3. Other control mechanisms
4.3.1. Though this chapter is predominantly concerned with the internal control functions
currently carried out by DG XX, it will also deal more briefly with other aspects of control.
4.3.2. It will thus comment briefly on the external audit function, carried out by the Court of
Auditors, and in this context at the political budgetary control exercised by Parliament (though
this subject is more correctly the subject of Chapter 7 and is covered more deeply there).  It must
also make mention of the internal inspection carried out by a specialised service of the
Commission77.
4.4. Approach taken
4.4.1. The recommendations to be made in this chapter will concern the key matters of
principle according to which the Committee believes the Commission’s audit and control
environment should be designed and do not to enter into the small print of the reforms it
identifies as desirable.  It is for those directly concerned to build a system which will work on
the foundations of these principles.
4.4.2. Furthermore, although SEM 2000 in many respects addresses a similar range of
problems to those arising in this chapter, the Committee has preferred, for the purposes of this
report, to base its analysis on the situation currently prevailing in the Commission, rather than
take its lead from the Commission’s own project for the reform of financial management.
Although conscious of SEM 2000 plans, and though mention will be made on the occasions
where there is a clear coincidence of thinking between SEM 2000 and the Committee’s own
reflections, on the whole the Committee prefers to follow its own path in reaching its
recommendations.
                                                
77 Referred to in this chapter by the commonly used French acronym, IGS - "Inspectorat Général des
Services"
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4.5. The First Report: Identifying problem areas
4.5.1. In its first report, the Committee made a range of criticisms relating to the role of the
directorate-general for Financial Control.  Two observations in particular point to problems
which the Committee would identify as fundamental.
4.5.2. The first, in paragraph 9.4.14, is a simple but telling statement of fact:
“Most of the irregularities highlighted by the Committee stemmed from decisions to
which Financial Control gave its approval”
4.5.3. Behind this fact lies a substantial question mark as to the effectiveness, indeed
usefulness, of ex ante financial control as currently organised in the Commission.78  It is a
question posed not only by this Committee, but one exercising the collective mind of the
Financial Control service of the Commission itself.  This is hardly surprising: according to DG
XX’s figures, in 1998 it processed  over half-a-million financial transactions. (This could be one
factor in the unfortunate reputation the Commission has required for late payment of creditors)
The bulk of DG XX’s staff is dedicated, directly or indirectly, to ex-ante control.79  In spite of
this, the volume of operations has already led to a system whereby proposals are only studied on
a sample basis (30% in 1998, descending to 10% in 1999), with the great majority of operations
therefore receiving approval automatically. On this basis, and notwithstanding the application of
some effort to target controls on the basis of risk analysis, the supposed “quality guarantee”
provided by the visa is a myth, and the sense in which authorising officers feel correspondingly
relieved of responsibility for the financial regularity of the operation unjustified in either fact or
principle.
4.5.4. The second observation relates to the other function of DG XX, internal audit.  In this
case, the problem arises as a common thread throughout the report.  It frequently occurred that
irregularities were identified in the course of audits by DG XX, and that these irregularities were
such as to indicate at least the necessity for swift remedial action.  The prime example of this
phenomenon was the Leonardo case, where observations (subsequently proven to be accurate) in
early drafts disappeared in final texts.80  Moreover, the finalisation of texts can take an
inordinately long time, as the arguments under the so-called “contradictory procedure” between
auditor and auditee, especially on difficult cases, become protracted.
                                                
78 Notably in the context of SEM 2000 (see especially "recommendation 11" - Annex 1)
79 For detailed figures see from "Financial Controller’s 1998 Annual Report" - SEC(1999) 446/2A/4,6,8
(summarised in Annex 2). It should be said that these figures are presented for reference purposes only,
as the classification of work and staff (particularly in the category "ex-post" audit) is questionable.
80 See First Report, Chapter 5
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4.5.5. The Committee supports the basic principle of the right of reply: there is no question that
the auditee should have the possibility to reply to audit findings before the report is finalised.
The problem identified by the Committee is not that the contradictory procedure exists, but in
the way it operates in practice - which is in turn the result of the relative position occupied by
DG XX within the Commission. What, in the final analysis, is in question is the very conception
of internal audit within a large organisation such as the Commission.
4.5.6. The focus of this chapter will therefore be on two subjects: the redesign of internal
control and the transformation of internal audit.
4.5.7. The recommendations made will be based on the premise - also the subject of an
observation in the first report81 - that the two functions, ex ante control of regularity of financial
operations  and a posteriori audit, are entirely separate (even conflicting) activities which do not
belong in the same department.
INTERNAL CONTROL
4.6. The need for change
4.6.1. There are different possible responses to the observation that the visa system of financial
control in the Commission does not work.  The first (an "ideal world" solution) is to try to make
the existing system work in practice as it should in theory, in such a way that all financial
proposals are genuinely and thoroughly checked. This would involve posting a vastly increased
number of officials to the financial control service - a move which is impossible for a variety of
reasons. A second response is to accept the impossibility of universal testing, by moving to a
sampling system, whereby only relatively few, hopefully "targeted", transactions are thoroughly
checked with the rest receiving an "automatic" visa (this being the current, SEM 2000-
sanctioned situation).
4.6.2. Whatever the (im)practicalities of these options, the Committee continues to have strong
reservations about them on two points of principle.  First, ex ante checking, whether it be
universal or on the basis of sampling, is unlikely to be a cost-effective process: the effort put in
to checking all transactions is clearly disproportionate, while sampling is unlikely to have
sufficient dissuasive effect.  The second, and fundamental, principle is that any retention of ex
ante control runs up against the crucial objection that, de facto if not de jure, it displaces
responsibility for financial regularity from the person actually managing expenditure onto the
person approving it.  This displacement of responsibility, meaning in effect that no-one is
ultimately responsible.
4.6.3. Thus we arrive at the third kind of response, namely a complete re-examination of the
very concept of ex ante control.
4.6.4. In the world of international financial management, the ex ante financial control system
of the Community institutions has something of an antediluvian feel about it.  It corresponds to
                                                
81 Paragraph 9.4.16
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an outmoded "belt and braces" vision of control which places little value on the sense of
personal responsibility of the "manager", focuses on the formal aspects of operations82 and
which can in any case only work effectively in an environment where a relatively restricted
number of financial proposals pass through the system.  Both these points have been identified
by the Committee as major problem areas for the Commission, which, as the first report of the
Committee pointed out, does not structurally encourage a sense of personal responsibility in its
staff and carries out a number and range of financial activities beyond its capacity to manage
them.  In terms specifically of the European civil service, the problem is further exacerbated by
the near-impossibility of applying administrative sanctions of a pecuniary nature against
officials who commit irregularities.83
4.6.5. Most modern practice indicates a shift away from rigid ex ante control systems, to ones
which rely on a combination of high quality financial management at source together with a firm
regime of ex post audit. DG XX itself in part reflects this development, having created an
internal audit service alongside the traditional visa departments.  In doing so, it has arguably
provided itself with the worst of both worlds, in the shape of two services, neither of which
stands a serious chance of operating effectively. To make matters worse, the functions of the
two services are potentially in conflict, as the audit service will inevitably throw up cases where
financial control has granted a visa for an irregular operation (cases abound...). The position of
the Financial Controller in such cases is not a satisfactory one.
4.6.6. The conclusion to be drawn is clear.  First, financial control (i.e. the ex ante guarantee of
the regularity of financial operations) must be completely rethought with a view to making the
managers of expenditure genuinely and concretely responsible for it.  Second, this function must
be completely separate from the internal audit function.
4.7. The principles of responsibility in financial management
4.7.1. The considerations outlined above point to a series of principles which must be respected
in any redesign of financial management:
• the manager of expenditure ("authorising officer") must be and feel responsible
for all aspects84 of the financial operations she/he carries out;
• the responsibility of authorising officers must be concrete and enforceable:
formal and practicable mechanisms must exist to sanction contraventions;
• attribution of competences and the delegation of authority in any financial
management structure must consequently be clear and unambiguous, in such a
                                                
82 Notwithstanding the fact that Art. 38(1)e of the Financial Regulation does allow respect for the
"principles of sound financial management" to be taken into account.
83 This statement is made not least on the basis of empirical evidence: no Community official has ever
been sanctioned under Article 22 of the Staff Regulations (see Chapter 6)
84 Broadly, the "legality, regularity and sound financial management" of expenditure. (c.f. TEC Art.
248(2) - paraphrase)
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way as to allow responsibility to devolve through the hierarchy in an identifiable
fashion;
• authorising officers must be adequately trained and equipped to exercise their
financial responsibilities;
• a demanding system of accounting, reporting and audit should reinforce the
principle of accountability.
4.7.2. With such a system for authorising officers in place, central financial control as currently
conceived essentially becomes redundant.  Certainly, the submission by authorising officers of
financial proposals for approval to a separate directorate-general of the Commission no longer
has a place in the system.   The "quality control", which is the ultimate purpose of financial
control, should be ensured at the level of the directorate-general responsible for the expenditure.
A form of "decentralisation" is thus envisaged, whereby responsibility is repatriated in the
operational services.  Reasons of efficiency moreover preclude any notion that a visa system be
reproduced in the directorates-general.85
4.8. What is internal control?
4.8.1. Before proceeding, it is worthwhile pausing to consider what exactly is meant by
"internal control", if the old-fashioned notion of it as an ex ante check on regularity is to be
replaced.  The convenient shorthand term "quality control" has already been used.  To be more
specific, internal control consists of all activities, instructions and routines in each directorate-
general that ensure proper and secure handling of the DG’s assets and financial resources.  These
can be outlined as follows:
• the provision to all parties to financial processes of adequate, complete and
accurate information relative to their tasks;
• measures to monitor and guarantee compliance with all relevant procedures,
instructions, regulations and laws;
• measures to protect public property and safeguard the value of public assets;
• measures to ensure the economic, efficient and effective use of resources
according to the principles of sound financial management;
• measures to monitor and, as far as possible, guarantee the achievement of policy
aims, priorities, targets and objectives.86
                                                
85 Though SEM 2000 does not commit itself to this idea, it visibly moves in the same direction -
Recommendation no. 11 (Annex 1)
86 The criteria applying to a priori internal control neatly match those to be reviewed and assessed by
internal audit (c.f.14.12.4)
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4.9. A new framework for internal control
Oversight and support
4.9.1. Within its vision of a decentralised internal control system falling under the
responsibility of each director-general, the Committee would emphasise that it is not proposing
anarchy.  SEM 2000 already offers a context within which a harmonised financial culture is
taking shape, complete with a system of financial "cells" within each directorate-general.  This
"spread" of financial competence is a vital component in the future development of the
Commission. Moreover, for obvious technical/management reasons, it is important that
accounting methods and basic financial management procedures should be the same throughout
the Commission.
4.9.2. The preoccupation of the Committee that individual director-generals and their delegates
should be personally responsible for the functioning of internal control systems and the
regularity of individual financial transactions thus does not imply that they should simply be left
to sink or swim.  On the contrary, it becomes increasingly important that the appropriate
structures be in place and that adequate guidance and support be available to authorising
officers.  This observation points to two needs which must be met.
4.9.3. First, a central specialised financial unit will continue to be necessary to oversee internal
control arrangements, to propose and coordinate amendments to the Financial Regulation and
other financial rules and procedures, to provide (when necessary) interpretations of the
regulations and other advice to authorising officers, etc.  Such a unit, which in the view of the
Committee should be based in DG XIX (Budgets), should play no formal role in the processing
of individual transactions (though, at the request of a director-general, it could offer advice on
specific cases), but should establish the basic procedures and ground rules for financial
management and monitor their application.
4.9.4. Second, obligatory and regular training must be available to all participants in financial
processes.  Current practice, whereby individual officials are simply allocated financial
responsibilities and left "to get on with it", has no place in the management of a modern
organisation. An essential quid pro quo of the personal responsibility to be given to authorising
officers is that they, in their own interests as well as those of the Institution, be adequately
equipped to exercise financial functions.
Delegation of authority
4.9.5. A further sine qua non of making internal control work is that the system of delegation
in the Commission, and thus the responsibilities attached to each level of the hierarchy, must be
absolutely clear.  The font of all authority in the Commission is the college of commissioners
itself.  Ultimately therefore, responsibility for all actions of the administration must find its way
back to individual commissioners and through them to the college.  The relationship between the
commissioners and the upper level of the Commission’s permanent hierarchy is discussed in
Chapter 7 and need not detain us here.  It suffices to say that the administrative authority vested
in director-generals is delegated from the Commission itself through single commissioners, with
the actions of each director-general being carried out under the supervision of the commissioner
(as part of the latter’s duty to supervise the overall functioning of his/her directorate(s)-general)
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and under his/her political responsibility (cf. 7.9.6).  The global operation of internal financial
control falls within the concept of the collective responsibility of the Commission as a whole.
4.9.6. For present purposes, the chain of delegation begins at the level of the Commission
through the commissioner.  She or he thus holds the ultimate responsibility for all financial
matters, including for internal control, and as a member of the College.
4.9.7. It is for the director-general to assume (overall) responsibility for all operational matters
in her/his directorate-general, including for internal control. Any subsequent delegation to
subordinate managers directly under the director-general should be established by the latter in a
specific document covering the order of delegation and the precise competences delegated. In
this order of delegation the manager directly under the director-general is answerable to the
latter for the management of his/her directorate/unit. This delegation of responsibility and
accountability also covers internal control. Every subordinate manager is responsible and
accountable for the internal control within his/her field of responsibility.
4.9.8. Accordingly, whatever the delegation of authority, the director-general bears primary
managerial responsibility, as delegated to her/him by the relevant commissioner, for setting up
and ensuring the smooth functioning of efficient and effective control systems that guarantee
that regulations are adhered to and that established strategies, policies and plans are followed.
4.9.9. Notwithstanding the chain of responsibilities outlined here, it is important that
consistency in financial rules and procedures be maintained across directorates-general.  It
would be the overarching role of the central financial unit in DG XIX (see 4.9.2-3) to ensure
this.
Financial operations - procedures
4.9.10. Within the system of delegation set up in any given directorate-general, specific
individuals will, as at present, have the task of authorising financial operations.  Under Title V
of the Financial Regulation, these persons, the authorising officers, are already (in theory)
personally responsible for the regularity of the operation in question.  For this responsibility to
operate in practice, there should, as this chapter has already argued, be no formal procedure
whereby the financial proposal is "vetted" or approved by a third party as a precondition of it
taking place.
4.9.11. None of this is to say that there should not be safeguards in the system.  In terms of the
quality of the preparation of financial transactions, each authorising officer will have the
resources of the directorate-general’s specialised financial cell at his/her disposal in accordance
with the internal procedures put in place by the director-general.  In particularly difficult and/or
complex cases, the authorising officer should also be able to call on the expertise of the central
financial unit in DG XIX for advice.87
                                                
87 This unit would incorporate the "advisory unit on contracts" referred to in chapter 2.
4.9.12. Furthermore, the intervention of the accounting officer should remain in place, through
the presence of a delegated accounting officer in each directorate-general.  The need for all
operations to be booked in the Commission’s accounts will continue to exist, implying the
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existence of an individual carrying out this role.  Moreover, the formal aspects of a transaction
(presentation, presence of requisite signatures, authority of authorising officer to sign for the
amount concerned, etc.), together with the availability of appropriations, should be verified by
the accounting officer.  A refusal on the part of the delegated accounting officer to implement a
transaction should be referred back immediately to the authorising officer who should then
decide, on his own responsibility, whether to overrule the objection and proceed with the
operation. The provision of the Financial Regulation whereby the functions of authorising and
accounting officer are separate (see para. 4.1.5) should therefore be maintained. (It should be
noted that further proposals made below will affect the exact role of accounting officers - these
do not however affect his/her participation in the implementation process)
Accounting and reporting
4.9.13. A further vital component of any system based on the "responsibilisation" of authorising
officers is an adequate system of monitoring, accounting and reporting.  At present, the accounts
of the Commission are maintained for official purposes solely by DG XIX.  In the view of the
Committee, though it is necessary that consolidated accounts be maintained for the Commission
as a whole, a system whereby responsibility for financial management is decentralised to the
directorates-general implies that official accounts should also be drawn up at that level.
4.9.14. The Committee therefore recommends that each directorate-general be obliged to
prepare an annual report and accounts covering all its activities.  In accordance with general
public and private sector practice, this document should not only contain information of a
financial nature, but should also review the activities of the directorate-general more widely,
indicating its activities in pursuit of policy objectives and assessing its success in achieving
those objectives.  This report should bear the certificate of the internal auditor as to the
reliability of the accounts and be submitted, first, to the Commission as a whole by the
competent commissioner and, second, by the Commission as a whole to the competent
institutions as part of the annual discharge procedure.
4.9.15. This proposal is intended to be more radical in its effects than in the new workload it
imposes on the Commission.  Most, if not all, the information to be included within the annual
report is already published (and thus prepared) by Commission services in an array of separate
reports, brochures, accounts, etc.  So far however, this has never been done in such a way as to
make the clear link between the management structures through which policy and expenditure
are implemented and the outcome of policies and expenditure.  Under the Committee’s
proposals, this link, which is one of responsibility, is made explicit in order to reinforce the
chain of accountability.
4.9.16. If accounts are to be formalised at the level of directorates-general, there are implications
for the function of accounting officer.  For this reason too,  each directorate-general will require
its own delegated accounting officer.
4.9.17. The system proposed is one which, if the accounts are to be meaningful, relies upon a
greater degree of logic and homogeneity in the division of financial responsibility between
directorates-general than currently exists. (See especially chapter 2)
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Enforcement of authorising officers’ responsibility
4.9.18. From the outset, this chapter has recognised that responsibility must be more than an
abstract concept.  If the principle is to be workable in the long run, specific administrative
sanctions, possibly including of a monetary nature, must be available to back up the notion of
responsibility in cases where authorising officers grievously fail in their obligations to the
institution.
4.9.19. Theoretically, a general possibility already exists under the Staff Regulations to oblige
an official "to make good, in whole or in part, any damage suffered by the Communities as a
result of serious misconduct on his part in he course of or in connection with the performance of
his duties"88 This possibility, which in any case is not limited to financial matters, has, to the
best of the Committee’s knowledge, never been used to exact monetary compensation from an
official.  (Chapter 6 further examines the possible disciplinary procedures.)
4.9.20. However, the starting point for fixing the individual financial responsibilities of
authorising officers lies in the specifically financial provisions of the European Union, namely
the Financial Regulation.
4.9.21. Title V of the Financial Regulation, entitled "Responsibilities of authorising officers,
financial controllers, accounting officers and administrators of advance funds", establishes the
principle that individuals bear a personal responsibility for their actions:
"Authorising officers who, when establishing entitlements to be recovered or issuing recovery
orders, entering into a commitment of expenditure or signing a payment order do so without
complying with this Financial Regulation and the rules for its implementation, shall render
themselves liable to disciplinary action and, where appropriate, to payment of compensation."89
4.9.22. Later in Title V, an indication is given of how this liability might be applied:
"The liability to payment of compensation and disciplinary action of authorising officers ... may
be determined in accordance with the provisions of Articles 22 and 86 to 89 of the Staff
Regulations"90 (emphasis added)
4.9.23. The Financial Regulation foresees the possibility therefore (note: not the obligation) of
"operationalising" the liability of authorising officers through the disciplinary procedures under
the terms of the Staff Regulations.  The difficulties associated with disciplinary procedures were
mentioned in the Committee’s First Report, and are discussed in detail in Chapter 6 of the
present report, where recommendations are made for improvements.  In the case of the highly
specific subject of financial misconduct, the difficulties are particularly serious as nature of the
supposed misconduct in question adds extra complications to the process of establishing the
responsibility of an official, insofar as specific accounting/financial methods are necessary.
                                                
88 Staff Regulations, Article 22
89 Financial Regulation, Article 73 (extract)
90 Financial Regulation, Article 76 (extract)
4.9.24. With these problems in mind, the Committee considers that the formal establishment of
the responsibility of authorising officers, and any subsequent liability, should be through a new,
separate and specific procedure, limited to strictly financial affairs and governed by the
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Financial Regulation.  In this respect, however, Title V of the Financial Regulation, as currently
worded, is insufficiently specific concerning the mechanisms by which individual
responsibilities (and possible liabilities) can be established.
4.9.25. First, it is necessary that the financial irregularity and the persons concerned be
identified. As indicated above, this is a job which requires specific financial/accounting know-
how and respect for correct procedure.  Moreover, the body performing this function must be
independent of the service to which the authorising officer belongs.  The Committee therefore
believes that the Internal Audit Service (whose creation is proposed later in this chapter) should
report, according to its usual procedures, on individual cases of financial irregularity and
identify the authorising officers concerned.  It should do this either on its own initiative, under
the responsibility of its Head, on the basis of facts emerging in the course of its normal work, or
on the basis of a (duly justified) request from the President, the competent commissioner or a
director-general.
4.9.26. Second, the personal responsibility of the individual must be fixed. This should be the
task of a specialised financial irregularities committee, composed of persons with relevant
experience and attached directly to the Secretary-general.  This committee would deliberate on
the basis of the reports described above.
4.9.27. The task of the committee described above would simply be to establish and identify the
responsibility of an authorising officer. It could do so in a variety of ways, depending on the
seriousness of the case. This process, which is purely administrative in nature, could then be
followed up, if necessary, by disciplinary procedures.
4.9.28. To conclude, the Committee recommends that the Title V of the Financial Regulation be
amended to provide for the procedure outlined above.
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INTERNAL AUDIT
4.10. Internal v. External Audit
4.10.1. Audit in the public sector has - or should have - a dual function, reflected in the
existence of two forms of audit, external and internal. The purpose of  external audit is to
provide the taxpayer with assurance that public money is being spent in a manner which respects
the principles of legality, regularity and sound financial management91.  It can therefore be seen
as “public interest” audit.  Such audit is external because it must be completely separate from,
and thus independent of, the auditee.  Such audit seeks objectively to analyse revenue and
expenditure and to identify the problems and issues which should be made public.
4.10.2. By contrast, the internal auditor provides a powerful tool by which the “management” of
the organisation can achieve its objectives with maximum efficiency and at the same time help
instill the sense of responsibility in its line managers necessary for effective internal control.  In
this respect, internal audit in the public sector is more closely related to the conventional internal
audit function in the private sector, whose function is not necessarily to make public the
weaknesses and irregularities it detects, but to report them to the management in order that
remedial action may be taken.  It follows that the internal audit service answers only to “top
management” and occupies a position of independence within the structure of the organisation.
4.11. The weakness of the present internal audit function
4.11.1. Two related issues lie at the heart of DG XX's audit problems.  First, as already stated,
the independence of the Financial Controller vis-à-vis the auditee is compromised by the mere
fact that, at present, both the visa and audit functions fall under her/his responsibility as director-
general of DG XX.  One branch of the directorate-general therefore potentially audits the actions
of the other. Second, and in the light of experience more importantly, the Financial Controller
does not enjoy the position of authority with respect to other Commission services which is
needed to make her/his independence truly operational.  In practice, the position of DG XX as
just one directorate-general among others, and the corresponding position of the Financial
Controller as just one high-level nominee among others, compromises her/his ability to translate
audit findings into management action.
4.11.2. The most telling confirmation of this problem comes in the observation that numerous
"sensitive" reports drafted by DG XX auditors have been the subject of lengthy contradictory
procedures, often with the effect, and, one suspects, the intention, of delaying the report - and
any consequent action - by periods of several months.  Leaving aside for the present the need to
introduce concrete measures to reduce the time taken for contradictory procedures to a
reasonable level, these discussions tend to take on the nature of a negotiation between fellow
director-generals.  In this process, the purpose of audit - the detection and rectification of
                                                
91 Cf. TEC Article 248 (ex 188c) Para. 2.: "The Court of Auditors shall examine whether all revenue has
been received and all expenditure incurred in a lawful and regular manner and whether the financial
management has been sound. In doing so, it shall report in particular on any cases of irregularity." In
the Community context, this activity falls within a duty to assist the discharge authority (Art. 276 (ex
206) TEC)
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irregularities, the identification of systemic weaknesses and proposal of corrective action - does
not necessarily take first place, being potentially overshadowed by the wish of both parties to
come out of the process looking as good as possible.
4.11.3. Nor is the situation helped by the fact that the commissioner responsible for financial
control/audit matters has a relative position, vis-à-vis fellow commissioners, each with their own
interests, which is exactly analogous to that of the Financial Controller with respect to fellow
director-generals.  Once again internal audit is, as it were, unable to impose itself.
4.11.4. The underlying problem is that the internal audit service is not perceived as a central
department at the service of the entire Commission, both as a guarantor of financial regularity
and as a mechanism through which the financial management of the Commission can be
improved, but as an antagonist and a competing service with its own interests to play for.92
4.11.5. It is a noteworthy irony that, whatever the Commission’s weaknesses in the field of
internal audit, it demands high standards of others.  For example, one of the criteria for the
accreditation of national EAGGF paying agencies is that they “normally dispose of … [an]
internal audit service: the objective [of which] … shall be to ensure that the agency’s system of
internal control operates effectively; the internal audit service shall be independent of the
agency’s other departments and shall report directly to the agency’s top management”.93
4.12. What is internal audit?94
Definition
4.12.1. “The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA)", an international professional organisation for
internal auditors, publishes definitions, professional standards, ethical rules, etc. for the exercise
of the internal auditing profession.  It has recently issued a new draft definition of internal audit:
"Internal auditing is an independent and objective assurance and consulting activity that
is guided by a philosophy of  adding value to improve the operations of the organisation.
It assists an organisation in accomplishing its objectives by bringing a systematic and
disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of the organisation’s risk
management, control and governance processes. Professionalism and a commitment to
excellence are facilitated by operating within a framework of professional practice
established by The Institute of Internal Auditors.”95
                                                
92 Though the Commission itself has recognised the need to extend and reinforce the internal audit
function (SEM 2000, recommendation 6), it has not satisfactorily addressed the issue of its relative
position vis-à-vis the rest of the Commission.
93 Commission Regulation (EC) 1663/95 of 7.7.95 (OJ L158 of 8.7.95) – c.f. above, at para. 3.8.3
94 This section relies on the definitions on internal audit prepared by the Institute of Internal Auditors
(IIA).  All quotations are from the IIA's website at www.theiia.org
95 Draft "definition of Internal audit" - 11 January 1999 (www.theiia.org/GTF/Iadef.htm)
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4.12.2. In the context of the Commission, there are a number of salient points in this definition:
• internal audit is an instrument which "adds value" to the activities of an
organisation, it is thus a tool for management,
• internal audit is within the organisation, but is independent and objective
• internal audit is a profession
Objective and scope
4.12.3.  Again according to the IIA, Internal Audit exists "to assist members of the organization
in the effective discharge of their responsibilities". To this end, it "furnishes them with analyses,
appraisals, recommendations, counsel, and information concerning the activities reviewed. ...
The members of the organization assisted by internal auditing include those in management and
the board of directors."
4.12.4. The tasks of the internal auditor range from traditional financial audit to value-for-money
or "performance audit" and are summed up by the IIA as follows:
 [To] review the reliability and integrity of financial and operating information and the means
used to identify, measure, classify, and report such information.
 [To] review the systems established to ensure compliance with those policies, plans, procedures,
laws, regulations, and contracts which could have a significant impact on operations and reports,
and should determine whether the organization is in compliance.
 [To] review the means of safeguarding assets and, as appropriate, verify the existence of such
assets.
 [To] appraise the economy and efficiency with which resources are employed.
 [To] review operations or programs to ascertain whether results are consistent with established
objectives and goals and whether the operations or programs are being carried out as planned.
96
Responsibility, authority and independence
4.12.5. The IIA describes the position of the internal audit department within an organisation as
follows:
"The internal auditing department is an integral part of the organization and functions
under the policies established by senior management and the board. The purpose,
authority and responsibility of the internal auditing department should be defined in a
formal written document (charter). The director of internal auditing should seek
approval of the charter by senior management as well as acceptance by the board. The
charter should make clear the purposes of the internal auditing department, specify the
unrestricted scope of its work, and declare that auditors are to have no authority or
responsibility for the activities they audit."
                                                
96 Cf. para 4.8.1. giving criteria for internal control
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4.12.6. Though part of the organisation, it is a fundamental principle that the internal audit
service should be independent of the activities it audits:
"Internal auditors should be independent of the activities they audit. Internal auditors are
independent when they can carry out their work freely and objectively. Independence
permits internal auditors to render the impartial and unbiased judgments essential to the
proper conduct of audits. It is achieved through organizational status and objectivity."
4.12.7. Finally, the IIA addresses the question of the internal status of the audit service:
"The organizational status of the internal auditing department should be sufficient to
permit the accomplishment of its audit responsibilities. The director of the internal
auditing department should be responsible to an individual in the organization with
sufficient authority to promote independence and to ensure a broad audit coverage,
adequate consideration of audit reports, and appropriate action on audit
recommendations." 97
4.12.8. The Committee makes no apology for quoting at length from the IIA, firstly because its
status as the relevant international professional organisation gives it unique authority, but
secondly, and perhaps more importantly for present purposes, because its preoccupations
concerning the scope, objectives, status and independence of internal auditors reflect so
accurately the problems encountered in the Commission’s present audit arrangements.
4.13. A framework for internal audit in the Commission
4.13.1. The likely shape of any proposal for the future of audit in the Commission emerges
naturally from a combination of the analysis of its present defects (both in this and the
Committee’s first report) and the desiderata for internal audit outlined by the IIA.
Status and position within the organisation
4.13.2. It is by now quite clear that the Internal Audit Service can no longer remain part of one of
many directorates-general. This organisational position gives its auditors (up to and including the
Financial Controller) neither the authority vis-à-vis their colleagues in the Commission nor the
"direct line" to top management required by an effective internal audit service.
4.13.3. The Committee therefore proposes that there be a specialised Internal Audit Service,
outside the regular structure of directorates-general, reporting directly to the President of the
Commission.98  The President of the Commission is the only figure in the Commission who is
free of sectoral interests (insofar as he is institutionally competent for all the activities of the
Commission) and who has the authority to draw the necessary conclusions from the results of
audits.  In line with the vision of internal audit outlined above, the Committee would envisage
                                                
97 Series of quotations from the "Statement of Responsibilities of Internal Auditing" (originally issued by
the IIA in 1947, most recently revised in 1997).
98 The President may wish, for internal organisational reasons, to delegate his competences vis-à-vis the
Internal Audit Service to a vice-president of the Commission (though no lower than that), but should in
any case retain responsibility for the action taken in respect of its findings.
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the Audit Service working as a diagnostic tool in the hands of the President, enabling him to
identify structural and organisational weaknesses in the Commission and the specific, even
isolated, problems which may arise from them.  Clearly therefore, the president should be able to
instruct the Audit Service to carry out specific tasks on an ad hoc basis and take the management
action indicated by the results.
4.13.4. Though this definition of internal audit is one which applies throughout the world of
major public and private sector organisations, one objection - drawn perhaps from experience - is
predictable.  Whereas in the private sector the head of an organisation has a direct incentive, in
the shape of the "bottom line" by which he/she is judged, to maximise its efficiency and to root
out all forms of waste, does the head of the Commission share such an incentive?  Indeed, might
his interest, as a political appointee, be to conceal inefficiencies, waste or even fraud?
4.13.5. The very fact that this question can (reasonably) be asked reveals the extent to which
democratic accountability has been undermined in the Commission.  The key to the previous
paragraph’s comparison between the head of a major private corporation and the President of the
Commission lies in the word "judged".  While it is true that the basis of the judgement exercised
may be different, it nevertheless remains a basic point of principle that both are accountable, the
former to the shareholders, the latter to the public at large, through the European Parliament.
The problem is that the accountability of the latter is a more complicated matter.
4.13.6. Indeed, the availability to the president of an effective internal audit function is part of
the broader picture by which the Committee hopes to reinforce accountability and in itself
reinforces the sense of responsibility felt by officials.
4.13.7. Nor should the nature of the Internal Audit service itself be forgotten.  As this chapter has
been at pains to emphasise, internal audit is a profession.  As such, it has professional standards,
practices and ethics.  These must be written into a basic document - a "charter"99  - which sets
out the competences, objectives, powers, status, etc. of the service.  The officials of the Internal
Audit service must be correspondingly qualified professional auditors, up to and including the
Head of the service.
4.13.8. The Head of the Internal Audit Service is clearly an important figure, akin to, though
with important distinctions, today’s Financial Controller. First, the administrative grade of the
individual concerned should be equivalent to that of a director-general: anything less would
immediately compromise the status of the service100.  Second, the individual concerned must be
a highly qualified and experienced member of the auditing profession, to which end it would
probably be necessary, or at least desirable, on most occasions to appoint the person concerned
from outside the institution on the basis of a specific recruitment notice.101   Third,
notwithstanding the fact that the Internal Audit Service responds to the President, the Head  of
                                                
99 See para. 4.12.5
100 As UCLAF has learnt to its cost...
101 Though not exactly analogous, one could compare this requirement with the formal stipulations about
the qualifications of members of the Court of Auditors (EC Treaty Article 247 (ex 188b)) or the
requirements for the Director of OLAF and the members of its Supervisory Committee (Regulation
(EC)1073/1999).  By contrast to these cases however, the Head of the Internal Audit Service should be
nominated by the Commission on the proposal of the President.
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the service must maintain full independence as to the conduct of the audits, the maintenance of
professional standards, the contents of reports, etc.  On paper, this independence is less complete
than that currently enjoyed by the Financial Controller, but in practice the new status of the
Audit Service should provide a more favourable "balance of power" and thus greater
independence vis-à-vis operational services of the Commission.
Selection of auditsError! Bookmark not defined.
4.13.9. The "charter" of the audit service should include provisions designed to ensure periodic
full coverage of the Commission's activities.  To this end, the work programme of the Audit
Service should be approved by the President on the basis of a proposal by the Head of the Audit
Service which takes into account the need to ensure that the Audit Service meets the objectives
set out in its charter.  At the same time, the Internal Audit Service must remain responsive to
management requirements.  Some elasticity or "headroom" should therefore be built into the
work programme in order to allow for extra audit work arising at short notice.  In particular, the
President must have the possibility to order special audits in accordance with needs arising.
Conduct of audits
4.13.10.   The basic principles governing the conduct of audits, be they within the Commission
or "on-the-spot in Member States, need not be significantly different from those currently
applying to DG XX officials, which provide for full and unrestricted access to all relevant
documentation.  Problems have arisen in the past more in connection with the formulation of
audit reports.
4.13.11.   The internal "contradictory procedure" (i.e. the right of reply of the auditee) has been
the source of substantial difficulties in the past (see first report).  Though there must be a right of
reply, and the replies of the auditee should, where necessary, be published together with the audit
report, the auditee should not be able to either "negotiate" the contents of an audit report or delay
its finalisation.  This is not to say that the auditee should not have the opportunity to correct
material errors of fact in the audit report before it is finalised, but that its intervention should not
go beyond this factual level.  Where divergences of opinion or interpretation subsist between
auditor and auditee, these can be dealt with by way of a parallel publication of observation and
reply.
4.13.12.   In any case, the contradictory procedure (beginning when the draft report is first
forwarded to the auditee and concluding with the finalisation of the report) should not last longer
than one month.  As a point of principle, after the month has lapsed, the decision on when, and
under what conditions, to finalise an audit report must lie exclusively with the Head of the
Internal Audit Service.
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Follow-up of audits
4.13.13. Under the scheme proposed by the Committee, the action to be taken as the result of
audit findings necessarily falls to the President of the Commission within the context of his
management competences.  No prescriptive approach is therefore possible in terms of follow-up
to audit reports.
4.13.14. In a spirit of transparency however, the measures taken by the President, and, as a
consequence, by other Commission managers, should be a matter of record.  This can be
achieved in two ways.  Firstly, the Internal Audit Service must publish an annual report outlining
its activities, summarising its most important findings and describing the action taken in
response by the Commission’s services.  This annual report should be presented by the President
to the Commission and should be made public.  Secondly, all reports finalised by the Internal
Audit Service should be made available to the Court of Auditors.  This will permit the Court to
monitor the concrete action taken by the Commission in response to audit observations.
Relations with the Court of Auditors
4.13.15. The professional quality of the work of the Internal Audit Service must be sufficient
for the external auditor of the Commission to be able to rely on it. In order to maximise the
potential benefits, there should be regular contacts between the Court of Auditors and the
Internal Audit Service at both the programming and implementation stages of their work. Full
access to the audit data of the Internal Audit Service for the Court must be assured, meaning in
practice that, beyond the simple communication of audit reports, all the underlying audit files of
the Internal Audit Service (i.e. "raw" audit data, observations, etc.) must be accessible to the
Court for use in the course of its audit work.
Resources
4.13.16. It is not for the Committee to decide on staffing levels in the Commission.  However,
it is legitimate to point out, as it did in its first report, that the number of staff currently dedicated
to internal/systems audit in the Commission is derisory (13).  To be effective the Internal Audit
Service which will replace the DG XX internal audit unit must enjoy an adequate level of
resources.
4.14. General Inspectorate of Services (IGS
4.14.1. The IGS was set up in 1991 to fill a perceived need in the management of the
Commission for an internal inspection service.  Between 1991 and 1999, it has grown from a
staff strength of 20 to 35. The IGS is of guaranteed independence and is attached directly to the
President of the Commission, who specifically mandates its inspections. Its tasks are briefly as
follows:
• to check and assess the respect by Commission services for regulations and
procedures and their consequences,
• to check and assess the use of human and financial resources within the
Commission in relation to the tasks of the departments concerned,
• to check and assess the cost-effectiveness of Commission services.
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4.14.2. To carry out this job, IGS inspectors have unrestricted access to Commission services.
Their  reports are subject to a contradictory procedure with the heads of the services concerned,
and are communicated on a confidential basis, together with an opinion of the Legal Service and
with the agreement of the Secretary-General, to the President of the Commission.  Any follow-
up action is decided upon by the President as is the question of whether or not to publish the
report.
4.14.3. It is the experience of the Committee that IGS reports are frequently of high quality, with
perceptive analysis of the operation of Commission services and useful recommendations.  The
follow-up which is given to them is, by and large, far less impressive.  The Committee would
therefore be in favour of strengthening the position of the IGS.
4.14.4. The means for doing so is implicit in the preceding paragraphs which show that the
underlying rationale of the IGS is extremely close, if not identical, to that of the proposed
Internal Audit Service, in that both are essentially analytical tools at the disposal of management
for the attainment of maximum value for money.  In the light of the competences to be given to
the Internal Audit Service, the IGS has no need to continue as a separate service.  It is thus a
short step to envisage a rationalisation whereby the staff and activities of the current IGS be
subsumed within the Internal Audit Service.  The Committee would recommend this course of
action.
4.15. Organisational consequences
4.15.1. The recommendations of this report concerning internal control and internal audit affect
all directorates-general carrying out financial operations. Given the structural changes in course
under SEM 2000, with its introduction of specific financial services in all directorates-general,
the organisational consequences for the administrative structure as a whole are not radical.  Two
services however are more fundamentally affected. First, DG XX. Staff involved in internal audit
should normally find a place in the new Internal Audit Service, subject to verification of their
qualifications.  On the other hand, the vast majority of the staff - currently occupied, directly or
indirectly, with ex ante control of financial operations - would have to be redeployed, where
needed.  It should again be stressed that the two present functions of DG XX are completely
separate activities.  Staff involved in ex-ante control are not auditors and would have no
automatic claim on positions in the Audit Service.  On the other hand, their technical knowledge
of financial procedures and the Financial Regulation, should make them valuable to operational
directorates-general throughout the Commission. Second, the IGS. As we have seen above, the
IGS would find its place as a department within the new Internal Audit Service.
4.15.2. As far as the Financial Controller is concerned, it is evident that this role, as delineated in
the Financial Regulation, ceases to exist.
4.16. The use made by the Commission of the audit findings of the Court of
Auditors
4.16.1. The main source of audit information for the Commission will (and should) be its own
Internal Audit Service.  However, a second important source of useful audit results and valuable
comment is provided by the Court of Auditors, both directly, in the form of reports and opinions,
and indirectly, in the form of the "political" recommendations and observations formulated by
-131-
the European Parliament and the Council on the basis of the Court’s findings. The present section
looks briefly at how the work of the external auditor is transformed into management action by
the Commission and at possible means by which the Commission might be encouraged to draw
more fruitfully on the audit work of the Court.
4.16.2. In looking at how the Commission makes use of the Court of Auditors’ work, it is
necessary to look at two separate processes: first, the translation of the Court’s own observations
into management action and, second, the action taken on the recommendations of the institutions
to whom the Court reports, notably in the context of the discharge procedure.
Audit coverage
4.16.3. The Court’s work programme is aimed at, on the one hand, carrying out the compulsory
tasks set out for it in the Treaty (e.g. a "Statement of Assurance", an annual report) and, on the
other, covering, firstly, an adequate range of themes, firstly in any given year, and, secondly, the
near entirety of budgetary activity over a longer cyclical timespan.  Audits of the Commission
are usually theme-based rather than organisation-based, i.e. they focus on specific activities or
policy areas rather than on defined departments or services.102
Nature of audit observations
4.16.4. A close reading of the Commission’s replies to Court’s reports, and the testimony of those
involved in the process of auditing the Commission, point towards a defensively antagonistic
reaction from the Commission to the Court’s observations.  The Commission could be persuaded
into a more constructive reaction if the Court, working with exactly the same audit techniques
and findings, were to present its observations in a more analytical style, giving an overview of
the situation encountered by the Court more tailored to the management needs of the
Commission.  This would probably involve a greater emphasis on department-based auditing
(which would incidentally allow management responsibilities to be identified (and felt) more
keenly), but would have little substantive effect on the way the Court does its job.
DAS
4.16.5. A similar problem of enabling the Commission to make use of audit results arises in
connection with the Statement of Assurance (universally known by its French acronym
"DAS"103).  The findings of the DAS, which by necessity come down to a statistical analysis of
"error rates" in financial management, are extremely difficult to relate to the systems and
services of the Commission.  It would be helpful to the Commission, Member States and other
readers of the DAS if the Court could indicate with greater precision which sector, systems and
procedures, and, in the case of shared management, which Member States, are mainly affected
by errors, and indeed the nature of the errors.
                                                
102 An exception to this rule is UCLAF, which was subject to a departmental audit
(Special report 8/97 - see chapter 5)
103
"Déclaration d'Assurance" - see EC Treaty article 248(1) (ex 188c)
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Timing of reports
4.16.6. If the impact on the Commission of external audit findings are to be maximised, there is
some scope for the Court to accelerate the production of its reports.  The possible measures, in
terms of the scope of audits, programming, internal procedures, etc. are an internal matter for the
Court.  Suffice it to say here that the fewer the pretexts given to the Commission not to take
Court audits seriously the better.
The Contradictory Procedure
4.16.7. Draft reports of the Court of Auditors are submitted to the auditee in order for the latter to
formulate replies.  Within a deadline of two months, representatives of the two institutions meet
in order, as far as possible, to agree each other’s text with a view to publication of the report.  In
its initial draft replies, the Commission in particular tends to "bid high" with excessively
categorical statements, in the knowledge that language and content will be moderated in the
course of the contradictory procedure, which it sees as a procedure to "tone  down" the Court’s
report as much as possible.  In other words, the process strongly resembles a negotiation and
obscures the real purpose of the exercise, which is ultimately to identify the remedial action
required.
4.16.8. Thus, not only is this procedure time-consuming - even when respected deadlines are
excessive - but it also reveals the unconstructive attitude of the Commission to the audit process.
4.17. Parliamentary budgetary control
4.17.1. The second source of external audit "findings" for the Commission comes by way of the
European Parliament, acting in its capacity as discharge authority (with the Council in a
subsidiary role).  Chapter 7 of this report discusses the principle and operation of democratic
accountability to Parliament in depth, and the reader is thus referred to that part of report for
comment on the relationship between Parliament and Commission.
4.17.2. Parliament, upon whose observations the Commission is bound to act, thus translates
external audit findings into political recommendations for action.
4.17.3. The changes to the Treaty introduced in Maastricht and Amsterdam have considerably
strengthened Parliament’s hand in the audit-based exercise of budgetary control over the
Commission, both in terms of the ammunition provided by the Court and in the use it can make
of it.  If the Court and the Parliament work effectively as a team, with the Court’s reports being
timely and relevant and the Parliament’s use of them thorough and incisive, external audit in the
European Union takes on a new and fruitful dynamic.
4.17.4. Formal powers are not the whole story, however, and the Commission still has to be
obliged in practical terms to react positively to the political recommendations based on external
audit findings.  At the moment, it is not clear whether the institutions are achieving the desired
result.  The Committee has already criticised Council for its lack of interest in following up
Court reports104 and though Parliament has been more active, its lack of the necessary
                                                
104 First report: paragraph 9.4.12
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institutional powers have until recently hampered serious efforts to "operationalise" Court
reports105.  The underlying difficulty however remains the one already identified, that the
Commission does not treat the discharge as a constructive process, but as an annual ordeal to be
gone through. The remedy is similar to that outlined in respect of the Court of Auditors and
largely lies with the Commission itself.  This has been the subject of this chapter: internal reform
in the Commission.
4.18. Recommendations
4.18.1. The existence of a procedure whereby all transactions must receive the explicit prior
approval of a separate financial control service has been a major factor in relieving Commission
managers of a sense of personal responsibility for the operations they authorise while at the same
time doing little or nothing to prevent serious irregularities of the sort analysed in the
Committee’s First Report.  Moreover, the combination of this function with a (weak) internal
audit function in a single directorate-general gives rise to potential conflicts of interest on the
part of the Financial Controller.  Thus a serious rethink of both internal control and internal audit
is necessary.
4.18.2. A professional and independent Internal Audit Service, the competences and activities of
which should be based upon the relevant international standards (Institute of Internal Auditors),
should be established, reporting directly to the President of the Commission. The centralised pre-
audit function in DG XX should be dispensed with and internal control - as an integrated part of
line responsibility - decentralised to the directorates-general.  One of the principal tasks of the
proposed Internal Audit Service should be to audit the efficiency and effectiveness of these
decentralised control systems.  (c.f. 4.18.16 below) (4.7.1-2, 4.9.8, 4.13.3, 7)
4.18.3. Chains of delegation should be made clear and explicit: every subordinate manager is
responsible and accountable for internal control in his/her field of responsibility. It is for the
director-general (and heads of independent services) to assume (overall) responsibility for all
operational matters in her/his directorate-general or service, including for internal control. The
chain of delegation begins at the level of the Commission through the commissioner.  She or he
thus holds ultimate managerial responsibility for all financial matters, including for financial
control, and political responsibility as a member of the College. (4.9.5-9)
4.18.4. Each directorate-general should have at its disposal two basic prerequisites for effective
financial management : (i) a specialised internal control function, exercised under the
responsibility of a senior official reporting directly to the director-general; (ii) an accounting
function, exercised under the responsibility of a delegated accounting officer.  The latter would
work under the functional supervision of the Commission’s accounting officer, but be
responsible for keeping the accounts and processing the financial operations exclusively of the
directorate-general in which it is located.
4.18.5. Each directorate-general should produce its own annual financial report and accounts,
audited by the Commission’s internal auditor, including both financial information and a wider
review of the directorate-general’s activities. These reports should be examined first by the
                                                
105 See chapter 7
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Commission, which should then submit them to the competent institutions as part of the
discharge procedure.  (4.9.13-17)
4.18.6. The Internal Audit Service should act under the responsibility and authority of the
President of the Commission, independently of any other Commission service. It should above
all be a diagnostic tool in the hands of the President, enabling him/her to identify structural and
organisational weaknesses in the Commission.  The competences, objectives, powers and status
of this Service should be set out in a basic founding document (a “charter”) The work
programme of the Internal Audit Service should ensure periodic coverage of all Commission
activities.  It should however leave headroom for additional ad hoc audit tasks to be carried out
at the request of the President and/or on the basis of needs arising.  (4.13.3, 7, 9)
4.18.7. The Head of the Internal Audit Service should be a highly qualified and experienced
member of the auditing profession, recruited specifically for this task.  S/he should hold and
administrative grade equivalent to that of a director general.  The Head of the Internal Audit
Service, though reporting to the President, should enjoy full independence as to the conduct of
audits, the maintenance of professional standards, the contents of reports, etc. (4.13.8)
4.18.8. The internal contradictory procedure between the Internal Audit Service and its auditees
should last at most one month, whereafter publication of the audit report should take place at the
discretion of the Head of the Internal Audit Service.  (4.13.11-12)
4.18.9. The President of the Commission should present to the Commission each year an annual
report of the Internal Audit Service, outlining its activities, principal findings and the action
taken, or to be taken, by the President as a result.  This report should be made public.  (4.13.13-
14)
4.18.10. All audit reports of the Internal Audit Service should be sent to the Court of Auditors.
Additionally, all data collected by the Service, all preparatory work and audit findings should be
available to the Court and be of sufficient professional quality to be used by it. (4.13.15)
4.18.11. The present General Inspectorate of Services (IGS) should be integrated into the new
Internal Audit Service.
4.18.12. A central specialised unit, responsible for the formulation and oversight of financial
procedures and internal control mechanisms should be constituted within DG XIX.  This body
should have no role in individual transactions (though it could, in difficult cases, offer advice),
but should establish Commission-wide procedures and ground rules for financial management
and monitor their application. (4.9.1-3)
4.18.13. All officials involved in financial procedures should undergo compulsory and regular
training in the rules and techniques applying to financial management as a precondition of being
allocated such work. (4.9.1-2, 4, 11)
4.18.14. The formal aspects of financial transactions should be verified by the delegated
accounting officer.  Any objections should be referred back to the authorising officer, who
should decide, on his/her own responsibility, whether to overrule the objections and proceed with
the operation. (4.9.12)
-135-
4.18.15. A new and specific administrative procedure should be established, governed by (an
amended) Title V of the Financial Regulation, designed formally to establish the individual
responsibilities and/or liabilities of authorising officers in respect of financial errors and
irregularities.  To this end, a new Financial Irregularities Committee would deliberate on the
basis of reports from the Commission’s internal auditor.  Disciplinary or other action could
follow if necessary. (4.9.18-28)
4.18.16. In the light of the foregoing recommendations, the existing DG XX no longer has any
reason to exist.  DG XX staff qualified for audit work should be redeployed to the new Internal
Audit Service, while other staff should be redeployed, as needed, to other Commission services,
notably those requiring expertise in financial procedures.  (4.15.1-2)
4.18.17. The Court of Auditors could seek to obtain a more constructive reaction on the part of
the Commission to its audit observations through greater recourse to department-based auditing,
presenting its observations in a more analytical style, giving an overview of the situation it
encountered and placing greater emphasis on the management needs of the Commission.
(4.16.4)
4.18.18. It would be helpful if the Court were able in its Statement of Assurance (“DAS”) to
indicate with greater precision which sectors, systems and procedures, and, in the case of shared
management, which  Member States, are mainly affected by errors, and the nature of the errors
concerned. (4.16.5)
4.18.19. The duration of the contradictory procedure between the Court of Auditors and the
Commission (and other auditees) should be considerably shortened.  The process should not
assume the nature of a negotiation on the severity or otherwise of the Court’s observations but
seek only to establish the facts.  The underlying purpose of the Court’s audits should be to
identify the remedial management action required in the Commission to address the issues
identified by the Court (4.16.7).
Chapter 4 - ANNEX 1
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SEM 2000: Recommendations
Recommendation No 1: policy debate, in January, to determine the budget priorities for the
following year and highlight the limits on the priorities set.
Recommendation No 2: whenever policy decisions are taken, establish the full cost of any
proposal in terms of financial, human and other resources (link between the administrative
appropriations and operawting appropriations).
Recommendation No 3: introduction of system for making overall allocations to individual DGs
covering as many categories of administrative expenditure as possible.
Recommendation No 4: systematic evaluation for all Community programmes and action; DG
XIX and XX step up their work on improving cost-effectiveness and evaluation techniques.
Recommendation No 5: rationalisation of ex ante control using techniques based on methods
and tools such as statistical sampling and the results of systems audits and the quality of a
department’s financial management.
Recommendation No 6: DG XX will develop the internal audit function in depth and scope, on
the basis of an annual work programme adopted by the Commission itself, covering systems
audits, management audits, performance audits and accounting audits.
Recommendation No 7: departments to ensure, when drafting a regulation and at subsequent
stages ending with final adoption, that it is clear and amenable to control and contains
safeguards against attempted fraud.
Recommendation No 8: separation between the design/management/relations function and the
finance/resources function in departments and transformation of the latter function into a
‘counterweight’ within the DG.
Recommendation No 9: integrated resource management and setting-up of a human resource
management system similar to and synchronised with the system already in place for financial
resources.
Recommendation No 10: resource management experience should be an increasingly important
factor in decisions on appointments and promotions. Staff initialling or signing a financial
commitment will make a statement to the effect that no conflict of interests exists.
Recommendation No 11: possible changes to regulations (abolition of prior approval, extension
of the concept of ‘current expenditure’, enshrinement of internal audit system in legal texts, and
clarification of authorising officers’ liability).
 N.B. The Commission has deferred its decision on this point.
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DG XX (FINANCIAL CONTROL): FACTS AND FIGURES
(The following information is drawn from the Financial Controller’s
Annual Report for 1998 and Orientations for 1999)
Transactions
The following numbers of financial transactions were processed by the ex ante control
department of DG XX.
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 (est.)
Transactions 275.000 302.000 360.000 461.000 550.000 600.000
Av.days/transaction 6.9 5.9 5.1 4.8 4.4 4.0
Sampling (%) 60% 55% 48% 40% 30% 10%
Use of resources
The chart below shows the proportions of DG XX resources (staff time) dedicated to specific
activities in 1998.
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Audit activity
DG XX carried out 201 ex-post audits in 1998 (against 152 in 1997), plus three special
investigations (tourism, Security Office and Leonardo).  It plans 284 audits in 1999.
The chart below indicates the coverage of major policy areas (according to the categories of the
Financial Perspectives) by ex-post audits:
Staff
DG XX has 230 staff.  This figure has been stable since 1995.  They are currently deployed as
follows:
Advice on proposed legislation, financial systems and proposed transactions 39 staff
Ex ante control 57 staff
Audit 69 staff
Training and technical assistance 9 staff
Development of control and audit instruments 7 staff
Administration and other horizontal activities 49 staff
